Unequal Origins, Unequal Trajectories: Social Stratification over the Life Course. by Cheng, Siwei
 
i 
Unequal Origins, Unequal Trajectories: Social Stratification over the 
Life Course 
 
by 
 
Siwei Cheng 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Public Policy and Sociology) 
in the University of Michigan 
2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
Professor Yu Xie, Co-Chair 
Professor Mary E. Corcoran, Co-Chair 
Professor Jennifer S. Barber 
Professor Jeffrey Andrew Smith 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my co-chair in Sociology, Yu Xie, for his invaluable guidance 
and support in the past six years. I am very grateful to him not just for teaching me lots of things, 
but also for teaching me how little I know. He taught me that it is exactly the knowledge of our 
“knowing nothing” that pushes scholars to be extremely careful and cautious in searching for the 
truth. This is indeed an important piece of advice that I will keep in mind for many years 
throughout my research career. I am greatly indebted to my co-chair in Public Policy, Mary 
Corcoran, for her endless encouragement and support. When I started my dissertation work, I 
was better at speaking in equations than I was better at speaking in English. Mary always teaches 
me how to “translate” equations and statistical methods into clear, strong, and meaningful 
language.  
My other committee members have been tremendously helpful and supportive as I 
progressed through my dissertation. Jennifer Barber taught me how to be a devoted researcher at 
work and an excellent teacher in class. Her expertise in family demography has always been a 
valuable asset to me. She helps me identify the contributions of my papers, and pushes me to 
clarify them in the front end. Jeff Smith is the most sociology-friendly economist that I know. He 
is always generous with his comments and critiques. His knowledge and insights in statistical 
methods and their interpretations have helped me strengthen my work. 
My dissertation chapters have also benefited from the advice from a number of fellow 
students and scholars. My thanks also go to Hongwei Xu, Xiang Zhou, and participants of the 
  
 
iii 
Quantitative Methodology Seminar and the Inequality and Family Workshop at the University of 
Michigan, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of Chapter 2. Sasha Killewald and 
Margaret Gough both provided valuable comments and suggestions on multiple drafts of Chapter 
3. Paula England was very generous with her time and comments when I talked to her about 
Chapter 3 at a conference. 
I am deeply indebted to my friends and colleagues at the University of Michigan, without 
whom I would never have completed this dissertation. I acknowledge Barbara Anderson, N.E. 
Barr, Deirdre Bloome, Sarah Burgard, Elizabeth Bruch, Fan Fei, Cindy Glovinsky, Kim 
Greenwell, Tong Guo, Yoonsun Han, Minhee Kim, Huiyun Kim, Howard Kimeldolf, Qing Lai, 
Huitian Lei, Kathy Lin, Airan Liu, Xi Lu, Lin Ma, Rhonda Moats, Zheng Mu, Lisa Neidert, 
Xingyu Pan, Sojung Park, Qiang Wang, Xiao Wang, Geoff Wodtke, Luofu Ye, Chen Zhang, 
Xinyuan Zhang, Xiaolei Zhao, Wei Zhou, Yiwen Zhou.  
During my doctoral study, I received financial support from a National Institute of Child 
Health and Human Development (NICHD) training grant to the Population Studies Center at the 
University of Michigan, from Marshall Weinberg Research Fellowship, Joan B. Kessler Award, 
the Rackham Graduate School, and the Department of Sociology at the University of Michigan. 
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their unconditional support and encouragement. 
Special thanks are due to my dear husband Xiye, an economist who (surprisingly) took it very 
well when I said I do not entirely agree with economists, and who shared with me the most 
memorable moments of my Ph.D. life. 
  
 
 
  
 
iv 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. ii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................... viii 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1  Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2  A Life Course Trajectory Framework for Understanding the Intracohort 
Pattern of Wage Inequality ................................................................................................... 5 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 5 
LIFE COURSE TRAJECTORY AS THE BASIS FOR THE INTRACOHORT PATTERN OF WAGE 
INEQUALITY ........................................................................................................................................................ 8 
THREE ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES OF THE LCT FRAMEWORK .......................................................... 12 
Random Variability Property ................................................................................................................. 12 
Trajectory Heterogeneity Property ..................................................................................................... 14 
Cumulative Advantage Property ........................................................................................................... 16 
MATHEMATICAL FORMALIZATION OF THE LCT FRAMEWORK ...................................................... 19 
Model Setup ................................................................................................................................................... 19 
Deriving the Intracohort Pattern of Wage Inequality .................................................................. 24 
APPLICATION OF THE LCT FRAMEWORK: THE INTRACOHORT PATTERN OF WAGE 
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES ...................................................................................................... 29 
Data and Sample Restriction .................................................................................................................. 29 
Statistical Strategy ...................................................................................................................................... 35 
Testing for the Significance of Three Essential Properties of the LCT Framework ......... 39 
Assessing the Contributions of Three Mechanisms to the Observed Growth of Intracohort Wage 
Inequality ....................................................................................................................................................... 43 
AUXILIARY ANALYSES ................................................................................................................................... 49 
Introducing the Temporal Variation of Wage Growth Rate ....................................................... 49 
Introducing Time-varying Controls for Work and Family Domain Experiences ............... 51 
DISCUSSION OF LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................... 54 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................... 58 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................... 63 
Chapter 3  The Accumulation of (Dis)advantage: The Intersection of Gender and 
Race in the Long-Term Wage Effect of Marriage .......................................................... 93 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 93 
SHIFTING FROM STATIC TO LIFE COURSE APPROACH ...................................................................... 96 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................................... 98 
INTERSECTION OF GENDER AND RACE ................................................................................................ 100 
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES ............................................................................................................................ 102 
DATA, SAMPLE, AND MEASURES .............................................................................................................. 104 
Data ................................................................................................................................................................ 104 
Sample Restrictions................................................................................................................................. 104 
Measures ...................................................................................................................................................... 105 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY .................................................................................................................................. 108 
Selection Concerns .................................................................................................................................. 108 
Model Specification ................................................................................................................................. 109 
  
 
v 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS ................................................................................................................................... 112 
Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................................................. 112 
Analysis on Pooled Sample ................................................................................................................... 113 
Analysis on Separated Samples .......................................................................................................... 114 
Childbearing as a Mediating Mechanism ........................................................................................ 115 
Work Experience as a Mediating Mechanism ............................................................................... 117 
Quantitative Assessment of the Contributions of Mediating Mechanisms ....................... 120 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................... 121 
DISCUSSION OF LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................. 124 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................... 125 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 129 
Chapter 4  Risk-Sharing in the Family: Within-couple Inter-temporal 
Responsiveness in Labor Market Activities ............................................................... 178 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 178 
THREE THEORETICAL SHIFTS IN FAMILY RESEARCH ...................................................................... 183 
From the Unitary towards the Individualistic Perspective ..................................................... 183 
From the Static towards the Life Course Perspective ................................................................ 186 
From the Resource-sharing towards the Risk-sharing Perspective .................................... 188 
AN EMPIRICAL CASE: WITHIN-COUPLE INTER-TEMPORAL RESPONSIVENESS ...................... 191 
Why This Case? ......................................................................................................................................... 191 
Relation to Existing Theories .............................................................................................................. 194 
HETEROGENEITY IN THE DEGREE OF RESPONSIVENESS ............................................................... 196 
Gender and Degree of Inter-temporal Responsiveness ............................................................ 197 
Parenthood and Degree of Inter-temporal Responsiveness ................................................... 198 
RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................................................................... 199 
Timeline of Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 199 
Alternative Mechanisms and Identification Strategies ............................................................. 200 
DATA, MEASURES, AND MODELS ............................................................................................................. 203 
Data ................................................................................................................................................................ 203 
Measures ...................................................................................................................................................... 204 
Model Specifications ............................................................................................................................... 207 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS ................................................................................................................................... 210 
Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................................................. 210 
Responsiveness to Spouse’s Annual Income ................................................................................. 211 
Responsiveness to Spouse’s Annual Work Hours and Hourly Wage ................................... 213 
Heterogeneity in Within-couple Responsiveness by Parenthood Status .......................... 215 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: FAMILY RESEARCH RECONSIDERED ................................... 216 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 222 
Chapter 5  Conclusion and Future Research ............................................................ 246 
 
 
 
  
 
vi 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Summary of the essential properties, corresponding hypotheses, conditions in the 
mathematicla formalization, elements in the multilevel growth curve model, and the results 
from empirical analyses of the LCT framework. .............................................................................. 76 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the NLSY79 sample used in the empirical analysis .................. 77 
Table 3 Estimated coefficients from multilevel growth curve models predicting log hourly wage
 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 78 
Table 4 Contributions of trajectory heterogeneity, between-group cumulative advantage, and 
residual inequality to the observed intracohort growth of wage inequality .............................. 79 
Table 1.A Summary of key assumptions, alternative specifications, and implications of relaxing 
these assumptions of the LCT framework………………………………………………….80 
Table 1.C Calculated wage inequality in the macroeconomy and adjustment factor for the 
cross-year standardization of wage inequality…………………………………………..….84 
Table 1.D1   Selected coefficients from multilevel growth curve model predicting log hourly 
wage, using the piece-wise linear model…………………………………………………...85 
Table 1.D2  Estimated coefficients from multilevel growth curve models predicting log hourly 
wage, with controls for work and family domain experiences……………………………..87 
Table 1.E  Estimated coefficients from multilevel growth curve models predicting log hourly 
wage, with imputed values for missing hourly wage……………………………………….90 
Table 1.F   Mean and standard deviation of average log hourly wage in previous three years by 
response status in the current period, at different years of potential experience…………...91 
Table 5   Descriptive Statistics by Race and Gender ........................................................................... 144 
Table 6   Beginning, Ending, and Change in Marriage Wage Premium for White Male and 
Black Male ................................................................................................................................................. 145 
Table 7  Beginning, Ending, and Change in Marriage Wage Premium for White Female and 
Black Female ............................................................................................................................................. 146 
Table 8    Total Change in Marriage Wage Premium and Contributions of Childbearing and 
Work Experience, Expressed as Percentage of Wage .................................................................... 147 
Table 2.A.  A Taxonomy of Selection Problems………………………………………………151 
Table 2.B.  Statistics for Sample Restriction………………………………………………….152 
Table 2.D   Coefficients on Covariates in Fixed-effect Models Predicting Log Hourly Wage , 
Comparing Models with Different Controls for Selection into and out of 
Marriage………………………………………………………………………….………158 
Table 2.F1   Coefficients on Covariates in Fixed-effect Models Predicting Log Hourly Wage , 
Comparing Models with Different Controls for Medication Mechanisms (With and Without 
Controls for Childbearing)………………………………………………………………...164 
Table 2.F2   Coefficients on Covariates in Fixed-effect Models Predicting Log Hourly Wage , 
Comparing Models with Different Controls for Medication Mechanisms (With and Without 
Controls for Work Experience)………………………………………………………...…166 
Table 2.G   Test for Significance of Changes in MWP by Linear Splines……………………171 
Table 9  Demonstration of alternative mechanisms and identification strategies ......................... 235 
Table 10  Weighted descriptive status for the NLSY79 total sample and my analytic sample . 236 
Table 11   Effects of spousal annual work hours and hourly wage on the individual’s likelihood 
of transition between work status and annual work hours............................................................ 237 
Table 12  Summary of Empirical Results on the Significance of Inter-temporal Responsiveness 
  
 
vii 
and Gender Differences .......................................................................................................................... 238 
Table 13  Effect of spouse’s annual income on the respondent’s own labor supply, testing the 
heterogeneity by parenthood status ..................................................................................................... 239 
Table 14  Effects of spouse’s annual work hours and hourly wage on the respondent’s own labor 
supply, testing the heterogeneity by parenthood status ................................................................. 240 
Table 3.B  Weighted descriptive statistics of annual income, hourly wage, and annual work 
hours for the respondent and the spouse…………………………………………………..244 
 
 
 
  
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Schematic demonstration of the contributions of trajectory heterogeneity and 
cumulative advantage to the intracohort pattern of wage inequality. ....................... 73 
Figure 2 Predicted average log hourly wage by years of potential experience, by gender, 
race and educational groups ...................................................................................... 74 
Figure 3 Observed and predicted variance of log hourly wage by years of potential 
experience ................................................................................................................. 75 
Figure 1.D1  Predicted average log hourly wage by years of potential experience, by 
gender, race and educational groups as illustrations of the mechanism of cumulative 
advantage, the piecewise linear model……………………………………………..86 
Figure 1.D2   Residual variance in log hourly wage by years of potential experience, 
with and without controls for work and family domain experiences………………89 
Figure 1.F Share of nonresponses by years of potential experience, by gender, race, and 
educational attainment……………………………………………………………..92 
Figure 4 Graphic illustration of wage effect of marriage for men under the static and life 
course perspectives. ................................................................................................ 137 
Figure 5 Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage in Total Effect Model by Gender 
in Pooled Sample .................................................................................................... 138 
Figure 6 Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage in Total Effect Model by Gender 
and Race .................................................................................................................. 139 
Figure 7 Selection-adjusted Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage by Race in 
Models with Different Controls of Potential Mechanisms, Male ........................... 140 
Figure 8   Selection-adjusted Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage by Race in 
Models with Different Controls of Potential Mechanisms, Female........................ 142 
Figure 2.C1 Histogram of Years of Marriage among the Married by Race and Gender.154 
Figure 2.C2 Histogram of total number of years spent divorced among those who has 
ever divorced by race and gender………………………………………………….155 
Figure 2.D  Estimated Wage Premium by Years of Marriage by Race and Gender, with 
Different Controls for Selection into and out of Marriage (Lowess Smoothed)…..160 
Figure 2.E1  Descriptive Trajectories of the Number of Child(ren) in the Household by 
Years of Marriage………………………………………………………………….161 
Figure 2.E2  Descriptive Trajectories of Annual Hours Worked and Job Tenure by Years 
of Marriage………………………………………………………………………...162 
Figure 2.E3   Descriptive Trajectories of Annual Weeks Unemployed and Annual 
Weeks out of the Labor Force by Years of Marriage………………………………163 
Figure 2.G  Estimated MWP by Years of Marriage by Gender and Race, Using Linear 
  
 
ix 
Spline Functions…………………………………………………………...………170 
Figure 2.H  Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with selection 
out of marriage controlled for by interacting the proportion of total years in sample 
spent divorced and potential experience…………………………………………..172 
Figure 2.I1.  Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with logarithm 
of potential experience included as control for potential experience……………...173 
Figure 2.I2.  Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with linear 
splines of potential experience included as control for potential experience……...174 
Figure 2.J. Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with sample 
restricted to first marriage, childless years……………………………………….175 
Figure 2.K. Estimated cohabitation premium in total effect model…………………….176 
Figure 10  Conceptual Illustration of Within-couple Inter-temporal Responsiveness 
under the Three Theoretical Shifts .......................................................................... 231 
Figure 11 Visualization of the analytic timeline of a hypothetical individual ................ 232 
Figure 12  Effect of spouse’s annual income on the individual’s likelihood of working at 
least normal hours versus working part-time by number of children and age of 
youngest child, male and female. ............................................................................ 233 
Figure 13  Effect of spouse’s hourly wage on the individual’s likelihood of working at 
least normal hours versus working part-time by number of children and age of 
youngest child, male and female. ............................................................................ 234 
Figure 3.A Illustration of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness……...………..243 
Figure 3.C Demonstration of Transition between Different Work Statuses……………245 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
x 
Abstract 
 
Social scientists and policy makers alike have long sought to understand the 
production, maintenance, and reproduction of inequality in society. While current 
scholarship on inequality tends to focus on the cross-sectional and inter-cohort 
variations in inequality, much less is known about how inequality is generated over 
the life course. My dissertation fills this intellectual gap by conducting an in-depth 
investigation of the patterns of inequality over the life course. It consists of three 
papers. The first paper establishes a life course trajectory framework for 
understanding the intracohort pattern of inequality, based on the random variability, 
trajectory heterogeneity, and cumulative advantage properties. This framework is 
formalized in mathematical and statistical forms, and then applied to analyze 
longitudinal survey data. The second paper examines the impact of marriage on 
people’s long-term wage trajectories over the life course and shows how this 
long-term marriage effect, as well as its underlying mechanisms, is shaped 
simultaneously by gender and race. The third paper integrates the life course 
perspective with theoretical innovations in family research to examine the 
within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness in labor supply as a risk-sharing 
behavior that family members adopt to collectively reduce the instability of income 
flows to the family. The results lend strong support to the existence of risk-sharing 
behaviors in reality, and also point to the significant heterogeneity in responsiveness 
by gender and parenthood status. Taken together, these three papers show that 
social inequality does not occur instantaneously, but is generated gradually over the 
trajectories of the human life course. Further, they imply that the generation of 
inequality over the life course is situated in the context of a broad range of factors, 
including labor market regimes, racial disparities, family organization, demographic 
behaviors, and gender roles. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
Social scientists and policy makers alike have long sought to understand the 
production, maintenance, and reproduction of inequality in society. While current 
scholarship on inequality tends to focus on the cross-sectional and inter-cohort 
variations in inequality, much less is known about how inequality is generated over 
the life course. My dissertation fills this gap by conducting an in-depth investigation 
of the patterns of inequality over the life course. 
 
My dissertation consists of three papers. In the first paper, I argue that while 
much research has been devoted to cross-sectional and intercohort patterns of wage 
inequality, relatively little is known about the mechanisms for the intracohort 
pattern of wage inequality. This neglect is due to the absence of an integral 
framework that links the macrolevel inequality pattern to its microlevel basis in the 
life course wage trajectory. To fill this intellectual gap, this paper establishes a life 
course trajectory (LCT) framework for understanding the intracohort pattern of 
wage inequality. First, the author proposes and conceptualizes three essential 
properties of the LCT framework: (1) random variability, (2) trajectory 
heterogeneity, and (3) cumulative advantage. Then, the author establishes a 
mathematical formalization of the LCT framework based on these three essential 
properties. Both the theoretical conceptualization and the  mathematical 
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formalization consistently imply that intracohort wage inequality will increase over 
the life course due to random variability, trajectory heterogeneity, and cumulative 
advantage. Finally, the author applies the LCT framework to data from the NLSY79 
using the multilevel growth curve model. The empirical analyses strongly support 
the significance of random variability, trajectory heterogeneity, and between-group 
cumulative advantage properties, yet do not support the within-group cumulative 
advantage property. Predictions based on empirical results show that the 
mechanisms of trajectory heterogeneity and cumulative advantage together explain 
57.40%, and the accumulation of random variability explains 42.60%, of the 
increase in wage inequality over the 20 years analyzed.  
 
 The second paper of my dissertation addresses a long-standing sociological 
question: How does marriage affect wages? A growing literature on this question 
invokes the life course approach to examine the long-term wage effect of marriage. 
However, these works often focus on the population-average effect of marriage or 
limit themselves to the case of some particular gender or racial group. This paper, 
instead, conducts a comprehensive analysis on the intersection of gender and race in 
the total long-term effect of marriage as well as its underlying mechanisms. Applying 
fixed-effect models to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data, I found 
that the marriage wage premium grows steadily and at a similar pace among White 
and Black men. The marriage wage premium is small and declines towards the 
negative among White women, while on the contrary, the marriage premium grows 
steadily over years of marriage among Black women. Further, measured work 
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experience explains a substantial amount of wage premium among Black men, yet it 
does little among White men, pointing to the importance of unobserved factors in 
determining White men’s marriage premium. While the impact of childbearing and 
work experience on White women’s accumulation of wage disadvantage after 
marriage is consistent with the specialization and human capital theory, the positive 
impact of work experience on married Black women’s wage trajectories should be 
better understood in the context of their lower expectations for the husband’s career 
success. 
 
Taken together, the above two papers show that economic inequality does not occur 
instantaneously, but unfolds gradually over the life course. For the sake of analysis, 
the chapters isolate individuals’ trajectories, examining each trajectory as if separate 
from that of other individuals. In my third dissertation paper, I shift to considering 
how individuals’ life course trajectories may be interrelated, particularly when 
connected through social units such as the family. In recent years, the theoretical 
orientations in family research have undergone three major shifts: from the unitary 
to the individualistic perspective, from the static to the life-course perspective, and 
from the resource-sharing to the risk-sharing perspective. This paper aims to 
cross-fertilize these three theoretical shifts in family research through an in-depth 
examination of the case of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness in labor 
supply among married individuals. I interpret the within-couple inter-temporal 
responsiveness in labor supply as an example of risk-sharing behaviors that family 
members adopt to collectively reduce the instability of income flows to the family. 
  
 
4 
Applying fixed effect models with lagged independent variables to the NLSY79 data, 
I found that, conditional on the couple’s fixed characteristics and observed 
time-varying variables, married women’s labor supply in a given year responds 
negative to their spouse’s annual income, annual work hours, and hourly wage in the 
previous year. By contrast, no significant inter-temporal responsiveness is found 
among men, and this gender difference is statistically significant. Moreover, 
consistent with my expectation that the presence of a young child intensifies the 
need for financial stability, my results show that having a youngest child aged below 
12 years old increases women’s degree of responsiveness. My findings have 
important implications in the context of four lines of sociological inquiries: (1) the 
functions of family in the contemporary society; (2) the dimension of “risk” in social 
inequality; (3) the proper unit of analysis in stratification theories; (4) gender in the 
family. 
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Chapter 2  A Life Course Trajectory Framework for Understanding 
the Intracohort Pattern of Wage Inequality
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The impact of marriage on men and women’s wages has long been conjectured, debated, and 
empirically tested. The dominant view so far is that marriage is associated with a significant 
wage premium for men, yet a much smaller wage premium, or even a wage penalty for women 
(Budig & England, 2001; Chun & Lee, 2001; Killewald & Gough, 2013). Some of these works 
attribute the gender differences in the wage effect of marriage to household specialization 
(Becker, 1991; Chun & Lee, 2001; Hersch & Stratton, 2000; Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Waite, 
1995) and investment in human capita l(Becker, 1985; Kenny, 1983; Korenman & Neumark, 
1991). Others emphasize the positive effect of marriage on men’s motivation and responsibility 
at work and the opposite effect on women’s work motivation (Ashwin & Isupova, 2014; Drobnič, 
Blossfeld, & Rohwer, 1999; Gorman, 2000; Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Mincer & Ofek, 1982; 
Pollmann-Schult, 2011; West & Zimmerman, 1987), or employers’ discrimination favoring 
married men and disfavoring married women (Bartlett & Callahan, 1984; Correll, Benard, & 
Paik, 2007; May, 1982). To determine the wage effect of marriage, this line of works typically 
constructs a single measure based on comparison between the levels of wage earned by the 
married and the unmarried, termed the Marriage Wage Premium (MWP hereinafter), glossing 
over the temporal variation in the wage effect of marriage across years of marriage. For 
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simplicity, I refer to this approach as the static approach.  
 One important limitation of the static approach is its ignorance of the simple but 
fundamental fact that the transition into marriage marks the beginning of a long-term life course 
experience (Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003; Elder, 1985; Mayer, 2009). Marriage should be 
seen not as a one-time event, but as a major turning point that shapes the individual’s life 
trajectory in all subsequent years. As a result, the wage effect of marriage may not occur 
instantaneously, but instead unfold gradually over the life course. To recognize the temporal 
variations in the MWP, research in this area needs to go beyond the static approach towards the 
life course approach.  
Examining such temporal variations in the MWP is important, not just because such variations 
may exist, but also because describing these variations will deepen our understanding of existing 
theories on family and work. The theories mentioned at the beginning of this article all invoke 
mechanisms that are long-term and process-based in nature because they often hinge on the 
accumulation, socialization, ideology-formation, and behavior adjustments in everyday life after 
the marital transition. Hence, the prevailing static approach in the current literature does not 
adequately reflect such process-based consequences of marriage. The dynamic, long-term nature 
of such marriage-induced wage changes warrants the adoption of the life course approach.  
Recently, a growing body of literature has started to recognize the possible temporal variations in 
the wage effect of marriage (Dougherty, 2006; Kenny, 1983; Korenman & Neumark, 1991; 
Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009). Dougherty (2006) studied the effect of marriage up to ten 
years after marriage and found that the marriage premium peaks about five years after marriage 
and then remains stable among males, yet among women, it peaks only two years after marriage 
and then starts to decline. Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009), however, found that marriage 
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lowers the rate of wage growth for both men and women.  Rodgers & Stratton (2010) 
conducted separate analyses for both White and African American men, and found that a larger 
gross effect of marriage on wage exists among African American men, while there are no 
statistically distinguishable racial differences in the effect of marriage on wage growth.  
However, these works either treat race as an additive statistical control (Dougherty, 2006; 
Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009), or focus exclusively on the men’s side of the story (Rodgers 
& Stratton 2010).  But, if we look at the long-term wage effect of marriage through the gender 
lens, should we adopt different perspectives when we look at White and Black couples? If we are 
interested in how the marriage institution is divided along the racial line, should we assume this 
racial divide is similar or different for men and women? These questions have been left 
unresolved in the current literature. Analysis in this paper contributes to literature by 
reconsidering the wage effect of marriage over the life course with a particular emphasis on the 
intersection of gender and race. I hypothesize that because Blacks and Whites may differ 
significantly in regard to economic prospects in the labor market (McCall, 2001; 
Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, & Johnson, 2005; William Wilson, 1996), the division of gender 
roles in the household (John & Shelton, 1997; Kamo & Cohen, 1998), and attitudes and 
anticipations regarding their spouses (Daniel, 1995; Waite, 1995), the long-term pattern of the 
wage effect of marriage may vary across gender-race subgroups.  
In addition, previous research often tests whether the empirical results are more consistent with 
some theories than with others, assuming or hypothesizing that there is a universal theory that 
fits all social subgroups. This paper challenges the view of a universal theory that explains the 
situation for everyone, arguing instead that the mechanisms underlying the total effect of 
marriage may vary substantially by gender-race subgroups. Drawing on the rich measures of 
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individuals’ time-varying family- and work-domain experiences provided by individual-level 
longitudinal data, I will investigate, separately for each gender-race subgroup, the contributions 
of two potential mechanisms underlying the total effect: childbearing and work experience. My 
results suggest that these two mechanisms affect different gender-race subgroups in different 
directions and to varying degrees, rejecting a universal theory in explaining the wage effect of 
marriage.   
To sum up, this study conducts a comprehensive investigation on how gender and race 
simultaneously shape the long-term wage effect of marriage over the life course. The 
investigation is guided by three research questions. First, does the wage effect of marriage take 
place instantaneously or cumulatively? Second, does the life course pattern of the wage effect of 
marriage vary by race? Third, do the mechanisms underlying the total effect of marriage vary 
across gender-race subgroups? By answering these three questions, this study will depict a 
comprehensive picture about not just the process through which wage advantage and 
disadvantage accumulate over the life course, but also how the underlying mechanisms are 
shaped simultaneously by gender and race. 
LIFE COURSE TRAJECTORY AS THE BASIS FOR THE INTRACOHORT 
PATTERN OF WAGE INEQUALITY 
 
Two processes are examined in stratification research on temporal trends in wage inequality: 
intercohort and intracohort patterns. The intercohort pattern is driven by the variation of 
inequality across cohorts who enter the labor force at different historical times;   the intracohort 
pattern is driven by the variation of inequality across ages among individuals within the same 
cohort (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Lynch 2003; Ryder 1965). That is, the intracohort pattern 
emphasizes the effect of age on wage distribution (Riley 1987). Therefore, one approach to 
studying  intracohort patterns – an approach typically employed in research taking a 
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demographic perspective – is to construct a synthetic cohort, track the distribution of wage at 
different ages, and summarize an age profile of wage inequality (Crystal and Shea 1990; Crystal 
and Waehrer 1996; Danziger and Gottschalk 1993; Lam and Levison 1992; Lemieux 2006; 
O'Rand 1996). Although the “age profile approach” describes the way  the aggregate level of 
inequality varies with age, it does not address how this aggregate pattern is affected by the 
varying age-to-age wage trajectories of individuals within the group (Halpern-Manners, Warren, 
and Brand 2009). Thus, the age profile approach is inadequate for identifying the microlevel 
mechanisms that generate the macrolevel wage inequality. 
This analysis takes the position that intracohort wage inequality should be studied from its 
microlevel basis: the life course trajectory. This basis assumes that a person’s life unfolds 
through a succession of inter-correlated life stages (Gottschalk et al. 2011; Mayer 2004; Mayer 
2009; Western et al. 2012) that, when linked together, form a life course trajectory. As applied 
here, a life course trajectory depicts not only wages at each stage in an individual’s life, but also 
the trajectory inter-connecting these stages in temporal order. When aggregated, the trajectories 
of all individuals in a cohort determine the development of intracohort inequality over their 
lifetimes. 
To date, two major theoretical perspectives underpin research investigating the wage 
inequality-generating process across the life course. The first is the permanent income hypothesis, 
which is an economic theory that presumes individuals rationally adjust their levels of 
consumption across the life course based on changes in personal income/wealth (Sorenson 2000). 
This line of research improves on the static model of wage attainment by extending the time 
horizon across the life course (Friedman 1957; Houthakker 1958). Yet, it relies on the 
assumption that individuals can fully anticipate and adjust consumption patterns to their future 
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income. This assumption may hold true in extremely stable societies (DiPrete 2002), but it is 
highly unrealistic for modern societies where unpredictable variability in life course wage 
attainment is the norm (DiPrete and McManus 1996; Gottschalk and Danziger 2005; Kalleberg 
2009; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010b; Western et al. 2012). 
The second theoretical perspective, the life course perspective, embeds the process of wage 
attainment in the social context, assuming that wages are subject to influences and uncertainties 
from various domains of social life (Elder 1985; Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003; Mayer 2009; 
Shanahan 2000; Wu 2003a). This perspective recognizes the influence of interrelated life 
conditions such as health status (Ross and Wu 1996; Wilson 2012), psychological traits 
(Sampson and Laub 1990; Shanahan 2000; Wheaton 1990) and socioeconomic status (DiPrete 
2002; Elman and O'Rand 2004)  situated in a variety of life events such as marital transitions 
(Williams and Umberson 2004), childbearing (Budig and England 2001; Correll, Benard and 
Paik 2007), military service (MacLean and Elder Jr 2007; Sampson and Laub 1996), job mobility 
(Rosenfeld 1992; Wegener 1991), and geographic migration (Hagan, MacMillan and Wheaton 
1996). Together, these conditions and events determine a person’s social status trajectory through 
life. The life course perspective suggests that the framework I establish for modeling the life 
course wage trajectory should embody two key aspects. First, because wages are likely to depend 
on the person’s experience in a multitude of life domains, some of which will be unpredictable, 
the framework should incorporate unanticipated variability in wage attainment. Second, given 
the wide scope and diversity of life domains that may affect each person’s wage attainment, the 
framework should treat individuals’ life course trajectories as fundamentally heterogeneous. 
Although the life course perspective supports the microlevel foundations of investigating 
wage inequality, research in this area still suffers from several limitations. First, few studies have 
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shed light on intracohort inequality in earnings and economic wellbeing. Notable exceptions 
include work by Crystal and Shea (1990) and Crystal and Waehrer (1996), which illustrate the 
importance of age patterns in economic inequality. However, most research in this field focuses 
on the observed pattern of aggregated inequality, failing to uncover the microlevel mechanisms 
generating the macrolevel inequality. Mentions of such micro-macro links exist – for example, in 
discussing the variance-covariance structure of the multilevel growth curve models, Raudenbush 
(2005, pp. 149) remarks that “the variance of the observations is a function of age (or time), 
which is sensible, because individuals are presumed to grow at different rates.” Yet, I know of no 
formal framework for systematically studying the consequences of such variation in life course 
trajectories. 
Second, even when prior work has explored the mechanisms for intracohort patterns of wage 
inequality over time, they have, focused almost exclusively on the wage gaps between cohort 
groups – with groups usually defined as people sharing the same observed social attributes, such 
as gender, race, level of education, and criminal background ( Bielby and Bielby 1996; 
Fernandez-Mateo 2009; Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson 2005; Western 2002; Willson, 
Shuey, and Elder 2007). For example, Fernandez-Mateo (2009) used supply- and demand-side 
factors to explain the gender difference in the rate of wage growth over experience or tenure. 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2005) conceptualized wage attainment over a person’s career as a 
dynamic process of human capital accumulation embedded in the interactions between individual 
workers, colleagues, employers and the workplace environment, and used this conceptualization 
to explain the growth of racial inequality over the life course. Western (2002) examined the 
impact of imprisonment as a turning point in the life course, and found that imprisonment 
reduces the rate of subsequent wage growth by about 30 percent. Accompanying the empirical 
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interests in group-based trajectory analyses are some recent methodological works that proposed 
strategies for categorizing individual trajectories by a finite set of discrete trajectory groups 
(Nagin 2009; Nagin 1999; Nagin and Tremblay 2005).  Yet, the almost exclusive focus of 
research on between-group differences has left out the question of how much inequality remains 
within these groups, as well the relative share of between- and within-group trajectory variations. 
This analysis broadens existing work on this subject by incorporating between-group, 
within-group, and total cohort inequality into a comprehensive framework. 
 
THREE ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES OF THE LCT FRAMEWORK 
 
Next I turn to defining the essential properties of a life course trajectory framework upon which 
to develop investigations of intracohort patterns of wage inequality. As mentioned above, I posit 
that the LCT framework should account for three essential properties: (1) random variability, (2) 
trajectory heterogeneity, and (3) cumulative advantage. Below I explain why these properties are 
essential to the LCT framework and draw three hypotheses about the implications of the 
microlevel mechanisms for the intracohort pattern of wage inequality. 
 
Random Variability Property 
 
Because the life course perspective assumes the interactions of multiple life domains, some of 
which are not fully anticipated, wages over the lifetime are expected to fluctuate in response to 
unplanned conditions or events (DiPrete 2002; Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009; Western et al. 2012).  
Transitory events, such as receiving a year-end bonus or taking a short sick leave, may affect 
wages only during the time they occur. Other fluctuations, such as receiving a promotion or 
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being fired, may have lasting effects on future wage attainment given their potential impact on 
human capital accumulation and social status (Althauser 1989; Briscoe and Kellogg 2011; 
Rosenbaum 1979; DiPrete 1981; Gangl 2006; Heckman and Borjas 1980; Mouw and Kalleberg 
2010b). Empirical work has directly assessed the significance of random variability in wage 
attainment. Gangl (2005), who estimated the contributions of different variance components of 
income using data from 12 countries, found that the United States had the highest “transitory 
variance in wage,” comprising 20.8% of the total variance of log income in the country. Recently, 
Western et al. (2012) reviewed related empirical research and concluded that, over recent 
decades, economic volatility and insecurity has increased significantly in the United States.  
Thus I propose that: 
Property 1 (random variability property): The LCT framework should contain a random 
component to capture the random variability in wage attainment. 
Not only is random variability an important part of total wage inequality, but the 
accumulation of random variability also may act to increase wage inequality over the life course.  
When unanticipated residual wage fluctuations – either setbacks or windfalls – have lasting 
effects on individuals’ earnings, the effects of seemingly transitory wage shocks accumulate over 
their lifetimes, inducing greater intracohort wage inequality (Gangl 2005; Gottschalk et al. 2011).  
Based on this argument, I raise the following hypothesis about the connection between random 
variability and total intracohort inequality: 
Hypothesis 1: Intracohort inequality will increase over the life course due to the 
accumulation of random variability over time. 
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Trajectory Heterogeneity Property 
The LCT framework property of trajectory heterogeneity relies on two notions of wage, which I 
define as baseline wage and wage trajectory. Baseline wage refers to the wage earned at the 
beginning of a person’s career, and can be seen as the starting point of the person’s wage 
attainment process. Wage trajectory refers to the pattern by which a person’s level of wage 
develops from the baseline wage across the life course. While a sizable body of literature has 
evaluated heterogeneity in individuals’ baseline wages, sociologists have only begun to uncover 
heterogeneity in individuals’ wage trajectories. 
Wage trajectory can vary by person for several reasons. First, wage variance is inherent to 
the canonical human capital theory of wage determination, which posits that individuals acquire 
human capital through labor market experience, which in turn increases wages over time, as the 
market yields positive economic returns on human capital (Becker 1994; Ben-Porath 1967; 
Heckman, Lochner and Todd 2006; Mincer 1974; Schultz 1961). However, rates of human 
capital accumulation vary by labor market experience as do market returns. Simply put, different 
kinds of jobs yield different advantages in terms of amassing human capital and market rewards 
– differences reflected in wage trajectory heterogeniety  (Heckman, Lochner and Todd 2006; 
Mincer 1996). 
Heterogeneity in wage trajectories is also embedded in family, work, and organizational 
contexts. Individual experiences in non-market domains of life, such as marital transitions, 
childbearing, and co-residing with other family members, may spill over to the work domain, 
effecting wage trajectories. For example, working mothers may give up jobs with faster wage 
growth in exchange for jobs with better work-family compatibility, resulting in a diverging 
gender gap among married couples with children over their life course. In addition, trajectories 
are affected by structural and organizational factors, such as employment relations (Kalleberg 
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2009), organizational settings (Baron 1984), and occupational reward systems (Carbonaro 2007; 
Grodsky and Pager 2001; Weeden and Grusky 2012). Based on these ideas, I propose that 
 
Property 2 (trajectory heterogeneity property): The LCT framework should allow for 
heterogeneity in individuals’ wage trajectories. 
 
While some earlier works have alluded to the idea of trajectory heterogeneity in wage 
attainment, few of them have explicitly discussed its implications for the intracohort pattern of 
wage inequality. Here I argue that the heterogeneity in wage trajectories will cause wage 
inequality within a cohort of individuals to increase over the life course.
 
0F
1
 Panel A of Figure 1 
illustrates this phenomenon. 1F
2
 Although persons A, B, and C have little wage gap when starting 
their job careers, their wages grow at different rates, indicated by the slopes of the lines, and over 
20 years of working their variable trajectories have  put them further and further apart – 
increasing intracohort wage inequality. Had A, B, and C maintained parallel wage trajectories, 
their relative wages would have been constant over time, and intracohort wage inequality would 
have remained unchanged. This leads me to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Intracohort inequality will increase over the life course due to the 
heterogeneity in the life course wage trajectories. 
                                                        
1
 The link between trajectory heterogeneity and inequality has also been noticed by earlier studies: for example, by 
devising a formal model of the trajectory of scientific productivity, Allison et al. (1982, pp. 623) showed 
mathematically that if we adopt a scale-invariant measure of inequality, “a homogeneous rate of accumulation 
would not lead to increasing inequality but a heterogeneous rate would produce increasing inequality.” 
2
 Here, Figure 4 provides a schematic illustration, which aims to exemplify the general implications of this specific 
mechanism, yet does not necessarily accord with every characteristic of any particular case. 
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Cumulative Advantage Property 
 
While the trajectory heterogeneity property emphasizes between-person differences in wage 
trajectories, the third essential property of the LCT framework emphasizes the positive 
dependence of an individual’s wage growth rate on his or her baseline wage. That is, not only do 
individuals have different wage trajectories based on a range of job, market, personal, and 
structural factors discussed above, but those with higher baseline wages may experience faster 
rates of wage growth, which leads to the divergence of wage trajectories over time. In prior 
literature, this positive association has been commonly referred to as “cumulative advantage” or, 
as Merton (1968, pp. 62) put it: “[T]he rich get richer at a rate that makes the poor become 
relatively poorer.”2 F3 Recently, a number of sociological studies have invoked cumulative 
advantage in explaining the increase of intracohort inequality on dimensions such as wage, living 
conditions, and physical well-being over the life course (e.g. Adler 2001; Allison, Long and 
Krauze 1982; Cole 1979; Crystal and Shea 1990; Dannefer 1987; Dannefer 2003; DiPrete 1981; 
DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Elman and O'Rand 2004; Frank and Cook 1995; O'Rand 1996; Rao 
1980; Rosen 1981; Ross and Wu 1996; Wilson 2012). However, as several scholars have pointed 
out, this term has been used quite casually and without a clear definition or conceptualization 
(DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Willson, Shuey, and Elder 2007). After conducting an extensive review 
of recent works on cumulative advantage as an inequality-generating process, DiPrete and Eirich 
(2006) called for future works to theorize this concept more precisely and distinguish between its 
various forms in an effort to generate “a deeper understanding for the reasons why trajectories 
                                                        
3The earliest scholarly discussion of the cumulative advantage dates back to the “Matthew effect” in the scientific 
career coined by Merton (1968). The Matthew effect describes the process in which the scientists who have received 
scientific recognition at an early stage of their career are more likely to acquire more resources and gain greater 
recognition in subsequent years. However, Merton did not explicitly draw the distinction between between-group 
and within-group cumulative advantage.  
  
 
17 
diverge at both the group and the individual level of observation” (DiPrete and Eirich 2006, pp. 
292). 
Cumulative advantage is a complex social process that may involve the simultaneous 
operation of numerous mechanisms on different levels. And it is beyond the scope of this 
analysis to discuss these comprehensively. Still, one direction for advancing our understandings 
of cumulative advantage is to break down this concept into more specific components. In my 
LCT framework, I decompose cumulative advantage into between-group and within-group 
cumulative advantage. 
Between-group cumulative advantage refers to the process through which the wage 
advantage of one social group over another social group at an early life stage magnifies over the 
life course. 3 F
4
 Prior works have documented evidence of between-group cumulative advantage, 
with group defined by gender (Fernandez‐Mateo 2009; Noonan, Corcoran, and Courant 2005; 
Reskin 1978; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993), race (Kim and Miech 2009; Shuey and Willson 2008; 
Walsemann, Geronimus, and Gee 2008; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2005), and level of educational 
attainment (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Elman and O’Rand 2004; Ross and Wu 1996).4F5 
Within-group cumulative advantage refers to the amplification of wage advantages among 
individuals sharing the same group attributes. For example, as recognized by sociological studies 
of scientific careers, among scientists sharing the same observed individual attributes, those with 
greater success at the start of their careers tend to have  faster rates of upward career mobility 
(Allison 1980; Cole and Cole 1973; Merton 1968; Xie 2014). This implies that even among 
individuals who are similar with regard to group membership, those who receive a higher wage 
                                                        
4
 Here, “social group” refers to the collection of individuals who share a common social attribute recognizable by 
others. 
5
 I will introduce measures for specific group indicators in my empirical analyses. 
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in their first job may experience higher wage growth in the future. Empirically, if the positive 
association between baseline wage and wage growth rate persists after controlling for 
observed/social group membership, within-group cumulative advantage is at work. 
The question of whether cumulative advantage exists between or within social groups has 
not yet been systematically examined. While findings from recent studies tend to favor the 
mechanism of cumulative advantage (Lynch 2003),  other literature has discussed the 
possibility of the “age-as-leveler” phenomenon, in which outcome advantages associated with 
social groups diminish, rather than magnify, over age (Elo and Preston 1996; Krieger and Fee 
1994). It is possible that cumulative advantage exists between, but not within, social groups; or 
that it exists between some groups but not others. To test these possibilities, it is necessary that: 
Property 3 (cumulative advantage property):  The LCT framework should reflect both the 
between-group and within-group cumulative advantage in wage attainment. 
Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the mechanism of cumulative advantage in the growth of 
wage inequality over the life course. Persons A, B, and C have entered the labor market with 
different baseline wages and each experiences wage growth that reflects this hierarchy. Thus, 
Person A has the steepest wage trajectory and Person C has the flattest, with Person B in the 
middle. These differences in growth rates mean that the initial wage inequality amplifies over the 
20 years of labor market experience.5F
6
 Based on this idea, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Intracohort inequality will increase over the life course due to the mechanism 
of cumulative advantage. 
 
                                                        
6
 For the sake of demonstration, the schematic illustration described here does not differentiate between 
“between-group cumulative advantage” and “within-group cumulative advantage.”  
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MATHEMATICAL FORMALIZATION OF THE LCT FRAMEWORK 
 
While much has been conjectured about mechanisms underlying intracohort wage inequality, a 
rigorous and logical formalization remains missing. Without such formalization, the researcher is 
often at the risk of mistakenly interpreting the effect of one mechanism as that of another or 
failing to distinguish the influences of two distinct mechansims. Here I formalize the LCT 
framework into a mathematical model, showing how the model can satisfy the three essential 
properties of LCT framework and yield results consistent with the three hypotheses. 
Like all mathematical models of social processes, the LCT model relies on some simplifying 
assumptions. Thus, the model is designed for the general case and may not work for every 
particular case in real life. I have kept the model as parsimonious as possible to the extent that 
these simplifying assumptions are inconsequential to the main conclusions drawn from the model. 
Possible extensions of the mathematical formalization are discussed in either the main text or the 
footnotes, and I assess the sensitivity of my conclusions to alterations of the model assumptions 
in auxiliary analysis. Appendix Table 1.A summarizes four key assumptions of the framework 
and discusses alternative specifications. 
Model Setup 
In canonical life course research, biological age is usually considered the primary dimension 
along which temporal change occurs. Yet, in a broader sense, the life course also involves other 
temporal dimensions, such as work experience, career progress, length of marriage, and the 
duration of exposure to certain environments (Rosenfeld 1992; Western 2002b; Wu 2003). 
Because wage is an indicator of economic rewards earned through activities in the labor market, 
this analysis considers years of labor market experience as a better link to the trajectory of wage 
attainment than biological age. Accordingly, the mathematical formalization of the LCT 
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framework will describe wage trajectory along the axis of labor market experience. I use t to 
denote number of years an individual has spent in the labor market, with t equal to zero at market 
entry.  As a simplification, I assume that once a person has entered the labor market, the person 
remains in the labor market until retirement, and that years of experience accumulate regardless 
of how many hours or weeks the individual spent working in year t-1.6 F
7
 Yit denotes the wage for 
person i at t years in the labor market; Yi0 denotes beginning/baseline wage; and γi denotes the 
person-specific, time-invariant growth rate from t − 1 to t. I assume that Yit is generated by 
the following process: 
Yit = (1 + γi) ⋅ Yi,t−1 
    = (1 + γi)
2 ⋅ Yi,t−2 
                            = (1 + γi)
t ⋅ Yi0 .                       (1.1) 
Simply speaking, Yit grows exponentially over t, as a function of the person’s wage at the 
previous period Yi,t−1 and the fraction of the increment captured by γi. This exponential growth 
process is similar to the process described by DiPrete and Eirich (2006) as a “strict cumulative 
advantage” model, which is analogous to the process of “wealth accumulation through the 
mechanism of compound interest” (DiPrete and Eirich 2006, pp. 272). 7F8 This model represents 
the simplest form of cumulative advantage. The emphasis of this paper, however, are between- 
                                                        
7
 To be sure, this assumption may not always hold true in real life. For instance, it is possible that a person enters 
the labor market, then drop out of the labor force or works a minimal amount of time for some years, and later come 
back to the labor market. Yet, the model can be altered in proper ways to address these special cases. One simple 
method is to treat the years in which a person stays out of the labor market as “missing” observations and do not 
count in these years in calculating t. Yet, it is also possible to reconcile this issue by specifying a different (which 
can even be zero or negative) growth rate of wage for the years in which the person has stayed out of the labor 
market. For example, we could specify 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (1 + 𝛾𝑖) ⋅ 𝑌𝑖(𝑡−1) if the person remains in the labor market in year t-1, 
and let  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (1 + 𝛾𝑖
′) ⋅ 𝑌𝑖(𝑡−1) if the person dropped out of the labor market for a significant amount of time in year 
t-1.  
8
 To explain, in the language of wealth or asset accumulation process, the baseline wage Yi0 can be seen as the 
“principal” or “initial investment”, γi as the “interest rate”, and Yit as the value of asset at time t. 
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and within-group cumulative advantage, which I will define and discuss in details later. 
Following the standard practice in modeling wage determination adopted by the human 
capital model (Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2003), I define log wage as the key outcome 
variable. Accordingly, I take the logarithm of both sides of Eq. (1.1), which yields: 
ln Yit = t ⋅ ln(1 + γi) + ln Yi0.                      (1.2a) 
The log transformation from Eq. (1.1) to Eq. (1.2a) is particularly helpful for further 
development of the model, because it transforms the wage equation from the multiplicative form 
to an additive equation with separable components. 
Next, to incorporate the random variability property, I add a component to Eq. (1.2a) to capture 
the random variability in individual wage. Denoted by e, this random component is independent 
of any observation of Y and γ and transforms the deterministic form of Eq. (1.2a) into the 
non-deterministic form: 
ln Yit = t ⋅ ln(1 + γi) + ln Yi0 + eit.                        (1.2b) 
Also, for the random variability property to exist, the random component e should take up a 
non-zero variance, as I formally state in the following Condition 1: 
Var(e) > 0 (Condition 1). 
That is, Condition 1 ensures that the random variability property is satisfied. 
For the sake of parsimony, I re-write the logarithm of wage in Eq. (1.2b) as a linear combination 
of three components: a linear function of labor market experience, a person-specific fixed effect, 
and a random component, as below: 
ln Yit = θi ⋅ t + λi + eit ,  where θi = ln (1 + γi) and  λi = lnYi0.             (1.3) 
The three components in Eq. (3) have intuitive interpretations: the slope on t, θi, is a 
function of γi, thus, it captures the person-specific wage growth rate. The person-specific 
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intercept, λi, is the logarithm of baseline wage Yi0, thus, it captures the person-specific baseline 
wage. Lastly, eit captures the random variability in wage. 8F
9
 
It is important to note that several key elements in the setup of this model are closely related 
to three classes of models developed by previous works. First, as shown in Eq. (1.1), the basic 
setup of my model can be seen as a discrete case of the well-known Yule process of exponential 
growth. The Yule process assumes that Yit = Yi0e
γit, so that the increment in Y at a given time 
point depends on the accomplishment at this time point up to a scalar of γi (i.e. 
dYit
dt
= γiYit). 
Similarly, from Eq. (1.1), we can write the increment in Y from t-1 to t as a function of Yi,t−1 
and γi: Yit − Yi,t−1 = γiYi,t−1. As such, my model and the Yule process both stem from a basic 
setup in which achievement at the current period affects the increment in achievement in the next 
period. 
Second, Eq. (1.1) relates to the contagious Poisson process as proposed by Allison et al. 
(1982) to model the process of a scientific career. Their study models the propensity to publish a 
scientific paper at time t, denoted by P(t), as a linear function of the number of papers already 
published at time t (denoted by X(t)). That is, they assume that P(t) = α + βX(t). Essentially, 
the parameter γ in my model and the parameter β in their model have similar interpretations, 
in that they both characterize the degree to which future interment depends on current 
achievement. Moreover, both my model and their model are flexible enough to allow for the 
between-person variation in these two parameters – in other words, both models allow for the 
heterogeneity in wage trajectories. Also, both models emphasize the idea that the inclusion of 
                                                        
9
 While modeling the specific forms of the random component eit is beyond the scope of this paper, the economic 
literature on income process offered some statistical strategies for modeling random variability (e.g. Gottschalk et al. 
2011).Auxiliary analyses to be presented later will further explain the variations in the random component. 
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random component is essential to characterizing a social process. 9F
10
 
Third, my model can be viewed as an extended application of Mincer (1974)’s human capital 
equation for wage determination. In the human capital equation, workers accumulate human 
capital through work experiences, and thus their wage will positively depend on the years of 
labor market experience. Formally, the human capital equation expresses the expectation of log 
wage as: E(lnY| si, xi) = αi + ρsisi + β0ixi + β1ixi
2, where αi represents the intercept, si 
indicates formal schooling, xi indicates experience, and ρis, β0i, and β1i represent the return 
on schooling, experience and quadratic experience respectively (Heckman, Lochner and Todd 
2006; Mincer 1996). As such, the β0i in this human capital equation has similar interpretation as 
θi in my model, because they both capture the speed at which wage grows over years of 
experience. Also, by having the subscript i in the speed-of-wage-growth parameter, both models 
can capture the heterogeneity in the rate of wage growth over the life course. 
Although my formalization allows wage growth rate to vary by person (represented by the 
subscript i in θ), it does not capture the variations of wage growth rate by time, as there is no 
subscript t in θ. I impose such simplification so as to keep this paper’s main focus to the 
significance, rather than the functional form, of the between-person variation in wage growth 
rate. In future research, however, several parameterizations can be adopted to account for the 
temporal variation of θ. Here, I briefly propose two examples. The first is to specify θit using a 
step-wise spline function, which captures the differences in wage growth rate across different 
stages of life. For example, suppose wage growth rate is equals θi1 for the earlier period 
between t1 and t2 and changes to θi2 for the later period between t2 and t3, then we can 
                                                        
10
 Allison et al. (1982, pp. 619) pointed out that one crucially important element of the scientific career process is 
that “the occurrence of publications or citations is at least partially governed by random processes.” 
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express θit as: θit = θi1 if t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, and θit = θi2 if t2 ≤ t ≤ t3. In this parameterization, 
θi1 and θi2 capture the individual’s wage growth rate at the two different time period. The 
second form of parameterization is to employ a polynomial function to approximate the temporal 
variation of wage growth rate. For example, we can specify θit as a polynomial of up to the 
power of p: θit = α0i + α1i ⋅ t + α2i ⋅ t
2 + α3i ⋅ t
3 +⋯+ αpi ⋅ t
p. In this parameterization, α0i 
captures the time-invariant part of wage growth rate, and α1i, α2i,… αpi capture the dependence 
of wage growth rate on time t up to a given power (p). 
 
Deriving the Intracohort Pattern of Wage Inequality 
 
Next, I use the microlevel wage attainment process specified by Eq. (1.3) to derive the 
macrolevel intracohort pattern of wage inequality. I choose the variance of log wage at t, denoted 
by Var(lnYt), as the indicator of wage inequality for individuals with t years of labor market 
experience. This indicator has three particular features that fit well with the purpose of this study. 
First, it is scale-invariant, meaning that if the wage for everyone at every time point increase by 
the same factor, the variance of log wage will not change. 10F
11
 Hence, the observed and predicted 
changes in this measure of inequality is free from any alternation in the scale of the metric 
measuring wage (Allison, Long and Krauze 1982; Faia 1975).11F
12
 Second, given the generally 
accepted notion of diminishing marginal utility from monetary income – that is, the notion that 
                                                        
11
 In laying out the axiom of scale invariance as a key principle for measuring inequality, Schwartz and Winship 
(1980, pp.7) explained that under scale invariance,“the size of the pie to be divided has no bearing on the degree of 
inequality-it is only the relative share each person receives that is important in determining inequality.” 
12
 In fact, as Faia(1975), Allison et al (1982) and DiPrete and Eirich (2006) have pointed out, although the 
compounding process in Eq. (1) automatically implies the increase in wage inequality over t, it does not, by itself, 
necessarily lead to the increase in the scale-invariant measures of inequality. This paper shares the same concern 
with these authors, and will tease out the mechanisms that give rise to the changes in the scale-invariant measure of 
wage inequality over the life course. 
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the marginal benefit associated with one unit of income decreases with income level, the 
logarithm of wage is particularly desirable as an indicator of the actual individual well-being, 
because its sensitivity to any fixed amount of monetary transfer decreases as absolute wage level 
increases (Allison 1978; Hedderson and Harris 1985). Third, Eq. (1.3) shows that log wage (lnYt) 
can be expressed as the linear combination of separable components, therefore, its variance can 
be conveniently written as the sum of variances and covariances of these components, as 
follows: 
 
Vart = Var(ln Yt) = Var(λ)⏟  
V1
+ t2 ⋅ Var(θ)⏟      
V2
+ 2t ⋅ Cov(λ, θ)⏟        
V3
+ Var(et)⏟    
V4
      (1.4) 
According to Eq. (1.4), the total wage inequality at time t can be written as the summation of 
four variance components: V1, V2, V3, and V4. 12F
13
 The first component V1 captures the variance 
in baseline wage, and because baseline wage do not change over time, this variance component 
does not contribute to the change of wage inequality over t. The last component V4 captures the 
part of wage inequality due to the random variability in wage attainment. Under Condition 1, this 
random variability will have positive variance, and thus V4 will be positive. Further, to the extent 
that random variability accumulates over the life course, V4 will increase with t, and the overall 
wage inequality will also increase. Therefore, Hypotheses 1 is supported. 
It takes some further calculations to show that the two variance components in the middle, 
V2 and V3, correspond to the trajectory heterogeneity property and cumulative advantage 
property respectively. The second component of wage inequality, V2, corresponds to the 
trajectory heterogeneity property. To see this, note that V2 depends on the variance of 
                                                        
13
Note that in Eq. (4), there is no term of the covariance between 𝑒𝑖𝑡 and other variables, because the model 
assumes that the random component is independent of the other components. 
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person-specific rate of wage growth, Var(θ). Since individuals follow heterogeneous wage 
trajectories over life, and thus will experience varying levels of wage growth rate, therefore: 
Var(θ) > 0 (Condition 2). 
Condition 2 ensures that the model satisfies the requirement of the trajectory heterogeneity 
property (i.e. Property 2). Further, when Var(θ) > 0, V2(= t2 ⋅ Var(θ)) will increase with t. 
Since V2 is a component of the total intracohort wage inequality, this means that when Condition 
2 is satisfied, total wage inequality among the cohort of individuals will increase over their lives, 
a conclusion consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
The third component of wage inequality, V3, is determined by the product of t and 
Cov(λ, θ). This component can be further decomposed into the between-group and within-group 
components of the cumulative advantage property. To illustrate, I introduce an m-dimensional 
vector of covariates, S, to represent the individual’s time-invariant social group measured on m 
different social dimensions. Then, by the Law of Total Covariance 13 F
14
, I decompose the covariance 
between λ and θ into the part due to S (between-group) and the part not due to S 
(within-group): 
Cov(λ, θ) = Cov(E(λ|S), E(θ|S))⏟            
Between−group
component 
+ E(Cov(λ, θ|S))⏟        
Within−group
component 
.       (1.5) 
In the first component of Eq. (1.5), E(λ|S) represents the expectation of baseline wage 
conditional on the individual’s social groups, and E(θ|S) represents the expectation of wage 
growth rate conditional on the individual’s social groups. Therefore, the covariance between 
                                                        
14
 The Law of Total Covariance is a mathematical theorem which states that for three random variables, X, Y, and Z 
on the same probability space with the covariance of X and Y being finite, then we have: 
Cov(X, Y) = E(Cov(X, Y|Z)) + Cov(E(X|Z), E(Y|Z)).  
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these two quantities,Cov(E(λ|S), E(θ|S)), represents the association between baseline wage and 
wage growth rate explained by social groups, that is, the between-group component of 
cumulative advantage. For the between-group component of cumulative advantage property to 
exist, there should be a positive between-group association between the baseline growth rate and 
wage growth rate. Thus, the covariance between E(λ|S) and E(θ|S) should be positive: 
Cov(E(λ|S), E(θ|S)) > 0 (Condition 3a). 
The second part in Eq. (5), E(Cov(λ, θ|S)), is the covariance between λ and θ conditional 
on S, so it represents the association between baseline wage and wage growth rate within these 
social groups, that is, the within-group component of cumulative advantage. In order to satisfy 
the within-group component of the cumulative advantage property, this association should be 
positive: 
E(Cov(λ, θ|S) > 0 (Condition 3b). 
To sum up the above discussion, Condition 3a ensures that cumulative advantage exists 
between observed social groups, and Condition 3b ensures that cumulative advantage exists 
within observed social groups. 
Given the expression in Eq. (5), we can re-write V3 in Eq. (4) as a linear combination of two 
components (V3a and V3b): 
V3 = 2t ⋅ Cov(λ, θ) = 2t ⋅ Cov(E(λ|S), E(θ|S))⏟              
V3a
(between−group component)
+ 2t ⋅ E(Cov(λ, θ|S))⏟            
V3b
(within−group component)
 .       (1.6) 
Eq. (6) shows that under Condition 3a and Condition 3b, the slopes on t in V3a and V3b are 
positive. Thus, both components will increase with t, and so will the total wage inequality – a 
prediction that is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
In addition to confirming our theoretical hypotheses, the mathematical formalization also helps 
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clarify the relations and distinctions between different components of total wage inequality. First, 
while trajectory heterogeneity and cumulative advantage both affect total wage inequality by 
acting on the variation in wage growth rate, there exists an important distinction between these 
two mechanisms. As Eq. (1.4) shows, they act on different elements of this variation: the 
contribution of trajectory heterogeneity works through affecting the degree of between-person 
variation in wage growth rate regardless of where this variation comes from, while the 
contribution of cumulative advantage works through affecting the intensity of dependence of 
wage growth rate on baseline wage. Hence, even if there is no association between baseline wage 
and wage growth rate – that is, the case in which V3 equals zero – the heterogeneity in wage 
growth rate, by itself, could still cause total wage inequality to increase over the life course as 
long as the variance of θ is positive. Second, Eq. (1.4) suggests that mathematically, trajectory 
heterogeneity causes total wage inequality to increase by the affecting t2, whereas cumulative 
advantage causes total wage inequality to increase by affecting 2t. When t takes a value of two 
or larger, t2 will increase at a faster rate than 2t does. Therefore, one could expect the 
contribution of trajectory heterogeneity to the growth of total inequality to be larger than that of 
cumulative advantage – a result that will be confirmed by my later empirical analyses. 
Up to this point, I have shown that under Condition 1, 2, 3a, and 3b, the mathematical 
formalization of the LCT framework satisfies the three essential properties of the LCT 
framework and yields the same predictions as those given in Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3. For a 
succinct illustration, I summarize the three essential properties, their corresponding hypotheses, 
and the corresponding conditions in the mathematical formalization in Table 1. Throughout this 
paper, Table 1 can be kept as a useful reference for comprehending the connections between 
theoretical, mathematical, and empirical parts of the LCT framework. 
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APPLICATION OF THE LCT FRAMEWORK: THE INTRACOHORT 
PATTERN OF WAGE INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The scope of the LCT framework extends beyond the formalization of an analytical construct. 
Next, I apply the LCT framework to a nationally representative longitudinal dataset that follows 
a cohort of individuals in the United States through their life experiences. While I realize that the 
empirical results should be interpreted as specific to this specific cohort in the specific special 
and historical, the empirical analyses and findings suggest that with appropriate data, the LCT 
framework has the promise of being utilized by future research to examine and compare the 
intracohort pattern of wage inequality in different social contexts. 
The application of the LCT framework proceeds with three parts. In the main analysis, I (1) 
test for the significance of the three essential properties of the LCT framework in reality and (2) 
assess their contributions to the observed intracohort pattern of wage inequality in the United 
States. Then, I will conduct two rounds of auxiliary analyses: the first allows the person-specific 
wage growth rate to vary across different life stages, and the second introduces control for a set 
of time-varying indicators of work experience, occupation, and family-domain life transitions. 
Lastly, I discuss the limitations of my analyses and suggests potential directions for future 
extensions. 
Data and Sample Restriction 
To empirically examine the underlying mechanisms in individuals’ life course trajectories, a 
longitudinal dataset that links repeated observations for each individual across a span of his or 
her life course is needed. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data (NLSY79 
hereinafter) suits well with this purpose, in that it follows a nationally representative sample of 
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12,686 young people in the United States who were 14 to 22 years old when they were first 
surveyed in 1979. That it, this dataset covers a sample that is representative of the cohort of 
population born largely between 1957 and 1965. These individuals were interviewed annually 
through 1994 and on a biennial basis thereafter. The currently available NLSY79 data provide 
useful information about the year-to-year wage trajectories for these individuals from the 
beginning of their career to their mid- and late-career. 14F
15
 
The key indicator of the life course in this study, as I discussed earlier, is the years of labor 
market experience. I construct a variable called “potential experience” to approximate the years 
that an individual has spent in the labor market after finishing formal schooling. This variable is 
calculated as age minus 18 for those with high school education or less, age minus 22 for those 
with some college education but less than four years, and age minus 25 for those with at least 
four years of college education. 15F
16
 
Due to the heterogeneity in the NLSY79 cohort’s birth year and the heterogeneity in the 
respondent’s age of labor market entry, in the currently available NLSY79 data, some 
respondents have longer wage records than others do. The estimated wage inequality for those 
with longer end of years of experience may over-represent those with longer records in the 
available and under-represent those with shorter records. Thus, to the extent that these 
                                                        
15
 My study favors the NLSY79 data over other datasets for several reasons. First, while other 
nationally-representative longitudinal datasets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, do exist, most of them 
cover individuals who were born in a wide range of years. As a result, the number of respondents within a narrowly 
defined birth year range (i.e. individuals from the same cohort) is relatively small compared to the NLSY79 data. 
Second, while some more resent data, such as the NLSY97 data, also follow individuals born within a narrow range 
of years over their career experiences, the respondents are still too young and are only at the beginning stages of 
their careers. Thus the NLSY79 data is also preferred over such recent datasets. 
16
 Recall that as explained earlier, my choice of labor market experience rather than biological age as the key 
dimension of life course process is based on the better fit between labor market experience and my purpose of 
modeling the wage attainment process. I also experimented with biological age as the dimension of life course 
process. The results were consistent with those from using potential experience and are thus omitted from the paper. 
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individuals perform systematically in wage attainment, this over- and under- representativeness 
could cause substantial bias to the estimation of wage inequality. For this reason, I choose to 
restrict my analytic sample to observations between the individuals’ entrance into the labor 
market (i.e. zero years of potential experience) to their mid-career (i.e. twenty years of potential 
experience). This restriction will reduce the above problem, because even for those in the 
youngest NLSY79 respondents (born in the year of 1965) who have not entered the labor market 
until age 25 (e.g. around year 1990), their first 20 years of potential experience have all been 
covered by the currently available NLSY79 data. After sample restriction, my analytic sample 
comes to a total of 133,121 person-year observations. 16F
17
 All data analyses are weighted. 
I use the logarithm of hourly wage of the individual’s current or most recent job, which is 
adjusted to 1999 dollars by Consumer Price Index, as the key outcome variable. I prefer log 
hourly wage over annual earnings or family income, because unlike the other two, hourly wage 
measures the economic return that the individual receives for one hour of labor that he or she 
provides, thus, it is not affected by the total hours worked by the individual or other family 
members.17F
18
 Consistent with my mathematical formalization, I measure wage inequality as the 
variance of log hourly wage. The individual’s wage will be coded as missing if he or she is not 
working at the time of interview. Fortunately, the multilevel growth curve model to be employed 
by this study, which I will introduce later, is flexible with missing data and unbalanced 
                                                        
17
 Certainly, even within this restricted time period, missing data on some variables and non-responses are still 
likely in longitudinal surveys. Individual wages are coded as missing if they were not working at the time of 
interview.  
18
 There are, of course, some limitations to the measure of hourly wage in capturing inequality among individuals. I 
will discuss more on its limitations in later sections. 
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observations (Curran, Obeidat, and Losardo 2010).18F
19
 Meanwhile, it is possible that individuals 
choose to work at multiple jobs. However, as several earlier works suggested, the decision to 
work multiple jobs is affected depends on the business cycle or macroeconomic conditions, 
therefore, the reported wage from the primary job the reporting may be more reliable than that 
from secondary jobs (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2009; Nee 1989; Partridge 2002). Hence, 
in cases where an individual is concurrently working at more than one jobs, only hourly wage 
from the individual’s primary job will be used. 19F20 
Next, I introduce my measures for individuals’ social group attributes. While my 
specification of “social groups” in the theoretical and mathematical parts of the LCT framework 
can be applied to any type of person-specific and time-invariant group indicators, it is not 
possible to exhaust all potential indicators in the empirical analysis. I choose to focus on three 
indicators of the individual’s social group which sociologists have long believed to be most 
central to the stratification system: gender, race, and educational attainment. 
First, gender is an important social attribute that separates individuals into groups of 
different earnings positions (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Reskin 1978; Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Skaggs 2002). Despite the recent social movements towards promoting gender wage equality in 
America, males still earn significantly higher wages than females of similar qualifications, and 
this gender inequality has been found to magnify over the life course. Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Skaggs (2002) argued that the gender wage gap can emerge and intensify over people’s careers 
                                                        
19
 Yet, I will discuss and assess the sensitivity of my conclusions with regard to the missing wage information by 
imputing these values later. 
20
 Given the relatively minimal proportion of individuals working at multiple jobs compared to those who are 
working at only one job, this simplification would only have a moderate impact on estimating the individual’s wage 
level. For example, according to statistics from earlier works using the NLSY79 data, Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Kimmel (2009, Table 1) showed that in year 2000, about 50% of males were working, yet only 7% of men are 
working at multiple jobs. 
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as a result of the social closure process in the workplace that excludes female workers from 
on-the-job training and productivity-enhancing workplace networks. Fernandez-Mateo (2009) 
showed that even in the case of contract employment, where women’s disadvantage in workplace 
resources and firm-specific skills is expected to affect their wage only minimally, men still 
experience substantially faster wage growth than women. In addition, life events in the family 
domains such as marriage and childbearing, often promote wage growth for men yet limit wage 
growth for women (Budig and England 2001; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Noonan et al. 
2005). Therefore, women might incur further wage disadvantage to men when they get married 
or become parents at later stages of their lives. 
Second, race is another dimension of social attribute along which cumulative advantage may 
occur (Kim and Miech 2009; Shuey and Willson 2008; Walsemann, Geronimus, and Gee 2008; 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2005). Racial minorities incur baseline as well as cumulative 
disadvantage in their career process. Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2005) showed that blacks and 
Hispanics have flatter wage trajectories relative to whites, and argued that this race-based 
cumulative advantage is likely due to the discrimination against racial minorities through 
monopolistic social closure in the workplace and the devaluation of racial minorities’ human 
capital over their careers (see also: Burt 1997; Royster 2003; Tilly 1998; Tomaskovic-Devey 
1993). My analyses examine the difference in baseline wage as well as wage growth rate 
between whites, blacks and Hispanics. 20F
21
 
Thirdly, cumulative advantage in wage could occur between groups of different levels of 
educational attainment (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Elman and O’Rand 2004; Ross and Wu 1996). 
Because people with higher educational attainment are usually believed to have greater stock of 
                                                        
21
 In NLSY79 data, the non-black and non-Hispanics are coded as white. 
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human capital, they likely receive higher wage at their entrance into the labor market. 
Furthermore, in the dynamics within the workplace, higher educational attainment usually 
indicates a higher status for the worker, which could signal lower uncertainty in the quality of job 
performance (Podolny and Stuart 1995), enhance the visibility of a worker among his or her 
colleagues in the organization (Gould 2002), promote the worker’s exposure to additional 
organizational resources (DiPrete and Eirich 2006; Shrum and Wuthnow 1988), and lift the 
worker’s confidence and motivation in work (Nease, Mudgett, and Quiñones 1999; Tay, Ang, 
and Van Dyne 2006). All these factors can leads to a faster rate of wage growth, resulting in the 
life course magnification of wage advantage of more highly-educated individuals. In my 
analyses, I categorize educational attainment into three levels: high school or less, some college 
but less than four years, and at least four years of college. 21 F
22
 
Certainly, while the three dimensions of social group described above are the most 
fundamental ones identified in the long tradition of sociological literature, I do recognize that 
omitting other dimensions of social groups constitutes an important limitation of my analyses. 
Indicators of these other dimensions of social groups require more sophisticated considerations 
that should be informed by both theoretical and empirical knowledge, which are beyond the 
scope of this study. I believe the initial attempt in this paper to distinguish between 
between-group and within-group components of cumulative advantage based on the above three 
dimensions of social groups could lay the foundations for future works following this line of 
inquiry. 
Table 2 gives the weighted sample distribution of time-invariant variables including gender, 
                                                        
22
 To be sure, individuals could differ from one another in terms of a finer-grained measure of educational 
attainment, such as years of schooling. However, I prefer the categorical measure of educational attainment, because 
in the workplace, individuals are usually differentiated from each other not necessarily on the exact number of years 
of schooling they have completed, but more likely, on observed educational degrees, such as high school or college. 
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race and educational attainment (Panel A), the means and standard deviations of log hourly wage 
by demographic groups (Panel B), and those by years of potential experience (Panel C).  Two 
patterns are worth noting from the descriptive statistics. First, consistent with findings from 
earlier studies, average wage differ among individuals belonging to different gender, race and 
educational attainment groups: on average, the mean hourly wage for men is higher than that for 
women by about 30% (≈ e(2.48−2.22) − 1). Among the three racial groups, whites earn the 
highest hourly wage, followed by the Hispanics, and blacks earn the lowest. Average wage also 
increase with the level of educational attainment: people with at least four years of college earn 
the highest, followed by those with some college but less than four years, and people with high 
school or lower educational attainment earn the lowest on average. Second, the distribution of 
wage by groups of potential experience accords with stylized facts documented by earlier works 
that average wage, as well as wage dispersion, increases with age (Dannefer 1987; Easterlin, 
Macunovich and Crimmins 1993). Specifically, the variance of log hourly wage increases by 
about 130% from 0.32 (= 0.572) for the group with 0-5 years of potential experience to 0.74 
(= 0.862) for the group with 16-20 years of potential experience. 
Statistical Strategy 
My core empirical analyses employ the multilevel growth curve model to predict log hourly 
wage for person i with t years of potential experience. The multilevel growth curve model is a 
statistical tool that allows the researcher to describe the patterns of variability in the individual 
trajectory. Thus, with appropriate modification, this model can be applied to studying the 
microlevel foundations of the varying extents of inequality over the life course. 22F
23
 The multilevel 
                                                        
23
 For an example of multilevel growth curve models in studying cumulative health inequality, see the work by 
Willson and colleagues (2007). 
  
 
36 
growth curve model fits well with the purpose of this study in two respects. First, the method of 
maximum likelihood estimation adopted by this model is flexible with partially missing data and 
the unequally spaced time points of observations (Curran et al. 2010), which are common in the 
wage-related variables in the NLSY79 data. 23F
24
 Second, rather than limiting its attention to a finite 
set of discrete, typological trajectory groups, the multilevel growth curve model allows for 
between-group trajectory differentials as well as variation across individuals’ trajectories within 
observed social groups (Bryk and Raudenbush 1987; Raudenbush 2005). With appropriate 
specifications, the model can be utilized to distinguish between the between- and within-group 
components of cumulative advantage. 24F
25
 
My implementation of the multilevel growth curve model involves two levels. The level-1 
model is organized around the person-year observations, and the level-2 model is organized 
around the individuals. In Level 1, I predict log hourly wage for person i with t years of potential 
experience, denoted by Wit, by the following equation: 
Wit = β0i + β1i ⋅ t + β2 ⋅ t
2 + eit.            (1.7) 
In Eq. (1.7), β0i represents the person-specific random intercept, and β1i represents the 
person-specific random slope on t. With regard to the LCT framework, these two parameters 
have meaningful interpretations: β0i can be interpreted as the person-specific baseline wage, 
                                                        
24
 An important assumption underlying the treatment of missing data by the multilevel growth curve model is that 
missing observations are missing at random (Little and Rubin 1989; Lynch 2003). That is, the likelihood of missing 
should not be systematically associated with other variables in the model. The possibility of violation of this 
assumption, of course, may exist in the real world. Later discussions will deal with the potential implications of such 
violation. 
25
 An alternative method for analyzing longitudinal data is the fixed-effect model. In fact, a number of prior works 
have employed the fixed-effect model to study wage trajectories over the life course (e.g. Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 
2005; Western 2002). This paper chooses to adopt the random-effect setting in the multilevel growth curve model 
rather than the fixed-effect model, because the former allows me to explicitly estimate the level of variation in the 
population distribution of the random slope on years of experience. 
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and β1i can be interpreted as the person-specific wage growth rate. The coefficient β2 captures 
the effect of the squared term of years of experience. While in reality it is possible that β2 varies 
by person, for the sake of parsimony, my main analysis assumes this coefficient is the same for 
everyone.25 F
26
 Yet, in preliminary analyses omitted from the paper, I assessed the possible variation 
of β2 by social groups, and the results are consistent with those assuming a fixed β2. 27 Lastly, 
the residual term eit represents the unexplained random variability of wage for person i at time t. 
In Level 2, I predict the person-specific random intercept β0i and random slope β1i using 
three covariates, S1, S2 and S3, which indicate three dimensions of the individual’s social groups: 
S1 represents gender, S2 represents race and S3 represents the level of educational attainment. 
The level-2 model is expressed by the following two equations: 
β0i = γ00 + γ01S1i + γ02S2i + γ03S3i + u0i ,                 (1.8) 
β1i = γ10 + γ11S1i + γ12S2i + γ13S3i + u1i .                  (1.9) 
Eq. (1.8) specifies person-specific baseline wage. γ00 represents the constant part of the 
baseline wage that is universal across persons and years of experience, and γ01, γ02 and γ03 
represent the effects of gender, race, and educational attainment on baseline wage respectively. 
The residual in baseline wage, u0i, is the person-specific random component in baseline wage 
capturing the unobserved individual heterogeneity that is not explained by the indicators of the 
person’s observed social groups. Eq. (1.9) specifies the person-specific wage growth rate. γ10 
represents the constant part of the growth rate of log hourly wage over t, and γ11, γ12 and γ13 
                                                        
26
 This simplification has also been adopted by earlier studies using the multilevel growth curve model to study 
inequality (e.g., Kim and Sakamoto 2008b; Xie and Hannum 1996). 
27
 With regard to between-group differences, in this preliminary analysis, I found no significant differences in β2 
by gender or race. The only significant difference occurs between individuals with different levels of educational 
attainment: people with higher educational attainment tend to experience a larger negative effect on the squared 
years of potential experience. 
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represent effects of gender, race, and educational attainment on wage growth rate. The residual, 
u1i, captures the random component in wage growth rate that is not explained by the three 
indicators of observed social groups. =I assume u0 and u1 to have zero mean, and allow the 
correlation between these two unobserved residuals to be non-zero. 
Note that my main analyses here assume wage growth rate varies by person yet does not 
change over time. To assess the robustness of my conclusions with regard to this assumption, 
later auxiliary analyses will introduce the temporal variation in wage growth rate to the model. In 
addition, the main analyses do not control for work experience and family-domain life events in 
predicting wage. These time-varying variables may have mediated the effects of gender, race and 
educational attainment on baseline wage and wage growth rate, or they may have contributed to 
some of the residual variations in wage. Later auxiliary analyses will examine whether 
controlling for these time-varying variables explains away some of the variations left 
unexplained by the main analyses. 
Specified by Eq. (1.7) – (1.9), the key elements in this multilevel growth curve model 
correpond directly to the essential properties in the LCT framework introduced earlier: 
In Eq. (1.7), the residual e represents the random component in wage. If Var(e) > 0, the 
random variability property will be supported. 
In Eq. (1.9), the between-person variation in β1 reflects the individual heterogeneity in 
wage trajectories. If Var(β1) > 0, the trajectory heterogeneity property will be supported. 
If between-group cumulative advantage exists in reality, indicators of a person’s social 
groups should affect β0 and β1 in the same direction. Thus, if the pairs of coefficients in β0 
and β1 corresponding to the same covariate (i.e., γ01and γ11, γ02and γ12, γ03and γ13) are all 
significantly different from zero and have the same signs within each pair, this meansthat groups 
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with higher baseline wage experience faster wage growth rate, and thus the between-group 
component of the cumulative advantage property will be supported. 
For within-group cumulative advantage to exist in reality, the residual components in β0i and 
β1i should associate negatively. Thus, if Cov (u0, u1) > 0, this means that within these groups, 
those with higher baseline wage tend to have higher wage growth rate, and the within-group 
component of the cumulative advantage property will be supported. 
For the clarity of demonstration, I summarize the elements in the multilevel growth curve 
model and their correspondence with the essential properties in Table 1.  As such, the 
theoretical components of the LCT framework are linked to the statistical strategy. Establishing 
this link is crucial for the empirical application of the LCT framework. 
Testing for the Significance of Three Essential Properties of the LCT Framework 
 
The first round of empirical analyses employs the multilevel growth curve models introduced 
earlier to test for the significance of three essential properties of the LCT framework. Table 3 
gives the results from two multilevel growth curve models predicting log hourly wage. First, 
does trajectory heterogeneity exist in reality? Model (1) allows individual characteristics to affect 
only baseline wage. Consistent with the patterns from the descriptive statistics, an individual’s 
group attributes are significantly associated with his or her baseline wage: males tend to earn 
higher baseline wage than females; whites earn the highest among the three racial groups, 
followed by Hispanics, and then blacks; baseline wage tends to be the highest for people with at 
least four years of college education, followed by those who had less than four years of college, 
and then those with only a high school degree or less. Model (1) assumes that a person’s wage 
growth rate β1i is solely determined by two factors: a constant slope (γ10), and a person-specific 
random effect (u1i) on wage growth rate. That is, Model (1) allows wage growth rate to vary by 
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person, yet does not allow it to depend systematically on indicators of their measured 
characteristics. 27F
28
 As Table 3 shows, the coefficient on years of potential experience is 
significantly positive (0.052), and the coefficient on squared experience is significantly negative 
(-0.002), indicating that the rate of wage growth decreases with years of potential experience. 
The variance of the person-specific wage growth rate is 0.014 and significantly larger than zero. 
Recall that earlier I have illustrated that the condition Var(β1) > 0 implies that there exists 
substantial heterogeneity in wage trajectories, therefore, the trajectory heterogeneity property is 
supported. 
Next, does cumulative advantage exist in reality? To test this, I further allow wage growth 
rate to depend on indicators of social groups in Model (2). I will discuss the results for 
between-group and within-group cumulative advantage separately. As shown earlier, the 
significance of between-group cumulative advantage can be tested by checking whether groups 
with higher baseline wage tend to experience higher wage growth rate – that is, by checking 
whether the three pairs of coefficients, γ01 and γ11, γ02 and γ12, γ03 and γ13, are 
statistically significant and have the same signs within each pair. The results in Model (2) 
support the significance of cumulative advantage associated with all three indicators of social 
groups: first, being female is significantly associated with lower baseline wage as well as slower 
wage growth rate. This finding contrasts the conclusion in some earlier works that the 
disadvantage in wage for females remains unchanged or even diminishes over their life courses 
(e.g., Bielby and Bielby 1996). Instead, this finding suggests that gender inequality should be 
considered in light of a life course cumulative advantage process (Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Skaggs 2002). Second, in accord with the findings of Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2005), race is 
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 In other words, this model assumes that the variance in 𝛽1 is entirely due to the variance in 𝑢1. 
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also found to be a significant dimension along which cumulative advantage occurs. While there 
is no significant difference between whites and Hispanics in the sample, the results show that 
compared to whites, blacks earn significantly lower baseline wage and experience significantly 
slower wage growth rate. Third, individuals with higher educational attainment, especially those 
with an educational attainment beyond high school, not only receive a higher wage at the 
beginning of their career process, but also experience faster wage growth rate over their lives. 
For a graphic illustration of the between-group cumulative advantage, Figure 2 displays the 
predicted life course trajectories of average wage by gender, race, and educational groups based 
on the estimation of Model (2). In each panel, I contrast the life course trajectories of individuals 
from social groups that have been found to differ significantly in baseline wage as well as wage 
growth rate: males versus females, whites versus blacks, and people with high school or less 
educational attainment versus those with some college but less than four years. Consistent with 
the schematic illustration of cumulative advantage in the earlier-presented Panel B of Figure 1, 
the curves show that individuals belonging to social groups with higher baseline wage tend to 
experience steeper wage trajectories, leading to the divergence of their wage trajectories over the 
life course 
The test for within-group cumulative advantage, however, tells a different story. In Model 
(2), the covariance between the two residual terms, u0 and u1, is negative, which suggests that 
conditional on gender, race, and educational attainment, the residual in baseline wage associates 
negatively with the residual in wage growth rate. This means that among individuals who share 
the same group-level attributes on the three measured dimensions, those with higher wage at the 
beginning tend to have lower wage growth rate, and those who started out at a lower baseline 
wage tend to “catch up” gradually over the life course. The fact that wage trajectories within 
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groups tend to converge over the life course means that the within-group component of 
cumulative advantage is not supported by my analyses. Exploring the specific processes 
underlying such convergence in wage trajectories within groups is beyond the scope of this study. 
Yet, some conjectures could be raised. First, this phenomenon may imply that the labor market 
provides “compensation” for jobs that offer lower starting wages by offering improved prospects 
of wage growth in the future, so that job seekers choosing among different jobs face a “trade-off” 
between a higher wage at the beginning and a faster rate of wage growth (Rosen 1986). Second, 
from the perspective of the individual’s work attitude, it is also possible that among individuals 
with similar observed characteristics, those who earn lower wages at the beginning are 
better-motivated to work harder and achieve faster wage growth in the future than those with 
higher starting wages. Third, it is not uncommon for young workers, especially those with higher 
skills, to “test the water” by “job-shopping” in their early years to learn about their true abilities 
and preferences, or simply to work in a low-skill job such as taxi-driving or doing community 
service, before they shift into a “true” career job (Borjas and Rosen 2012; Johnson 1978). As 
such, the within-group “catch-up” in wage attainment may in part be the manifestation of these 
people moving from career-atypical jobs to true career jobs over time.28F
29
 Fourth, one defining 
feature of the recent rise in economic inequality in the United Statesis the divergence of the 
income of the super-rich (e.g., the top 1%) from the income of the majority of wage earners 
(McCall and Percheski 2010; Piketty 2014; Volscho and Kelly 2012), which is likely driven by 
the top income earners’ cumulative advantage in obtaining higher earnings. The super-rich take 
up a small portion of the population and are difficult to capture with survey data, especially given 
NLSY79 data’s oversampling of low-wage individuals. If the analyses are applied to a larger 
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 This could be tested by excluding the beginning few years of potential experience, or by a detailed examination 
about the occupational mismatch at these individuals’ first few jobs. 
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sample of top income earners, however, it is possible that within-group cumulative advantage 
will be observed for this specific share of population. 
Finally, does the random variability property exist in reality? The results suggest yes. In 
Model (1) and Model (2), the residual takes a significantly positive variance of 0.165, which 
equals about ¼ of the variance in individuals’ random intercept. Hence, random variability takes 
up a substantial portion of total wage inequality and the random variability property is supported. 
The last column of Table 1 summarizes the findings by stating whether the proposed 
properties are supported (marked by a tick) or not (marked by a cross) by data. Both the random 
variability property and the trajectory heterogeneity property are supported by data, while the 
findings for the cumulative advantage property are mixed: cumulative advantage exists between 
groups defined by gender, race, and educational attainment, but does not exist within these 
groups. 
Assessing the Contributions of Three Mechanisms to the Observed Growth of Intracohort 
Wage Inequality 
 
Given the significance of the random variability property, trajectory heterogeneity property, and 
between-group cumulative advantage property in life course wage attainment revealed by the 
above analysis, I now go on to assess the contributions of these mechanisms to the growth of 
total intracohort wage inequality by implementing the following four-step simulation 
procedure. 29F
30
 
Step 1. I use the estimated coefficients (each denoted by the true coefficient with a hat) from 
Model (2) to predict log hourly wage for person i with t years of potential experience, that is: 
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 According to my earlier analyses, only between-group cumulative advantage is supported by data, while 
within-group cumulative advantage is not. Thus, the assessment of the contribution of cumulative advantage to the 
change in total intracohort wage inequality will focus only on the between-group component. 
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Wit̂ = β0î + β1î ⋅ t + β2̂ ⋅ t
2, where β0î, β1î and  β2̂ are calculated by Eq. (8) and Eq. (9). 
Step 2.  I calculate wage inequality among this cohort of individuals at each year of potential 
experience using the variance of log hourly wage predicted from Step 1. I denote the variance of 
log hourly wage at t years of potential experience by Var(Wt̂). Since Var(Wt̂) is estimated 
from the full model (Model (2)), it represents the predicted wage inequality assuming that both 
trajectory heterogeneity and between-group cumulative advantage are at work, therefore, I term 
it “TH+BCA”. 
Step 3. Similar to Step 1, I conduct another round of prediction of log hourly wage. Yet, I 
manipulate the wage attainment process by “shutting down” the mechanism of between-group 
cumulative advantage while preserving the heterogeneity in wage trajectories. That is, I simulate 
the counterfactual of wage trajectories under the assumption that only trajectory heterogeneity is 
at work but between-group cumulative advantage is not. To do so, I generate log hourly wage by: 
Wit
∗̂ = β0î + β1i
∗̂ ⋅ t + β2̂ ⋅ t
2, where I generate values of β1
∗̂  so that Var(β1
∗̂) = Var(β1̂) under 
the restriction that β1
∗  is uncorrelated with S1, S2 or S3. Details about the technical procedure 
for constructing the counterfactual wage trajectories are presented in Appendix B. 
Step 4. Similar to Step 2, I calculate wage inequality using the log hourly wage at each year of 
potential experience predicted from Step 3, which form the trajectory of Var(Wt
∗̂). Because 
Var(Wt
∗̂) represents the predicted wage inequality under the assumption that only trajectory 
heterogeneity is at work but between-group cumulative advantage is not, I term it “TH”. 
Through the above four steps, I have obtained two sequences of predicted intracohort wage 
inequality: TH and TH+BCA. 30F
31
 These two sequences of predictions then help me to discern the 
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Note that the other components in the wage determination equation either affect only the time-invariance baseline 
wage (e.g., determinants for β0i) or affect the level of wage equally for everybody (e. g. , β2 ⋅ 𝑡
2), so they will not 
bring about any change in between-person wage inequality.  
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contributions of trajectory heterogeneity and between-group cumulative advantage to the total 
intracohort pattern of wage inequality: if TH increases with t, this means the mechanism of 
trajectory heterogeneity will contribute to the increase in wage inequality – a finding that 
supports Hypothesis 2; if TH+BCA increases with t at a faster rate than TH, this means that 
adding the mechanism of between-group cumulative advantage will further accelerate the growth 
of wage inequality over the life course – a finding that supports Hypothesis 3; if, after controlling 
for both TH and BCA, there still exists an extra increase in wage inequality that is not explained, 
this implies that the accumulation of random variability has contributed to the growth of 
intracohort wage inequality– a finding that supports Hypothesis 1. 
As an important last step, I adjust the observed and predicted intracohort wage inequality by 
the historical trend of wage inequality in the macroeconomy. This adjustment is necessary 
because given the well-documented surge of wage inequality in the United States during the 
observation window (i.e., from 1979 to 2010) of the NLSY79 cohort (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
2008; Lemieux 2006; McCall and Percheski 2010), it is possible that the increase in wage 
inequality among the NLSY79 respondents over the observed period is driven entirely by the 
economy-wide increase in wage inequality, rather than the discussed mechanisms underlying 
individuals’ life course trajectories. Hence, the purpose of this adjustment is to rule out the 
confounding effect of the changing macroeconomy on the growth of intracohort wage inequality 
across the observed period. This adjustment is implemented as a standardization process similar 
to the better-known adjustment process for Consumer Price Index, except that my adjustment 
factor is the level of wage inequality instead of the price index. First, I estimate the year-specific 
index for wage inequality in the American macroeconomy using the Current Population Survey, 
which provides large-sample nationally-representative estimates of American wage inequality for 
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each calendar year. Then, I match this index to each individual observation based on the year at 
which wage information was recorded. Lastly, I use the matched indexes to convert the wage 
inequalities measured for the NLSY79 cohort at different years to the comparable level of wage 
inequality at year 2000. 31F
32
 The detailed procedure of this adjustment is presented in Appendix C. 
Figure 3 plots the observed and predicted inequality in log hourly wage by years of labor 
market experience. The solid curve indicates the observed wage inequality – measured by the 
variance of log hourly wage – among NLSY79 respondents from zero to twenty years of 
potential experience. During this period, the observed intracohort wage inequality – by the 
measure of variance of log hourly wage – has more than doubled from about 0.368 to 0.753. 
Thus, the general pattern suggests that the life course works as a differentiation process through 
which individuals become increasingly differentiated from each other in terms of wage. The 
lowest curve (dashed) in this figure is the TH curve, which gives the predicted variance of log 
hourly wage by years of potential experience under the assumption that only trajectory 
heterogeneity is at work while between-group cumulative advantage is not. The upward slope of 
this curve indicates that the mechanism of trajectory heterogeneity causes intracohort wage 
inequality to increase over the life course – a result that supports Hypothesis 2. 
The dash-dotted curve, which is located above the TH curve, is the TH + BCA curve. It 
gives the predicted variance of log hourly wage by potential experience under the assumption 
that both trajectory heterogeneity and between-group cumulative advantage are at work (i.e., 
TH+ BCA). Intracohort wage inequality increases at a faster speed under TH+BCA than it does 
under TH, which suggests that introducing the mechanism of between-group cumulative 
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 Because wage inequality is calculated by individuals’ years of potential experience, it is likely that individual 
observations for each year of potential experience are recorded at different calendar years. In this case, I will take 
the average of the adjustment factor of wage inequality across the individual observations recorded at different 
calendar years and construct the average adjustment factor in my calculation of adjusted wage inequality. 
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advantage based on gender, race, and educational attainment further accelerates the increase in 
intracohort wage inequality over the life course. This result is consistent with the prediction from 
Hypothesis 3 that intracohort wage inequality increases over the life course due to the 
mechanism of between-group cumulative advantage. 
Meanwhile, the gap between the observed inequality and the TH+BCA curve represents the 
residual variance in wage that is not explained by the model. Therefore, it measures the 
magnitude of the random variability in wage inequality. The figure shows that over the twenty 
years of life course, the magnitude of random variability has grown gradually. Hence, this 
finding supports Hypothesis 1. Relating this result to my earlier discussion, this result is 
consistent with arguments from some earlier works that individuals carry wage fluctuations at the 
early life stages to later life stages, which results in the accumulation of random variability over 
the life course. 
Finally, to what extent does each mechanism contribute to the total increase in intracohort 
wage inequality? To quantify the contributions of the three mechanisms respectively, I first 
illustrate that their contributions to total wage inequality are separable. The illustration is quite 
straightforward: recall that in Eq. (4), I have decomposed the variance in log wage into the 
summation of four additive and separable components: V1,V2,V3 and V4. Therefore, the change 
in Vart over the life course, denoted by ΔVart, can be decomposed as below: 
ΔVart = ΔV1 + ΔV2 + ΔV3 + ΔV4 .             (1.10) 
Eq. (10) suggests that the change in total intracohort wage inequality can be separated into 
the changes in the four separable variance components of the total wage inequality. As illustrated 
earlier, random variability, trajectory heterogeneity, and cumulative advantage contribute to total 
inequality through V4, V2 and V3 respectively, therefore, their contributions to the growth of 
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total wage inequality over time will be separately measured by ΔV4, ΔV2 and ΔV3. Table 4 
demonstrates, with each row, the intracohort wage inequality (1) in the observed sample, (2) 
under TH, (3) under TH+BCA, and (4) in the residual. The second and third columns give the 
level of wage inequality measured at the entrance and twentieth year of labor market experience 
respectively. The fourth column calculates the change in wage inequality between these two 
points in life. The last column expresses this change as the percentage of the observed change in 
total wage inequality. As the last column indicates, the mechanism of trajectory heterogeneity, 
alone, explains 50.39% of the total increase in wage inequality. Introducing the mechanism of 
cumulative advantage based on gender, race, and educational attainment explains an extra 7.01% 
(=57.40%-50.39%) of the total increase in wage inequality. In total, the combination of these two 
mechanisms explains about two thirds (57.40%) of the total increase in wage inequality. The 
empirical finding of a much larger effect of trajectory heterogeneity than cumulative advantage 
accords with my earlier expectations informed by the mathematical formalization.32F
33
 
The rest of the increase in wage inequality, taking up 42.60% of the observed growth of 
wage inequality over the cohort’s life course, is due to the increase in residual inequality. It 
reflects the increase in the random variability which is left unexplained by the observed variables 
incorporated in this model.  The findings suggest that at least for the first twenty years of labor 
market experience of this specific NLSY79 cohort, a substantial share of total growth of wage 
inequality over their lives is attributable to the growth of random variability. In a broader sense, 
this finding is consistent with, and provides new evidence for, the recent findings in the 
stratification literature that earnings attainment in American society in the post-1980 era is 
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 Yet, the relatively small size of the quantitative contribution of between-group cumulative advantage should not 
be taken as an indication of the non-significance of this mechanism. In fact, the significant effects of individuals’ 
group attributes on both baseline wage and wage growth rate provide evidence that gender, race, and educational 
attainment have played salient roles in the long-term stratification of individuals over their life courses. 
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marked by substantial earnings volatility and economic insecurity (Gottschalk et al. 2011; 
Western et al. 2012). 
 
AUXILIARY ANALYSES 
 
As mentioned earlier, the LCT framework is designed for studying the intracohort pattern of 
inequality in general, and thus may not exactly fit every particular situation in reality. Yet, 
fortunately, the richness of measures in the NLSY79 data allows me to empirically assess the 
potential implications of relaxing some of the key assumptions in the model. Next, I present 
results from two auxiliary analyses. The first relaxes the assumption of the time-invariance of 
wage growth rate for an individual, and the second introduces controls for time-varying 
indicators of work and family domain experiences. 
Introducing the Temporal Variation of Wage Growth Rate 
Recall that the main analyses impose the simplifying assumption that the rate of wage growth – 
represented by β1i – is constant over t. In reality, however, it is possible that the rate of wage 
growth changes over the life course for the same person. To account for this possibility, I 
introduce the temporal variation of wage growth rate to the multilevel growth curve model by 
replacing the linear function of potential experience with a piece-wise linear function (i.e., a 
spline function). The spline function contains two knots, one at six years of potential experience 
and the other at fourteen years of potential experience, to separate the time period between zero 
to twenty years of potential experience into three parts. I define t1, t2 and t3 as below: 
t1 = {
t, if t ∈ [0,6]
6, if t ∈ [7,20]
; t2 = {
0, if t ∈ [0,6]
t − 6, if t ∈ [7,13]
7, if t ∈ [14,20]
; t3 = {
0, if t ∈ [0,13]
t − 13, if t ∈ [14,20]
.    (1.11) 
With t1, t2 and t3 defined as above, I re-write Eq. (1.7) into the piece-wise linear form: 
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Wit = β0i + β1i
1 ⋅ t1 + β1i
2 ⋅ t2 + β1i
3 ⋅ t3 + eit ,            (1.12) 
 
where β0i is specified in the same way as in Eq. (1.8), and each β1i
j
 (j=1, 2, and 3, 
representing the coefficient for each of the three periods) is specified as: 
β1i
j
= γ10
j
+ γ11
j
S1i + γ12
j
S2i + γ13
j
S3i + u1i
j
,       for j = 1,2, and 3.            (1.13) 
 
That is, the piece-wise linear function estimates the effects of group attributes on wage growth 
rate distinctively for each life stage. I estimate this model using the same data as used in the main 
analyses, and the selected coefficients on the S’s and variance components are reported in Panel 
A of Appendix Table 1.D1. 33F
34
 Overall, wage growth rate tend to be steepest during the 
individual’s early career, and the growth rate shrinks at later life stages. The effects of gender, 
race, and educational attainment on baseline wage are similar to those in the main analyses, yet 
their effects on wage growth rate vary by life stages: The negative effect of being female on 
wage growth rate is greater in the earlier stages of experience than in the later stage. The 
negative effect of being black on wage growth rate is greatest and significant during 7–13 years 
of labor market experience. The directions of the effects of gender and race on wage growth rate 
during the three periods are all consistent with those in the main analyses. The case of education, 
however, is more complicated. The table shows that individuals with higher educational 
attainment experience faster wage growth in the 0–6 years of labor market experience, and their 
advantage in wage growth rate become small and insignificant during 7–13 years. During the last 
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 While the partition of potential experience into three parts in the piece-wise linear components is largely up to the 
discretion of the author, the findings do not alter substantially if I separate the twenty years of experience into four 
equal parts instead of three parts.  
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period (14–20 years), however, the effect of higher educational attainment on wage growth rate 
turns out to be negative and is significant between those with high school degree or less and 
those who have at least a college education. This suggests that the earnings advantage of more 
highly-educated individuals tends to shrink slightly after 14 years of labor market experience. 
One possible explanation of this shrinkage is the “ceiling effect” – that is, wage increases are 
more difficult to achieve once the highly-educated workers have already achieved a high level of 
absolute earnings. Another possibility is that highly educated individuals who earn extremely 
high wages are more likely to drop out of the sample at older ages, resulting in a moderate 
shrinkage in wage gap between highly- and lowly-educated individuals in the observed sample. 
Panel B of Appendix Table 1.D1, which gives the variance components of the model, suggests 
wage growth rate varies substantially throughout the three life stages. 34F
35
 Similar to the earlier 
Figure 2, Appendix Figure 1.D1 compares the predicted average log hourly wage by years of 
experience for different gender, race, and educational groups. The figure shows that although the 
spped at which the gaps between groups widen over the life course vary by life stage, the wage 
gaps between different dimensions of social groups are all wider at the end than at the beginning 
of this twenty-year period. In short, the auxiliary analyses suggest that my main conclusions are 
not altered by allowing wage growth rate to vary over the life course. 
Introducing Time-varying Controls for Work and Family Domain Experiences 
My main analyses focus on the total effects of pre-market time-invariant group attributes (gender, 
race, and educational attainment) on wage growth rate. Those models do not control for work 
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 The model reported in the table imposes the assumption that the covariances between u0, u1,1. u12, and u1,3 
are zero, because otherwise the large number of unknown covariances will make their estimation computationally 
expensive and unstable. However, in a separate model not reported here, I replace this zero-covariance assumption 
with the assumption that the covariances between these terms are equal. That model yields a negative covariance 
between these terms, which is consistent with my main findings of the negative association between baseline wage 
and wage growth rate within social groups. 
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and family domain experiences that occurred during the individuals’ labor market experience. 
Since these experiences mediate the effect of pre-market characteristics on wage growth rate, it is 
reasonable to expect that the effects of these group attributes on wage attainment will shrink after 
work and family domain experiences have been controlled for. In addition, since the occurrences 
and wage impacts of some experiences cannot be fully anticipated, one could expect the 
inclusion of these experiences to explain away part of the residual variance. In the following, I 
will add time-varying indicators of individuals’ work and family domain experiences to the 
original multilevel growth curve model. Using Xit to denote these time-varying controls, I 
re-specify Eq. 1. (7) as: 
Wit = β0i + β1i ⋅ t + β2 ⋅ t
2 + ∑ βk ⋅ Xit
K
k=1⏟        
Time−varying
controls
+ eit.            (1.14) 
In Eq. (1.14), the variables in X contains work and family domain experiences. The work 
domain experiences include the individual’s tenure (measured in weeks) with his or her current 
employer, the total number of hours worked in the previous year, the number of weeks spent 
unemployed and out of the labor force in the previous year, and the interactions between these 
work experience variables and the individual’s years of potential experience. The model also 
includes the individual’s time-varying occupational categories coded on a 41-category scheme. 
The controls for family domain experiences include the individual’s time-varying marital status 
and the number of children in the household, as well as the interactions between these variables 
with gender to capture the heterogeneity in the wage effects of these experiences. 
The results are reported in Appendix Table 1.D2. Model D1 does not include the effect of 
group attributes on wage growth rate and Model D2 includes them. As expected, controlling for 
time-varying work and family domain experiences leads to the shrinkage of the effect size of 
gender, race, and educational attainment on baseline wage as well as wage growth rate. For 
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example, in predicting baseline wage, the coefficient on being female shrinks in absolute size 
from -0.205 in the main analyses to -0.138 in the model with controls for work and family 
domain experiences. And in predicting wage growth rate, the coefficient on being female shrinks 
slightly in magnitude from -0.010 to -0.0092. Compared to those who did not receive college 
education, the college-educated experience a significantly faster wage growth rate by 0.006 per 
year in the main analyses, yet the coefficient becomes much smaller (0.0027) and insignificant in 
the model with controls for work and family experiences. Thus, the auxiliary analyses suggest 
that part of the total effects of group attributes on baseline wage and wage growth is mediated by 
work and family domain experiences that unfold gradually over the individual’s life course. 
The effect of including these controls on reducing the size of variance components, however, 
is minimal. The variance of u1 in Model A1 and A2 is 0.016 and is larger than that in Model (1) 
and Model (2) (which is 0.014). 35F
36
 As for the residual variance Var(e), there is only a very 
moderate decrease in the residual variance from the model without controls (0.165) to the model 
with controls (0.152). The next question is: does controlling for these experiences help explain 
some of the growth in residual variance over the life course? Appendix Figure 1.D2 plots the 
residual variance by years of potential experience under the model with and without 
time-varying controls. The figure shows that the inclusion of the work and family domain 
experiences reduces the amount or growth of residual variance by a very minimal amount. 
The lack of explanatory power of these work and family experiences in accounting for the 
growth of residual variance over time may be due to the fact that more subtle mechanisms 
affecting life course wage trajectories lie within the organizational environment and network 
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 Whether the difference between the two is significant is uncertain, but this at least implies that the 
between-person variation in wage growth rate is no less in the model with controls for these observed work and 
family domain experiences than in the model without these controls. 
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structure of the workplace, which are not directly measured by the NLSY79 data. For example, 
Tomaskovic-Devey and colleagues (2005) pointed out that workplace networks, organizational 
arrangement, and employer-employee relations are crucial to sociological understandings of 
career trajectories and wage inequality. With either quantitative or qualitative data that provide 
finer-grained measures of the organizational settings and workplace dynamics over time, this will 
be a promising area for future works to explore the underlying organizational dynamics that 
produce the intracohort pattern of wage inequality over individuals’ lives. 
 
DISCUSSION OF LIMITATIONS 
 
Like all empirical investigations, the analyses in this study should be interpreted with careful 
consideration for several important limitations. The first limitation is the missing wage 
information. In the NLSY79 data, wage information is missing when the individual is not 
working at the time of interview, or when the individual simply did not answer the survey. This 
paragraph will focus on the first type of missing wage information and the next two paragraphs 
will discuss the second. Earlier, I noted that the multilevel growth curve model, in itself, is 
flexible with regard to missing observations and unbalanced data across individuals. Yet, if those 
who are not working are systematically different from those who are working, potential biases of 
model estimation may occur. It is possible that, if they had worked, those who chose not to work 
would have received lower wages than the population average, which would cause the estimated 
wage for those currently working to be upwardly biased with regard to the population. In 
addition, there may exist significant group differences in the likelihood of missing wage 
information: women are likely to spend more time not working than men and, thus, to have a 
higher likelihood of not reporting wage information. Therefore, the estimated coefficients may 
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be more representative of the wages for men than for women. Even without such 
non-randomness in missing wage information, the analyses could still benefit from an enlarged 
sample and thus a higher power of statistical estimation if some basic imputation for missing 
data is performed. To explore this briefly, I imputed an individual’s missing hourly wage for a 
certain year using his or her own wage in the closest wage record prior to that year, provided that 
the closest wage record is within the previous three years. The results are reported in Appendix 
Table 1.E.36F
37
 The results in Model A3 and Model A4 are consistent with those in Model (1) and 
Model (2) from Table 3 of the main analyses. 
The second limitation relates to survey nonresponse. 37F
38
 While the missing wage information 
discussed above generates missing data on the key dependent variable, a survey nonresponse 
generates missing data of an entire person-year observation. With regard to the overall amount, 
the problem of nonresponses is mild for the NLSY79 data, as the total nonresponse rate is 
reported to be very low. 38F
39
 Still, the systematic dependence of the likelihood of nonresponse upon 
individual characteristics could potentially affect the estimation of the variance in wages (Lynch 
2003). Hence, it is necessary to examine the temporal pattern of nonresponse. Appendix Table 
1.F gives the means and standard deviations of the respondents’ average wage in the previous 
three years by response status in the current year at 3, 5, 10, 15, and 18 years of potential 
experience, respectively. These numbers suggest that the nonresponse sample tends to have 
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 After imputation, the number of person-year observations increased from 133,121 to 186,269. 
38
 Here, I use the term “survey nonresponse” instead of “attribution” because, while some individuals drop out of 
the sample permanently after one wave of nonresponse (i.e., attrition), other individuals did not participate in certain 
waves of the survey (nonresponse), yet came back for later waves. Hence, the category of “survey nonresponse” 
covers a wider range of missing data problems. 
39
 As the latest NLS handbook (2005) indicates, the retention rate – that is, the number of respondents interviewed 
divided by the number of respondents remaining eligible for interview at each wave – remained above 90 percent in 
the beginning years and was around 85 percent in most subsequent years (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005). The 
handbook also indicates that in year 2002, over 75% of the respondents remained in the sample. 
  
 
56 
lower average wages but higher wage variations than the response sample, and thus the estimated 
wage inequality may understate the true level of inequality in the population. More importantly, 
the gap in wage variation between those who responded and those who did not grows from 
earlier to later life stages. This implies that it is possible that my estimation of life course growth 
of wage inequality based on the NLSY79 response sample understates the true increase of wage 
inequality in this cohort. 39F
40
 
Another pertinent pattern of survey nonresponses is the association between nonresponses 
and individuals’ group characteristics. Appendix Figure 1.F plots the share of survey 
nonresponses as a proportion of the total sample in the first wave by years of potential 
experience for different social groups. Overall, the share of nonresponses increases over time, 
and flattens out after about ten years of experience. There exist some group differences in the 
pattern of nonresponses: males have a larger nonresponse share than females; whites have a 
larger nonresponse share than racial minorities. Thus, the sample may under-represent men and 
whites at later years. Individuals’ different levels of educational attainment alter the timing of 
nonresponse: the nonresponse share of those with some college but less than four years starts to 
rise the earliest, while that of those with high school education or less remains low in the 
beginning years and starts to catch up at around ten years of experience. Hence, individuals with 
lower educational attainment may be over-represented during early life stages. With the presence 
of such group differences in the pattern of survey nonresponses, the representativeness of 
variance estimations may be affected accordingly. However, such group differences are unlikely 
to cause much bias to the model coefficients, as these observed characteristics are already 
included as covariates in the multilevel growth curve models. Yet the presence of selective 
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nonresponses based on unobserved characteristics could still cause more complex biases in the 
estimated coefficients (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2013). 
Third, due to data limitations, my analytic sample is restricted to the span of life up to the 
respondent’s twentieth year of potential experience. Whether the results could be extrapolated to 
later stages of life depends critically on whether mechanisms affecting individuals’ wage 
trajectories in early- and mid-career will continue to affect these wage trajectories in the same 
manner during late-career. Meanwhile, some unique features of later life inequality are worth 
noting when making such extrapolations: mortality rate will be higher at later stages, and the 
dependence of mortality rate on gender, race, education, and earnings is likely to affect economic 
inequality at later life stages. In addition, with the growing hazards of physical and mental 
problems in later life, disparities in these outcomes, rather than economic standings alone, are 
worth considering for an older population. I await future waves of NLSY79 to allow for 
investigation of the inequality-generating process at later life stages. 
Fourth, while hourly wage is a good indicator of an individual’s earning ability in the labor 
market—a site where economic inequality is initially generated—this measure may not capture 
the total material resources available in the family, another focal site of economic stratification. A 
number of family-level indicators, such as the family’s total disposable income and total assets, 
may provide better measures of the consumption capability and living conditions for the 
individual. In addition, recent works have emphasized that the effects of economic fluctuations, 
especially those due to adverse events, are mitigated by risk pooling within the family as well as 
policy aids for low-income families (Western et al. 2012; Western, Bloome, and Percheski 2008). 
In future works, family-level indicators of economic resources may be further explored to form a 
more comprehensive picture of the changes in inequality over the life course. 
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Last but not least, the NLSY79 cohort was exposed to the labor market at a specific 
historical period (1979–2010) in the United States. Earlier, in an attempt to correct for the drastic 
growth of macrolevel wage inequality during this period in the U.S., my analyses borrowed 
external information from the Current Population Survey to adjust accordingly. However, this 
adjustment is certainly not sufficient to account as many other profound processes specific to this 
social and historical context may have shaped wage trajectories. These processes include 
structural trends such as rising returns to skills, technological advances, deindustrialization, 
financialization, de-unionization, and globalization, demographic trends such as the decline in 
marriage and fertility rates and the increase in non-marital childbearing, as well as business 
fluctuations such as the economic recession in the early 1980s and the recent recession from 
2007 to 2009. To the extent that microlevel mechanisms have interacted with these contextual 
processes in producing the intracohort pattern of wage inequality, the mechanisms revealed by 
my empirical analyses may not operate in the exact same way for another cohort within a 
different social and historical context. I believe that applications of this framework to other social 
and historical contexts will greatly enrich the sociological knowledge of the interaction between 
social context and the individual life course, and should thus be a promising field of future 
investigations. And furthermore, with longitudinal data that follow a wider range of cohorts of 
population over time, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, it would be possible to 
extend the LCT framework to separate the effect of age from the effect of period trends on wage 
inequality. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past decades, sociologists have engaged in a collective endeavor to understand patterns 
of wage inequality in society. Following this line of inquiry, a large body of research has been 
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devoted to examining the cross-sectional and intercohort patterns of wage inequality. Yet, these 
two areas of inequality research generally treat each individual as a single point of observation, 
overlooking the process through which wage inequality develops over individuals’ life courses. 
As a result, relatively little is known about the intracohort pattern of wage inequality. Much of 
this neglect is due to the lack of an integral framework to study this macrolevel pattern of 
inequality from its microlevel basis in the life course wage trajectories. To fill this gap, this paper 
established a life course trajectory (LCT) framework for understanding the intracohort pattern of 
wage inequality. 
The LCT framework brings the life course perspective into inequality research. Specifically, 
it identifies the life course wage trajectory as the basis for the intracohort pattern of wage 
inequality. The framework is based on the central thesis that an appropriate framework for 
understanding the intracohort pattern of wage inequality should satisfy three essential properties: 
(1) random variability, (2) trajectory heterogeneity, and (3) cumulative advantage. After 
theoretically conceptualizing these three properties, I proposed a mathematical formalization of 
the LCT framework that integrates them under a common model. Both the theoretical argument 
and the mathematical formalization implied that intracohort wage inequality will increase over 
the life course due to the accumulation of random variability, the heterogeneity in wage 
trajectories, and the mechanism of cumulative advantage. Finally, I combined the LCT 
framework with the multilevel growth curve model and applied it to a nationally-representative 
longitudinal dataset. Empirical analyses not only enabled testing for the existence of the 
proposed essential properties in reality, but also revealed the contributions of the three 
mechanisms to the total increase in wage inequality over the life course. 
The LCT framework contributes to the sociological literature on three levels: theoretical, 
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empirical, and methodological. In recent decades, the sociological community has become 
increasingly interested in understanding the microlevel foundations of macrolevel social 
phenomena. As such, a growing demand has emerged for theoretical frameworks that help 
conceptualize the macro-micro linkage in the stratification system. By examining the case of life 
course inequality, this study provides future researchers with a theoretical framework that 
explicates the process through which the life course wage dynamics on the individual level give 
rise to the pattern of intracohort wage inequality on the aggregate level. It shows that the 
aggregate pattern of inequality should, and could, be understood from its basis in the life course 
trajectory. 
Second, the LCT framework does not limit itself to pedagogical illustrations. In fact, this 
framework can be combined with the statistical strategy of the multilevel growth curve model 
and tested with real data. Empirical evidence confirms the significance of the random variability, 
trajectory heterogeneity, and between-group cumulative advantage properties in reality. In 
addition, my empirical analysis is the first to reveal the contributions of different mechanisms to 
the intracohort growth in wage inequality for this cohort in the United States:the results suggest 
that the mechanisms of trajectory heterogeneity and between-group cumulative advantage 
together explain over half (57.40%) of the increase in wage inequality across the 20-year life 
span, and the rest of the inequality growth is due to the accumulation of random variability. 
The third contribution of the LCT framework is methodological. On the one hand, although 
earlier studies have invoked the multilevel growth curve model in analyzing inequality across the 
life course (e.g., Willson et al. 2007; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2002), they have not situated this 
statistical method within an integral framework. My LCT framework complements these earlier 
applications by allowing researchers to interpret the statistical parameters within the context of a 
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sociologically meaningful framework (refer to Table 1 for a brief review). On the other hand, 
while previous works typically use the multilevel growth curve models to test for the 
significance of one or more long-term mechanisms, few have adopted this strategy to 
quantitatively assess the contributions of various distinct microlevel mechanisms to total wage 
inequality. My empirical application, instead, illustrated a method for decomposing the change in 
total wage inequality into separable components that are due to different mechanisms. 
The LCT framework is part of an ongoing sociological effort to understand the production 
and reproduction of social inequality. In particular, I offer two recommendations for future 
research to utilize and extend the LCT framework. First, as I discussed earlier, human lives 
proceed through the interaction of multiple domains of life course outcomes. While my LCT 
framework was originally designed to study wage inequality, it has the potential to extend to 
other domains of individual outcomes, such as cognitive development, physical and mental 
well-being, political opinions, and family living conditions. Second, in essence, the LCT 
framework focuses specifically on the life course mobility process from year to year for the same 
individual. Yet, more broadly, the trajectory of inequality could occur among social units that are 
larger than the individual. For example, family has long been considered as the key structural 
unit in the stratification system. If we change the unit of analysis from the individual to the 
family, and replace the individual’s life course trajectory with the multi-generational family 
lineage, this framework could be used to study intergenerational mobility within the same 
family—a process crucial to patterns of intergenerational and historical inequality (Chan and 
Boliver 2013; Mare 2011). When applied in this way, the framework could be utilized to answer 
questions such as “Does the heterogeneity in the trajectories of family lineages contribute to the 
growth of inequality among different families over generations?” (i.e., a question corresponding 
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to trajectory heterogeneity) or “Does the advantage of high-status families persist, magnify, or 
diminish over multiple generations?” (i.e., a question corresponding to cumulative advantage). 
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Figure 1 Schematic demonstration of the contributions of trajectory heterogeneity and 
cumulative advantage to the intracohort pattern of wage inequality. 
 
 
 
 
   Panel A  Illustration of trajectory heterogeneity      
 
               
 
    Panel B  Illustration of cumulative advantage 
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Figure 2 Predicted average log hourly wage by years of potential experience, by gender, race and 
educational groups 
 
  
 
 
SOURCE. - National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Figure 3 Observed and predicted variance of log hourly wage by years of potential experience 
 
SOURCE. - National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE. - Observed inequality is the variance of log hourly wage of the sample, TH is the 
variance of the predicted wage under the assumption that only trajectory heterogeneity is at work, 
and TH+BCA is the variance of the predicted wage under the assumption that both trajectory 
heterogeneity and between-group cumulative advantage are at work. 
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Table 1 Summary of the essential properties, corresponding hypotheses, conditions in the mathematicla formalization, elements 
in the multilevel growth curve model, and the results from empirical analyses of the LCT framework. 
 
Essential 
property 
Corresponding hypothesis Condition in mathematical formalization 
Element in the multilevel growth 
curve model 
Supported 
by data? 
Random 
variability 
property 
Intracohort inequality will 
increase over the life course 
due to the accumulation of 
random variability. 
Var(e) > 0 Var(e) > 0 ✔ 
Trajectory 
heterogeneity 
property 
Intracohort inequality will 
increases over the life course 
due to trajectory 
heterogeneity. 
Var(θ) > 0 Var(β1) > 0 ✔ 
Cumulative 
advantage 
property 
Intracohort inequality will 
increases over the life course 
due to cumulative advantage. 
Between-group  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸(𝜆|𝑆), 𝐸(𝜃|𝑆))>0 
The pairs of 𝛾01 and 𝛾11 , 𝛾02 and 
𝛾12 , 𝛾03and 𝛾13  are significant and 
have the same signs within each pair. ✔ 
Within-group 𝐸(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜆, 𝜃|𝑆) > 0 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢1, 𝑢0) > 0 ✗ 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the NLSY79 sample used in the empirical analysis 
 
Panel A:  Time-invariant variables Percentage 
Gender Male 50.84 
 Female 49.16 
Race White 79.82 
 Hispanic 6.31 
 Black 13.87 
Educational 
attainment 
High school or less 58.35 
Some college but less than four years 21.74 
 At lease four years of college 19.91 
   
Panel B: Log hourly wage by demographic characteristics      Mean log hourly wage      S.D. of log hourly wage   
By gender Male 2.48 0.68 
  Female 2.22 0.70 
By race White 2.38 0.71 
  Hispanic 2.30 0.68 
  Black 2.20 0.64 
By educational 
attainment 
High school or less 2.24 0.61 
Some college but less than four years 2.40 0.69 
At least four years of college 2.59 0.85 
     
Panel C:  Log hourly wage by potential experience                   Mean log hourly wage     S.D. of log hourly wage  
 0-5 years of potential experience 2.26 0.57 
 6-10 years of potential experience 2.39 0.64 
 11-15 years of potential experience 2.45 0.69 
 16-20 years of potential experience 2.52 0.86 
 
SOURCE.- National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE.- All sample statistics are weighted. 
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Table 3 Estimated coefficients from multilevel growth curve models predicting log hourly wage 
 
 
SOURCE.- National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE.- *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All 
analyses are weighted.  
  
    Model (1) Model (2) 
  
 
Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig. 
Coefficients predicting baseline wage β0       
  Constant intercept (γ00) 1.952 (0.011) *** 1.926 (0.013) *** 
  Gender (𝛾01) [Reference: male]         
     Female -0.252 (0.011) *** -0.205 (0.015) *** 
  Race(γ02) [Reference: white]       
     Hispanic -0.011 (0.013)  0.007 (0.017)  
     Black -0.118 (0.013) *** -0.083 (0.019) *** 
  Educational attainment(γ03) [Reference: high school or less]       
     Some college but less than four years 0.331 (0.012) *** 0.302 (0.016) *** 
     At least four years of college 0.734 (0.017) *** 0.723 (0.018) *** 
Coefficients predicting wage growth rate β1      
  Constant slope (γ10) 0.052 (0.002) *** 0.058 (0.002) *** 
  Gender (𝛾11) [Reference: male]           
     Female       -0.010 (0.002) *** 
  Race (𝛾12) [Reference: white]            
     Hispanic       -0.004 (0.002)  
     Black       -0.008 (0.002) ** 
  Educational attainment (𝛾13) [Reference: high school or less]     
     Some college but less than four years    0.006 (0.003) * 
     At least four years of college    0.002 (0.004)  
Other coefficient       
                       Squared experience (β2) -0.002 (0.000) *** -0.002 (0.000) *** 
        
Variance components       
  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢0) 0.637 (0.082) *** 0.636 (0.081) *** 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1) 0.014 (0.001) *** 0.014 (0.001) *** 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢0, 𝑢1 ) -0.065 (0.007) *** -0.065 (0.007) *** 
  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒) 0.165 (0.004) *** 0.165 (0.004) *** 
Number of individuals 12099  12099   
Number of person-year observations 133121 
 
133121   
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Table 4 Contributions of trajectory heterogeneity, between-group cumulative advantage, and 
residual inequality to the observed intracohort growth of wage inequality 
 
Prediction Specifications 𝑡 = 0 𝑡 = 20 Δ𝑣𝑎𝑟 
% of Δ𝑣𝑎𝑟 
explained 
Observed inequality 0.368 0.753 0.385 100.00% 
TH 0.307 0.501 0.194 50.39% 
TH + BCA 0.307 0.528 0.221 57.40% 
Residual inequality 0.061 0.225 0.164 42.60% 
 
SOURCE.- National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE.- The columns of “t=0” and “t=20” indicate variance of log hourly wage among this 
cohort at zero and twenty years of labor market experience respectively, Δ𝑣𝑎𝑟 is the change in 
variance of log hourly wage between zero and twenty years of experience. All the variances are 
adjusted for the trend of wage inequality in the macroeconomy at the time when they are 
measured. Observed inequality is the variance of log hourly wage of the sample, TH is the 
variance of the predicted wage under the assumption that only trajectory heterogeneity is at work, 
and TH+BCA is the variance of the predicted wage under the assumption that both trajectory 
heterogeneity and between-group cumulative advantage are at work. The marginal contribution 
of BCA to total wage inequality can be calculated as: 57.40%-50.39%=7.01%. 
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Appendix A    
 
Summary of Assumptions and Alternative Specifications in the Mathematical and Statistical Model of the 
LCT Framework 
 
The mathematical formalization for the LCT framework is designed for the general case and thus inevitably relies on some simplifying assumptions. In Table 1.A 
below, I summarize some key assumptions, propose some alternative specifications to extend the model, and list the implications of relaxing these assumptions. 
Although this summary may not exhaust all possible extensions of the framework, I do believe Table 1.A can be kept as a reference when applying the LCT 
framework to address different research questions. I recommend future works to use this table as the basis for potential extensions of the LCT framework. 
 
Table 1.A   Summary of key assumptions, alternative specifications, and implications of relaxing these assumptions of the LCT 
framework 
 
Simplifying Assumption In Mathematical Language 
Example of Alternative 
Specifications 
Implications of Relaxing the 
Assumption 
1. For each individual, wage 
growth rate is linear and 
remains unchanged over the life 
course. 
𝛾𝑖 in Eq. (1) (or 𝜃𝑖 in Eq. (3)) 
does not change over t. 
(1) Specify a linear spline 
function with different growth 
rate at different life stages. 
(2) Use polynomial function to 
approximate the temporal 
variation of wage growth rate. 
The implications are examined 
empirically in preliminary 
analyses and in the auxiliary 
analysis. This assumption is not 
consequential for the main 
results. 
2. An individual’s years of labor 
market experience accumulate 
by the same rate regardless of 
how many hours/weeks he or 
she has worked in the year. 
𝛾𝑖 in Eq. (1) (or 𝜃𝑖 in Eq. (3)) 
does not depend on the 
hours/weeks worked in year t-1. 
(1) Specify Eq. (1) as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (1 + 𝛾𝑖
′) ⋅ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 
if the person stays a significant 
amount of time out of the labor 
market in year t-1, where 
𝛾𝑖
′ ≠ 𝛾𝑖. 
(2) Include controls for 
employment experience. 
The implications are examined 
empirically in the auxiliary 
analysis. Including work 
experience and family domain 
events explain some, but a 
limited amount, of the total 
wage variation. 
3. Social groups are represented 
by three key indicators: gender, 
race, and educational 
attainment. 
The vector of group indicators, 
S, contains three dimensions 
(gender, race and educational 
attainment). 
Other person-specific group 
indicators, such as parental 
social class, religion, region of 
residence, could also be 
Inclusion of other dimensions of 
group attributes may increase 
the share of wage variance 
between groups and decrease its 
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introduced as important 
dimensions of social groups that 
affect wage and wage growth. 
share within groups. 
4. There is no (or only minimal) 
selective attrition or selective 
mortality in the data 
The likelihood of nonresponse 
at year t does not depend on S or 
𝑊𝑡−1. 
As is true for the NLSY79 data, 
the likelihood of 
attrition/mortality may depend 
on the individual’s fixed 
characteristics, as well as on the 
individual’s wage attainment in 
previous periods. 
Auxiliary analysis reveals that 
the nonresponse sample tend to 
have lower average wage but 
higher wage variations, causing 
the estimated wage inequality 
based on the observed sample to 
be likely downwardly biased. 
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Appendix B    
 
Technical Details for Constructing the “Counterfactual” of Log Hourly Wage 
In empirical analyses, I introduced a four-step procedure for assessing the contributions of 
trajectory heterogeneity and between-group cumulative advantage to the increase in total wage 
inequality. In Step 3 of this procedure, I predicted the “counterfactual” of log hourly wage 𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗ , 
under the assumption that only trajectory heterogeneity is at work but between-group cumulative 
advantage is not. This prediction is implemented by taking the following technical steps: 
Based on the estimated coefficients from Model (2), I generate an intermediate variable 𝜓 to 
capture the part of wage growth rate 𝛽1  that is determined by 𝑆1 , 𝑆2  and 𝑆3 , that is: 
𝜓𝑖 = 𝛾11̂𝑆1𝑖 + 𝛾12̂𝑆2𝑖 + 𝛾13̂𝑆3𝑖. 
I generate another variable, 𝜙, by drawing from a normal distribution that has the same mean 
and variance of 𝜓. That is, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜙) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜓). Yet, 𝜙 does not depend on 𝑆1, 𝑆2 or 𝑆3. 
I predict 𝛽1
∗  by the following equation: 𝛽1𝑖
∗̂ = 𝛾10̂ + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝑢1?̂? . It follows that 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽1𝑖
∗̂ ) =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜙) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1?̂?) . Recall that according to the original setting (i.e. Eq. (7)), I have 
generated 𝛽1?̂? by the following: 𝛽1?̂? = 𝛾10̂ + 𝛾11̂𝑆1𝑖 + 𝛾12̂𝑆2𝑖 + 𝛾13̂𝑆3𝑖 + 𝑢1?̂?. It is implied that 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽1̂) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜓) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1̂) (assuming no association between S’s and 𝑢1). Also recall that 
in (2), I showed that 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜙) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜓). Therefore, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽1
∗̂) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽1̂), and 𝛽1
∗̂ does not 
depend on 𝑆1, 𝑆2 or 𝑆3. That is to say, in this step, I have generated 𝛽1
∗̂ in a way that keeps the 
heterogeneity of wage trajectories while “shutting down” the group-based cumulative advantage 
in wage attainment. 
Lastly, I predict the counterfactual wage for person i at time t: 𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗̂ = 𝛽0?̂? + 𝛽1𝑖
∗̂ ⋅ 𝑡 + 𝛽2̂ ⋅ 𝑡
2. This 
is the “counterfactual” log hourly wage under the assumption that only the mechanism of 
trajectory heterogeneity is at work while between-group cumulative advantage is not.  
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Appendix C  
 
Adjustment Method for the Historical Trend of Wage Inequality 
Because wage inequality in America has increased drastically from 1979 to 2010, a period in 
which wage data were collected from the NLSY79 sample, it is important that my analysis rule 
out the possibility that the increase in wage inequality for a cohort of population as they grow old 
is actually the result of the economy-wide increase in wage inequality. I adjust for wage 
inequality in the macreconomy by conducting a standardization of wage inequality by 
transforming the wage inequality in each year of observation to the comparable level of wage 
inequality in year 2000. This standardization process is analogous to the better-known 
adjustment for inflation, and is implemented as follows: let 𝑉𝑚 denote the variance of log hourly 
wage measured in year 𝑚 , and let 𝐼𝑚 and 𝐼2000  denote the wage inequality in the 
macroeconomy in year m and year 2000 respectively. The wage inequality in the macroeconomy 
is calculated by the variance of log hourly wage among working labor force aged between 20 and 
60 from the Current Population Survey for each year. Then, the “adjustment factor” for year m, 
𝐹𝑚, is calculated by:  𝐹𝑚 =
I2000
𝐼𝑚
, and the adjusted wage inequality in year m is: Vm,adjusted =
𝑉𝑚 ⋅ 𝐹𝑚. For example, 𝐼1996 is 0.365 and 𝐼2000 is 0.37 in year 2000, therefore, 𝐹1996 =
0.37
0.365
=
1.014. So the adjusted wage inequality in year 1996 is: V1996,adjusted = 𝑉1996 ⋅ 1.014. The 
complete information of the wage inequality and the adjustment factor based on the Current 
Population Survey data by calendar year is presented in Table 1.C. I also note that because wage 
inequality is calculated by individuals’ years of potential experience, it is likely that individual 
observations for each year of potential experience are recorded at different calendar years. In this 
case, I will average the adjustment factor across the individual observations recorded at different 
calendar years and construct the average adjustment factor in my calculation of adjusted wage 
inequality. 
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Table 1.C  Calculated wage inequality in the macroeconomy and adjustment factor for the 
cross-year standardization of wage inequality 
Year Wage Inequality (𝐼𝑚) Adjustment Factor (𝐹𝑚) 
1980 0.287 1.289 
1981 0.289 1.280 
1982 0.308 1.201 
1983 0.316 1.171 
1984 0.321 1.153 
1985 0.326 1.135 
1986 0.329 1.125 
1987 0.332 1.114 
1988 0.328 1.128 
1989 0.339 1.091 
1990 0.339 1.091 
1991 0.333 1.111 
1992 0.333 1.111 
1993 0.336 1.101 
1994 0.382 0.969 
1995 0.366 1.011 
1996 0.365 1.014 
1997 0.362 1.022 
1998 0.357 1.036 
1999 0.357 1.036 
2000 0.370 1.000 
2001 0.375 0.987 
2002 0.383 0.966 
2003 0.404 0.916 
2004 0.389 0.951 
2005 0.400 0.925 
2006 0.400 0.925 
2007 0.419 0.883 
2008 0.419 0.883 
2009 0.425 0.871 
2010 0.429 0.862 
 
SOURCE.- Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of Current Population Survey 1980-2010. 
NOTE.- Wage inequality is calculated as the variance of log hourly wage for the working 
population between age 20 to age 60. Data are available at the NBER website: 
http://www.nber.org/data/morg.html. 
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Appendix D 
Tables and Figures for Auxiliary Analyses 
 
Table 1.D1   Selected coefficients from multilevel growth curve model predicting log hourly 
wage, using the piece-wise linear model 
 
Panel A: Selected coefficients on observed social groups 
   Coefficient on wage growth rate 
 Coefficient on 
baseline wage 
0-6 years 7-13 years 14-20 years 
Universal coefficient   0.0367*** 0.0237*** 0.0206*** 
     
Gender (reference: male)         
Female -0.1665*** -0.0171*** -0.0098** -0.0025 
     
 Race (reference: white)         
Hispanic     0.0288 -0.0049 -0.0051 -0.0069 
Black -0.0967*** -0.0036 -0.0084* -0.0036 
     
Education   
(reference: high school or less)           
Some college 0.2103*** 0.0235*** 0.0074 -0.0108 
College and above 0.5991*** 0.0253*** 0.0048 -0.0548*** 
        
Panel B: Variance components 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢0) 0.8694   
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1,1) 0.0412   
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1,2) 0.0368   
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1,3) 0.0444   
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒) 0.1168   
 
SOURCE.- National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE.- *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All 
analyses are weighted.  
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Figure  1.D1  Predicted average log hourly wage by years of potential experience, by gender, 
race and educational groups as illustrations of the mechanism of cumulative advantage, the 
piecewise linear model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Data source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
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Table 1.D2  Estimated coefficients from multilevel growth curve models predicting log hourly 
wage, with controls for work and family domain experiences 
    Model D1 Model D2 
   Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig. 
Coefficients predicting baseline wage β0       
  Constant intercept (γ00) 1.9090 0.0514 *** 1.8892 0.0522 *** 
  Gender (𝛾01) [Reference: male]       
     Female -0.1777 0.0179 *** -0.1378 0.0193 *** 
  Race(γ02) [Reference: white]     
     Hispanic 0.0119 0.0165  0.0177 0.0223  
     Black -0.1003 0.0148 *** -0.0734 0.0219 ** 
  Educational attainment(γ03) [Reference: high school or less]       
     Some college but less than four years 0.2675 0.0165 *** 0.2543 0.0187 *** 
     At least four years of college 0.6493 0.0183 *** 0.6196 0.0230 *** 
Coefficients predicting wage growth rate β1      
  Constant slope (γ10) 0.0557 0.0028 *** 0.0597 0.0036 *** 
  Gender (𝛾11) [Reference: male]       
     Female    -0.0082 0.0026 ** 
  Race (𝛾12) [Reference: white]       
     Hispanic    -0.0012 0.0026  
     Black    -0.0055 0.0028 * 
  Educational attainment (𝛾13) [Reference: high school or less]     
     Some college but less than four years    0.0027 0.0034  
     At least four years of college    0.0061 0.0033 † 
Controls for work experience       
 Job tenure 0.0007 0.0000 *** 0.0007 0.0000 *** 
 Job tenure ×  𝑡 -0.00004 0.00000 *** -0.00004 0.00000 *** 
 hours worked 0.00002 0.00001 ** 0.00002 0.00001 ** 
 hours worked ×  𝑡 0.00000 0.00000 *** 0.00000 0.00000 *** 
 Weeks unemployed 0.0008 0.0006  0.00083 0.00061  
 Weeks unemployed ×  𝑡 -0.0004 0.0001 *** -0.0004 0.0001 *** 
 Weeks out of labor force -0.0004 0.0005  -0.0004 0.0005  
 Weeks out of labor force ×  𝑡 -0.0003 0.0001 *** -0.0003 0.0001 *** 
Controls for occupation Yes  Yes  
Controls for  family-related life events       
 Cohabiting 0.0244 0.0167  0.0244 0.0167  
 Cohabiting × female -0.0063 0.0225  -0.0063 0.0225  
 Married 0.0426 0.0128 ** 0.0426 0.0128 ** 
 Married × female -0.0584 0.0181 ** -0.0584 0.0181 ** 
 Widowed or divorced -0.0118 0.0190  -0.0118 0.0190  
 Widowed or divorced × female 0.0330 0.0261  0.0330 0.0261  
 # of children in the household -0.0076 0.0057  -0.0076 0.0057  
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SOURCE.- National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE.- *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All analyses are weighted.  
  
 # of children in the household × female -0.0201 0.0096 * -0.0201 0.0096 * 
        
        
Other coefficient       
                       Squared experience (β2) -0.0010 0.0001  -0.0010 0.0001 *** 
        
Variance components       
  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢0) 0.7948 0.1091 *** 0.7942 0.1089 *** 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1) 0.0162 0.0018 *** 0.0161 0.0018 *** 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢0, 𝑢1 ) -0.0788 0.0112 *** -0.0787 0.0112 *** 
  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒) 0.1520 0.0044 *** 0.1520 0.0044 *** 
Number of individuals 11543 11543 
Number of person-year observations 110114 110114 
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Figure 1.D2   Residual variance in log hourly wage by years of potential 
experience, with and without controls for work and family domain experiences 
 
 
 
SOURCE. - National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Appendix E   
Results with Imputed Values for Missing Hourly Wage 
Table 1.E  Estimated coefficients from multilevel growth curve models predicting log hourly 
wage, with imputed values for missing hourly wage 
 
SOURCE.- National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE.- *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
All analyses are weighted.  
  
    Model A3 Model A4 
  
 
Coeff. S.E. Sig. Coeff. S.E. Sig. 
Coefficients predicting baseline 
earnings 𝛃𝟎       
  Constant intercept (γ00) 1.9627 0.0100 *** 1.9422 0.0100 *** 
  Gender (𝛾01) [Reference: male]       
  Female -0.2619 0.0094 *** -0.2126 0.0124 *** 
  Race(γ02) [Reference: white]     
  Hispanic -0.0112 0.0122  -0.0040 0.0159  
  Black -0.1309 0.0114 *** -0.1120 0.0161 *** 
  Educational attainment(γ03) [Reference: high school or less]       
  Some college but less than four years 0.3220 0.0106 *** 0.3001 0.0134 *** 
  At least four years of college 0.7173 0.0147 *** 0.7308 0.0166 *** 
Coefficients predicting earnings growth rate 𝛃𝟏      
  Constant slope (γ10) 0.0494 0.0016 *** 0.0534 0.0018 *** 
  Gender (𝛾11) [Reference: male]       
  Female    -0.0073 0.0012 *** 
  Race (𝛾12) [Reference: white]       
  Hispanic    -0.0011 0.0015  
  Black    -0.0028 0.0014 * 
  Educational attainment (𝛾13) [Reference: high school or less]     
  Some college but less than four years    0.0032 0.0013 * 
  At least four years of college    -0.0020 0.0021  
Other coefficient       
                       Squared 
experience (β2) -0.0016 0.0001 *** -0.0016 0.0001 *** 
        
Variance components       
  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢0) 0.4583 0.0874 *** 0.4576 0.0873 *** 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢1) 0.0042 0.0004 *** 0.0042 0.0004 *** 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢0, 𝑢1 ) -0.0286 0.0057 *** -0.0285 0.0057 *** 
  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒) 0.1682 0.0047 *** 0.1682 0.0047 *** 
Number of individuals 12192  12192  
Number of person-year observations 186269  186269  
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Appendix F 
 
Demonstration of Nonresponse Pattern 
Table 1.F   Mean and standard deviation of average log hourly wage in previous 
three years by response status in the current period, at different years of potential 
experience 
  Responded at t Nonresponse at t 
Years 
of 
potenti
al 
experi
ence 
Mean log 
hourly wage 
in previous 3 
years 
S.D. of log 
hourly wage in 
previous 3 
years 
# of 
respondents 
Mean log hourly 
wage in previous 
3 years 
S.D. of log 
hourly 
wage in 
previous 3 
years 
# of 
non-res
pondent
s 
t=2 2.10 0.50 8758 2.23 0.52 480 
t=5 2.17 0.52 9596 2.24 0.52 705 
t=10 2.32 0.59 8585 2.26 0.61 1269 
t=15 2.42 0.66 7649 2.22 0.67 585 
t=18 2.43 0.75 7375 2.38 0.81 269 
SOURCE.- National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
NOTE.- In the table, t refers to years of potential experience. The means and standard deviations 
of wages are calculated for the average of the respondent’s log hourly wage during the previous 
three years. Thus, the comparison of previous wage by response status illustrates the difference 
in wage levels between the non-missing and missing sample at different years of potential 
experience. 
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Figure 1.F Share of nonresponses by years of potential experience, by gender, race, 
and educational attainment 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE. - National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Chapter 3  The Accumulation of (Dis)advantage: The Intersection of Gender 
and Race in the Long-Term Wage Effect of Marriage 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The impact of marriage on men and women’s wages has long been conjectured, debated, and 
empirically tested. The dominant view so far is that marriage is associated with a significant 
wage premium for men, yet a much smaller wage premium, or even a wage penalty for women 
(Budig & England, 2001; Chun & Lee, 2001; Killewald & Gough, 2013). Some of these works 
attribute the gender differences in the wage effect of marriage to household specialization 
(Becker, 1991; Chun & Lee, 2001; Hersch & Stratton, 2000; Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Waite, 
1995) and investment in human capital(Becker, 1985; Kenny, 1983; Korenman & Neumark, 
1991). Others emphasize the positive effect of marriage on men’s motivation and responsibility 
at work and the opposite effect on women’s work motivation (Ashwin & Isupova, 2014; Drobnič, 
Blossfeld, & Rohwer, 1999; Gorman, 2000; Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Mincer & Ofek, 1982; 
Pollmann-Schult, 2011; West & Zimmerman, 1987), or employers’ discrimination favoring 
married men and disfavoring married women (Bartlett & Callahan, 1984; Correll, Benard, & 
Paik, 2007; May, 1982). To determine the wage effect of marriage, this line of work typically 
constructs a single measure based on a comparison between the levels of wage earned by the 
married and the unmarried, termed the Marriage Wage Premium (MWP hereinafter), glossing 
over the temporal variation in the wage effect of marriage across years of marriage. For 
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simplicity, I refer to this approach as the static approach.  
 One important limitation of the static approach is its ignorance of the simple but 
fundamental fact that the transition into marriage marks the beginning of a long-term life course 
experience (Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003; Elder, 1985; Mayer, 2009). Marriage should be 
seen, not as a one-time event, but as a major turning point that shapes the individual’s life 
trajectory in all subsequent years. As a result, the wage effect of marriage may not occur 
instantaneously, but instead unfold gradually over the life course. To recognize the temporal 
variations in the MWP, research in this area needs to go beyond the static approach towards the 
life course approach.  
Examining such temporal variations in the MWP is important, not just because such 
variations may exist, but also because describing these variations will deepen our understandings 
about existing theories on family and work. The theories mentioned at the beginning of this 
article all invoke mechanisms that are long-term, process-based in nature, because they hinge on 
the accumulation, socialization, ideology-formation, and behavior adjustments in everyday life 
after the marital transition. Hence, the prevailing static approach in current literature does not 
well reflect such process-based consequences of marriage. The dynamic, long-term nature of 
marriage-induced wage changes warrants the adoption of the life course approach.  
Recently, a growing body of literature has started to recognize the possible temporal 
variations in the wage effect of marriage (Dougherty, 2006; Kenny, 1983; Korenman & Neumark, 
1991; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009). Dougherty (2006) studied the effect of marriage up to 
ten years after marriage and found that the MWP peaks about five years after marriage and then 
remained stable among males, yet among women, it peaks only two years after marriage and 
then starts to decline. Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009), however, found that marriage lowers 
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the rate of wage growth for both men and women.  Rodgers & Stratton (2010) conducted 
separate analyses for both White and African American men, and found that a larger gross effect 
of marriage on wage exists among African American men, while there is no statistically 
distinguishable racial differences in the effect of marriage on wage growth.  
However, these works either treat race as an additive statistical control (Dougherty, 2006; 
Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009), or focus exclusively on the men’s side of the story (Rodgers 
& Stratton 2010).  But, if we look at the long-term wage effect of marriage through a gender 
lens, should we adopt different perspectives when we look at White and Black couples? If we are 
interested in how the marriage institution is divided along the racial line, should we assume this 
racial divide is similar or different for men and women? These questions have been left 
unresolved in current literature. Analysis in this paper contributes to literature by reconsidering 
the wage effect of marriage over the life course with a particular emphasis on the intersection of 
gender and race. I hypothesize that, because Blacks and Whites may differ significantly in regard 
to the economic prospects in the labor market (McCall, 2001; Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, & 
Johnson, 2005; William Wilson, 1996), the division of gender roles in the household (John & 
Shelton, 1997; Kamo & Cohen, 1998) and attitudes and anticipations for their spouses (Daniel, 
1995; Waite, 1995), the long-term pattern of the wage effect of marriage may vary across 
gender-race subgroups.  
In addition, previous research often tests whether the empirical results are more consistent 
with some theories than with others, assuming or hypothesizing that there is a universal theory 
that fits all social subgroups. This paper challenges the view of a universal theory that explains 
the situation for everyone, arguing instead that, the mechanisms underlying the total effect of 
marriage may vary substantially by gender-race subgroups. Drawing on the rich measures of 
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individuals’ time-varying family- and work-domain experiences provided by individual-level 
longitudinal data, I will investigate, separately for each gender-race subgroup, the contributions 
of two potential mechanisms underlying the total effect: childbearing and work experience. My 
results suggest that these two mechanisms affect different gender-race subgroups in different 
directions and to varying degrees, rejecting a universal theory in explaining the wage effect of 
marriage.   
To sum up, this study conducts a comprehensive investigation on how gender and racial 
simultaneously shape the long-term wage effect of marriage over the life course. The 
investigation is guided by three research questions. First, does the wage effect of marriage take 
place instantaneously or cumulatively? Second, does the life course pattern of the wage effect of 
marriage vary by race? Third, do the mechanisms underlying the total effect of marriage vary 
across gender-race subgroups? By answering these three questions, this study will depict a 
comprehensive picture about not just the process through which wage advantage and 
disadvantage accumulate over the life course, but also how the underlying mechanisms are 
shaped simultaneously by gender and race.  
 
SHIFTING FROM STATIC TO LIFE COURSE APPROACH 
 
Existing literature often captures the wage effect of marriage by the term marriage wage 
premium (MWP). A positive MWP indicates a positive wage effect of marriage, while a negative 
MWP, sometimes also called the “marriage penalty”, indicates a negative wage effect of 
marriage. Prior research typically determines the MWP by comparing the wage earned by those 
who are married and unmarried of similar demographic and educational background (e.g. OLS 
regression estimator), or by comparing the wages of the same person when the person is married 
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and when the person is single (e.g. the fixed-effect estimator). For simplicity, I call this 
perspective the “static approach,” because it assumes that the wage effect of marriage is 
uniformly distributed over a person’s years of marriage, or marginalizes the temporal variation in 
this wage effect into an average measure. Figure 4 illustrates the static approach with the case for 
men. The horizontal axis is years of marriage, and the vertical axis is wage. The vertical straight 
line indicates the point at which the person gets married. The solid line plots the wage trajectory 
if the person had remained single, and the dashed line plots the wage trajectory after the person 
got married under the static approach. As the figure shows, being married moves the person’s 
wage trajectory upward. The MWP can be measured as the vertical difference between the solid 
and the dashed line. In the static approach, the wage trajectories of being married and being 
single are parallel to each other, resulting in a constant wage advantage of being married over 
being single. 
The static approach ignores the temporal variations of the MWP. The life course approach, 
however, emphasizes that marriage should be seen as a life-turning event that initiate a period of 
long-term, dynamic interactions between marriage, fertility experiences, work history, and labor 
market institutions (Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003; Shanahan 2008; Warren, Sheridan, and 
Hauser 2002). The dotted line in Figure 4 demonstrates the wage trajectory for being married 
under the life course approach. The line moves upwards upon getting married, and the wage 
trajectory grows with a steeper slope for being married than being single. As a result, the figure 
illustrates an example in which married men’s wage advantage accumulates gradually over years 
of marriage. As such, the life course approach helps the researcher visualize the process through 
which the MWP unfolds over time. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Describing the temporal variations in the MWP is sociologically significant, not just because 
such variations may exist, but because this engages existing theories. Below, I review existing 
theories about the wage effect of marriage, placing emphasis on what they imply about the 
temporal variations in the MWP. 
Specialization theory argues that marriage leads men to specialize in more 
productivity-enhancing activities while women to specialize in domestic responsibilities (Becker, 
1991). As a result, marriage is associated with a large and significant MWP for men, yet a much 
smaller, and even negative MWP for women (Budig & England, 2001; Chun & Lee, 2001; 
Glauber, 2007; Gupta, 1999; Jacobsen & Rayack, 1996; Killewald & Gough, 2013; Korenman & 
Neumark, 1991). It thus follows that the impact of marriage will intensify over years of marriage, 
because the demand and complexity of household labor generally increase over time, particularly 
with the arrival of children in the household. That is, the MWP for men will grow over years of 
marriage, while the MWP for women will decline over years of marriage.  
Human capital theory attributes the wage differences between the married and the unmarried 
to productivity differences due to the additional investment in human capital among married men 
and the reduced human capital investment among married women (Akerlof, 1998; Becker, 1985; 
Daniel, 1995; Greenhalgh, 1980; Kenny, 1983; Korenman & Neumark, 1991). This theory has 
similar implications about the temporal variations in the MWP: The additional investment in 
human capital among married men from year to year likely leads to the increase in the MWP 
over years of marriage, while the reduction in women’s human capital investment due to 
repeated work experience disruptions will slow down women’s wage growth, resulting in the 
decline in the MWP for women. If the human capital theory holds, in reality, we also expect to 
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see a significant reduction in the MWP after work experience variables are controlled for. 
Motivation theory describes the couple’s life course trajectory after getting married as a 
socialization process that produces and reproduces gender roles at home and in the workplace 
(Ashwin & Isupova, 2014; Rodgers & Stratton, 2010; Thébaud, 2010; West & Zimmerman, 
1987). For example, Ashwin & Isupova (2014) drew on qualitative data to show that not only do 
married men “do gender” by performing their breadwinner roles as hard-working earners in the 
workplace, but also married women actively hold their husband accountable to provide income 
and resolve financial difficulties. As such, marriage motivates men to earn higher wages while 
discourages women from being career-oriented, and part of such motivational effect may operate 
through childbearing (Townsend, 2002). To the extent that such gender-biased within-couple 
socialization process continue to affect the husband’s and wife’s career motivation differently 
over time, the wage advantage for married men and the wage disadvantage for married women 
are likely to accumulate gradually over years of marriage.  
Unlike the above theories that focus primarily on the supply side of labor in explaining the 
MWP, the employer discrimination theory provides a perspective on the demand side. This line 
of works suggest that employers may rely on the ideology that married men become the family’s 
bread-earner and married women the secondary wage earners, which lead them to favor married 
men over unmarried men, and unmarried women over married women in employment decisions 
and wage allocation (Bartlett & Callahan, 1984; Hersch & Stratton, 2000; Hill, 1979; Kilbourne, 
England, & Beron, 1994; Malkiel & Malkiel, 1973; May, 1982).  Following this logic, the 
MWP will be constant if employers do not distinguish between individuals who are married for 
different lengths of time. Yet the MWP could vary over time if the employer’s perception 
depends on years of marriage. For example, if employers consider men who have stayed longer 
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in marriage as more reliable, men’s marriage premium will increase over time. In addition, such 
gender-based discrimination may intensify with the birth of children, as employers may form 
gender-biased ideologies about working mothers and fathers, resulting in a further increase of 
MWP for men and decrease of MWP for women (Benard & Correll, 2010; Correll et al., 2007; 
Glauber & Gozjolko, 2011; Kmec, 2011; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004).  
 
INTERSECTION OF GENDER AND RACE 
 
A growing literature shows that the intersection of gender and race on earnings is a central 
feature of the stratification system in the United States (Browne & Misra, 2003; Glauber, 2008; 
Greenman & Xie, 2008; Kilbourne et al., 1994; McCall, 2005). Unfortunately, literature on the 
wage effect of marriage has yet to combine the life course approach with the intersectional 
perspective. Previous works on the racial differences in the MWP for men and women often 
center around one gender and yield mixed evidence. Some research shows that men’s MWP is 
greater for Whites than for Blacks  (Blackburn & Korenman, 1994; Daniel, 1995; Korenman & 
Neumark, 1991; Waite, 1995), some suggested similar MWP for White and Black men 
(Kilbourne et al., 1994), while others found a larger male marriage premium for Blacks (Loh, 
1996; Rodgers & Stratton, 2010). As for women, marriage has been found to be associated with a 
wage penalty for White women, yet a marriage premium, though small in size, for Black women 
(Kilbourne et al., 1994; Waite, 1995). In addition, the motherhood penalty literature showed that 
Black women receive a smaller wage penalty for having a child than White women do (Hill, 
1979; Lehrer, 1992; Waldfogel, 1997).40F
41
 To the extent that there are some shared mechanisms 
                                                        
41
 Budig & England (2001), however, showed that Black women receive smaller motherhood penalties than their 
White counterparts only for the third and subsequent births. 
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underlying the impact of marriage and childbearing on wages, one could expect the racial 
differences in the motherhood penalty to exhibit similar patterns in the wage effect of marriage. 
Why would Whites and Blacks differ in the wage effect of marriage? One plausible 
explanation lies in the work domain. For example, Rodgers & Stratton (2010) showed that the 
gross effect of marriage – the effect without controls for human capital and work-related 
variables - is almost 50% as large for Black men than for their White counterparts at the time of 
marriage, yet, much of this racial difference is explained by differences in observed variables 
such as actual experience and job tenure. Other possible explanations may come from the family 
domain. A number of qualitative works suggest that that when Black men get married, marriage 
and family responsibilities carry the meaning of lifelong commitment and promote psychological 
stableness, which help them sustain a stable long-term relationship with their partner (Hurt, 2013; 
Marks et al., 2008). Others found that marriage provides Black men social and financial 
resources that are critical to their career successes (Waite & Gallagher, 2002). Alternatively, 
one’s change in wages from before to after marriage could also depend on the person’s mode of 
interaction with his or her spouse, as well as the attitudes and expectations of the spouse. It was 
suggested that the intensity of intrahousehold specialization may be lower among Black couples 
than among White couples (Rodgers & Stratton, 2010). Several studies, for instance, showed that 
married Black men do a larger share of housework than married White men (John & Shelton, 
1997; Kamo & Cohen, 1998). Finally, the work and family domains may be intertwined: partly 
due to Black men’s disadvantage in the labor market in general, wives in Black families tend to 
have lower expectations for their Black husband’s career success (Daniel, 1995; Waite, 1995), 
which is likely to reduce Black men’s gains from marriage and mitigate Black women’s wage 
loss due to marriage.  
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However, current literature on the intersection of gender and race in the wage effect of 
marriage has left two issues unresolved. First, previous works adopting the intersectional 
perspective are static, focusing mainly on the gender and racial differences in the average wage 
effect of marriage but not its temporal variations. My analysis extends to the life course approach, 
recognizing that Blacks and Whites may differ, not only in terms of the immediate effect of 
marriage, but also in the pattern by which the impact of marriage endures, magnifies, or 
diminishes over years of marriage. Second, when examining the racial differences, previous 
works often focus on one gender, rendering it impossible to compare the underlying mechanisms 
by race and gender. My analysis covers a full range of gender-race subgroups, which enables us 
to compare their differences not just in the total impact of marriage, but also in the mechanisms 
leading to this total effect.  
 
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 
Drawing on the preceding arguments, I will test four sets of hypotheses relating to three research 
questions. First, does the wage effect of marriage take place instantaneously or cumulatively? 
Hypotheses 1A and 1B concern the total effect of marriage in the sample where Whites and 
Blacks are pooled together (i.e. the “pooled sample”): 
Hypothesis 1A: In the pooled sample, marriage is associated with an increasing wage premium 
for men. 
Hypothesis 1B: In the pooled sample, marriage is associated with a decreasing (and even 
negative) wage premium for women. 
Second, does the life course pattern of the wage effect of marriage vary by race? Hypotheses 2A 
and 2B present two competing hypotheses about the racial differences in the total effect of 
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marriage among men, to be testing in the separated samples: 
Hypothesis 2A:Black men’s marriage wage premium increases at a greater rate over years of 
marriage than White men’s marriage wage premium. 
Hypothesis 2B: Black men’s marriage wage premium increases at a slower rate over years of 
marriage than White men’s marriage wage premium. 
Hypotheses 3A and 3B present two competing hypotheses about the racial differences in the total 
effect of marriage among women: 
Hypothesis 3A: Black women’s marriage wage premium decreases at a greater rate (or increases 
at a slower rate) over years of marriage than White women’s marriage wage premium. 
Hypothesis 3B: Black women’s marriage wage premium decreases at a slower rate (or increases 
at a greater rate) over years of marriage than White women’s marriage wage premium. 
Third, do the mechanisms underlying the total effect of marriage vary across gender-race 
subgroups? Following the discussion in the Theoretical Framework Section, I test two additional 
hypotheses about mechanisms: 
Hypothesis 4 (childbearing): Marriage can affect wages through affecting childbearing. Thus, 
controlling for childbearing will reduce the magnitude of the total wage effect of marriage over 
the life course. 
Hypothesis 5 (work experience): Marriage can affect wages through affecting work experience. 
Thus, controlling for measured work experience will reduce the magnitude of the total wage 
effect of marriage over the life course. 
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DATA, SAMPLE, AND MEASURES 
Data 
To analyze changes in wage trajectories before and after marriage, a longitudinal dataset that 
contains within-individual repeated measures on work history and family transitions is needed. 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data (NLSY79 hereinafter) fits well with the 
purpose of this study, as it follows a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young people 
aged 14 to 22 when they were first surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed 
annually through 1994 and on a biennial basis thereafter. The NLSY79 dataset provides rich 
information about the year-to-year variations of individual family transitions, work experiences, 
and wage trajectories, and has thus been chosen by numerous studies to examine the association 
between family transitions and labor market outcomes (Budig & England, 2001; Fuller, 2008; 
Hodges & Budig, 2010; Killewald & Gough, 2013; Killewald, 2013; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 
2009). My analysis draws on 1979-2010 waves of the NLSY79 data. The sample is weighted in 
all analyses below. 
Sample Restrictions 
 
I restrict the sample in several ways. Because those who become parents before any work 
experience may experience different impact of marriage and childbearing from those who 
become parents after the individual has entered the labor market, I follow Killewald & Gough 
(2013) to exclude the respondents who have at least one child in the household before age 18. 
Because the identification in fixed-effect models relies on within-person changes (Killewald & 
Gough, 2013; Rodgers & Stratton, 2010), I restrict my sample to individuals who have at least 
two non-missing wage observations. These two restrictions lead to the dropping of about 30% of 
the White person-years, and about 40% of the Black person-years. I will focus on the part of the 
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sample that has at least one year of potential experience (dropping an additional 8%-14% of total 
person-years) and has non-missing wage information in the current period (dropping an 
additional 6%-11% of total person-years). Finally, to minimize the influence of selectivity in the 
timing of entry and exit from marriage, I restrict the sample to be more homogeneous in terms of 
duration of marriage. I exclude those individuals who remain never-married until age 45, and 
focus my analysis on those who got married between age 18 and 30. I also restrict my sample to 
the person-year observations in which the individual has spent less than 10 years divorced. These 
further restrictions drop an additional 11%-14% of the total person-year observations. Appendix 
Table 2.B gives the detailed statistics for my sample restrictions procedure by gender and race. 
After sample restrictions, my analytic sample comes to total numbers of person-year 
observations of 24,623 for While men, 20,381 for While women, 8,104 for Black men and 6,245 
for Black women respectively. 
Measures  
Wage. The key dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wage of the individual’s 
current/most recent job, which is adjusted to 1999 dollars according to the national-level 
Consumer Price Index. Log hourly wage is preferred to annual earnings, because unlike annual 
earnings, hourly wage is not affected by the total hours worked by the individual and thus is a 
better measure of the economic return that the individual receives for one hour of labor that he or 
she provides (Killewald & Gough, 2013). The major advantage of taking the log transformation 
of wage is that the change in log hourly wage from year t-1 to year t directly reflects the 
percentage change in earnings over one year. I code the individual’s wage as missing if he or she 
is not working at the time. The fixed-effect models to be used in this study are flexible with these 
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missing values and unbalanced data between different individuals. 41F
42
 
 Marital status. I categorize marital status by three mutually exclusive groups: (1) 
never-married; (2) married and spouse present in the household, (3) other (including divorced, 
widowed or separated, referred to as “divorced” hereinafter). For missing observations on marital 
status, I impute the individual’s marital status at the current period using the record of marital 
status in the previous record.  
 Years of marriage. To capture the long-run effect of marriage on wage trajectories, I 
construct a key indicator termed “years of marriage.” This variable is calculated as current age 
minus the person’s age at first marriage, and minus the years of gaps between marriages if the 
person has experienced multiple marriages. 42F
43
 For example, consider a person who first got 
married at age 25, then got divorced at age 30. Suppose that five years after this divorce, the 
person re-married at age 35 and remained in this marriage thereafter. Then this person’s “years of 
marriage” at age 40 is calculated as:  
40 (current age) – 25 (age at first marriage) – 5 (between-marriage gap) = 10 years. 43F44 
 In addition, my measure of “years of marriage” also includes up to five years (denoted by -5, 
-4, -3, -2, and -1) prior to the transition into first marriage. This is for two reasons. First, it is 
possible that the wage effect of marriage will start prior to the point of marital transition, thus 
extending the time window to pre-marriage years will provide some evidence on the timing of 
the wage effect of marriage (Dougherty, 2006). Second, accounting for the years leading up to 
                                                        
42
 In preliminary analysis not reported, I conducted my analysis with imputed missing wages using the person’s 
wage record in the past three years, and the results are not changed. 
43
 In preliminary analysis not reported, I conducted my analysis with imputed missing wages using the person’s 
wage record in the past three years, and the results are not changed. 
44
 The main results are not altered if we censor the sample at the end of their first marriage (results available from 
the author upon request). Because restricting to first marriages will reduce the number of person-year observations 
with longer years of marriage, the main analysis will keep those with more than one marriages in the sample. 
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marriage may shed light on the possible impact of cohabitation, an important alternative option 
of union formation (Cohen, 2002; Kiernan, 2001; Seltzer, 2000; Thornton, Axinn, & Xie, 2008). 
Because the starting and ending dates of cohabitation is subject to relatively more reporting 
errors than the reporting for marriage history due to conceptual ambiguities (Manning & Smock, 
2005; Seltzer, 2000), analyzing the wage effect of cohabitation may require a different set of 
specification and tests and is thus left out of the main analysis. Sensitivity analysis to be 
presented later will show results on the wage impact of years of cohabitation experience.  
 Parenthood status. I measure the demand for child care by two indicators. The first is the 
number of children in the household. Excluding children residing elsewhere means that my 
analysis focuses on the actual demand for childcare in the immediate household. The second is 
set of dummy variables indicating whether there is a children 0-6 years old, 7-12 years old, or 
12-18 years old. 
 Work experience. Time-varying work experience is measured by a set of job-related 
variables, including the individual’s tenure (in weeks) with his or her current employer, the total 
number of hours worked in the previous year, the number of weeks spent unemployed and out of 
the labor force in the previous year, and the cumulative number of weeks spent unemployed and 
out of the labor force in the past. Work experiences also include time-varying dummies for 
individual’s occupation classified using a 41-category coding scheme to capture the 
within-person between-occupation job mobility on wages and wage growth.44F
45
 
 Other control variables. My models also control for potential experience and its square term. 
Potential experience differs from actual experience, which is captured in the “work experience” 
controls, in that it measures the length of time in the life cycle elapsed since entering the labor 
                                                        
45
 The coding scheme of 41 collapsed occupational categories is available from the author upon request. 
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market, unaffected by the actual amount of experience gained through working. Potential 
experience is calculated as age minus 18 for those with high school education or less, age minus 
22 for those with some college education, and age minus 25 for those with college education and 
above.45F
46
 Other controlling variables include race and educational attainment (coded as high 
school and below, some college education, and college an above). These variables are controlled 
not only additively, but also in interaction with potential experience to capture the heterogeneity 
in wage growth. The individual’s timing of entrance into marriage is measured by the variables 
age at first marriage (AFM), and the individual’s history of divorce is captured by the variable 
total years of divorce (TYD), measured by the total number of years that the individual has ever 
spent divorced in the sample. 46F
47
 
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
Selection Concerns 
One key challenge to empirical studies on the wage effect of marriage is how to distinguish the 
causal effect of marriage from selectivity associated with marital transitions. Ideally, if 
individuals who are unmarried, recently married, and married for a long time are similar in terms 
of observed and unobserved characteristics associated with wage level and wage growth rate, the 
wage premium associated with t years of marriage can be simply calculated as taking the 
difference in wage between those who are married for t years and those who are single. Yet, since 
those who get married and those who stay longer in marriage may be selective on these 
                                                        
46
 Potential experience indicates the number of years that a person could potentially accumulate his or her 
experience after leaving school, but not how individuals actually behave on the labor market over these years, which 
is likely to differ by social groups such as gender and race. 
47
 If the individual has no divorce record, years of divorce will equal zero. 
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wage-associated characteristics, the estimated wage difference among individuals with different 
marital status may be due to selection rather than the causal effect of marriage (Cohen, 2002; 
Ginther & Zavodny, 2001; Gray, 1997; Pollmann-Schult, 2010; Rodgers & Stratton, 2010). For 
example, sizable research has shown that earnings potential is a strong and positive predictor of 
the likelihood of marriage for men (Goldscheider & Waite, 1986; Mare & Winship, 1991; 
Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, & Lim, 1997; Oppenheimer, 2003; Sweeney, 2002; Xie, Raymo, Goyette, 
& Thornton, 2003). Other works suggest that women’s economic standing has become an 
increasingly strong determinant of marriage (Oppenheimer, 1988; Sweeney, 2002).  
In addition, selection could occur when individuals with different years of marriage differ 
systematically in regard to the rate of wage growth, a concern raised by Loughran and 
Zissimopoulos 2009. For example, past works suggest that men’s timing of marriage depends on 
their economic prospects, which may be reflected in either overall wage level or wage growth 
(Krashinsky, 2004; Oppenheimer, 1988; Xie et al., 2003). Others suggest that that women with 
higher wage growth potential choose to delay marriage to avoid some of the negative impact of 
marriage on their career development (Goldin & Katz, 2000; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009). 
In addition, the likelihood and timing of divorce may also depend on characteristics that are 
associated with the person’s earnings prospects, particularly among women (Kalmijn & 
Poortman, 2006; Moore & Waite, 1981; Rogers, 2004; South & Spitze, 1994; White, 1990). Such 
selectivity in regard to wage growth lead to sample composition bias in the estimating the 
association between MWP and years of marriage (Vaupel & Yashin, 1985; Xie, 2013). Appendix 
G provides a detailed discussion on the taxonomy of different selection problems.  
Model Specification 
To address the selection based on overall wage level, my analysis will follow prior works to 
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apply fixed-effect models to longitudinal data in order to identify the effect of marriage by 
comparing wages of the same individual when he or she is in different marital statuses 
(Dougherty, 2006; Gray, 1997; Hausman & Taylor, 1981; Kilbourne et al., 1994; Killewald & 
Gough, 2013; Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Pollmann-Schult, 2011). Yet, my model differs from 
those in the previous static approaches by including dummies for years of marriage as 
independent variables, similar to Dougherty (2006): 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡
2               (wage and wage growth) 
          +∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=2                      (time-varying control variables) 
          +∑ 𝛾𝑘 ⋅ 𝐷𝑘
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐾
𝑘=−4       (dummies for years of marriage) 
          +𝜂𝑖                            (individual fixed effects)  
          + 𝐴𝐹𝑀 ⋅ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡                  (selection into marriage based on wage growth) 
          +𝑇𝑌𝐷 ⋅ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡                  (selection out of marriage based on wage growth) 
        +𝜖𝑖𝑡 .                           (residual)   
In the above, the dependent variable, 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑡 , is log hourly wage, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡
2  
represent the linear and square term of potential experience respectively. 𝑋𝑗𝑡′𝑠  are 
person-specific and time-varying variables pertaining to childbearing and work experience. 𝑋𝑗𝑡′𝑠 
also include a dummy indicator for divorced person years. 𝐷𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒 contains a set of 
dummies indicating years of marriage, with five year or more prior to first marriage (i.e. years of 
marriage = −5) held as the reference category. This dummy variable specification is favorable 
because of its flexibility of the shape of the wage trajectory. The key coefficients of interest are 
the 𝛾′𝑠, which represents the difference in wage at each year of marriage compared to the 
reference wage earned at five years or more prior to marriage. By looking at the changes in 𝛾 
over years of marriage, we will know how much steeper a married person’s wage trajectory will 
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be relative to the wage trajectory if the person had remained single. The person-specific fixed 
effect, 𝜂𝑖 , captures the time-invariant unobserved characteristics that simultaneously affect 
marriage and wage level throughout the person’s life. 
I address the selection into and out of marriage based on the rate of wage growth in two 
ways. To account for the selectivity in the timing of transition into marriage, I control for the 
interaction between AFM (age at first marriage) and potential experience. 47F
48
 To account for the 
selection out of marriage, I control for the interaction between TYD (total years of divorce) and 
potential experience. 48 F
49
 In addition, to minimize the influence of selectivity in terms of age of 
marriage and propensity to divorce, my empirical analysis will focus on a relatively 
homogeneous sample of individuals who entered first marriage between age 18 and 30 and who 
have not stayed for more than 10 years out of marriage. 49F
50
 
 
                                                        
48
 Similar specification has been adopted by a recent work by Killewald & Gough (2013). 
49
 Loughran & Zissimopoulos (2009) accounted for this selection problem by applying first-differencing at the first 
stage and then the individual-demeaning specification at the second stage. Yet, the two states together create 
measurement errors that are usually larger and more complicated than the cross-sectional and conventional 
fixed-effect estimates. Instead, here, I choose to address wage growth associated selection by explicitly controlling 
for individual-level wage growth differences. 
50
 Beyond the selectivity problems as described above, three addition problems may complicate the interpretation of 
the estimated MWP. The first concerns the timing of marriage’s treatment effect: because individuals may anticipate 
their upcoming marriage and adjust their behaviors in advance, it is possible that the wage effect of marriage occurs 
before the actual marital transition (Antonovics & Town, 2004; Cohen, 2002). This is likely to lead to the 
underestimation of the “gross effect” of marriage. The second problem concerns the reverse causality: individuals 
may postpone marriage until they know that they have passed a certain threshold in economic standing or having a 
positive expectation of their career growth (Antonovics & Town, 2004; Edin & Kefalas, 2011; Smock, Manning, & 
Porter, 2005; Xie et al., 2003). The third problem arises from the co-occurrence of the marital transition and career 
advancement due to an underlying maturation process that differs among individuals (Killewald & Lundberg, 2014; 
Winship, 1986). The second and third problems could lead to the overstatement of the actual causal effect of 
marriage. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Weighted descriptive statistics of the NLSY79 data are given in Table 5. Among my analytic 
sample, which excludes those who are never-married until age 45, average educational 
attainment is higher for Whites than for Blacks, particular in terms of the attainment of the 
college degree. 50F
51
 For both Whites and Blacks, throughout the life course, a smaller share of men 
are married than of women. There are significant racial differences in the pattern of marriage for 
both sexes. A greater proportion of Whites marry: At age 25, 35, and 45, the proportion of 
never-married is greater for Black men (with 35.96% unmarried at age 45) than for White men 
(with 21.82% unmarried at age 45), and greater for Black women (with 29.85% unmarried at age 
45) than for White women (with 12.53% unmarried at age 45). Similar pattern of gender and racial 
differences is reflected in terms of age at first marriage: Women get married at an earlier age than 
men do, and this gender gap in age at first marriage is greater among Blacks (2.08 years) than 
among Whites (1.83 years). Among those who were married before age 45, the average age at first 
marriage is later for Black men (26.61) than for White men (24.05), and later for Black women 
(24.53) than for White women (22.22). 51F
52
 With regard to divorce history, the percentage of ever 
divorced is greater for women than for men, and greater for Blacks than for Whites. However, 
among those who ever got divorced, there Whites are divorced at an earlier wage than Blacks. The 
racial differences in the pattern of entry into and exit from marriage give rise to the racial 
differences in the length of marriage: In my analytic sample, among the married person-years, the 
length of marriage is greater for White men (12.47 years) than for Black men (10.41 years), and 
                                                        
51
 Since my sample exclude those who are never-married until age 45, the gap in educational attainment between 
White and Black is smaller compared to the racial gap in educational attainment in the general population. 
52
 If we include the never-married individuals in the sample, the median age at first marriage is 23 and 25 for White 
and Black males respectively, and 21 and 23 for White and Black females respectively. 
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greater for White women (13.13 years) than for Black women (11.18 years). 52F
53
  
Analysis on Pooled Sample 
First, I apply the model as specified in Equation 1 to examine the long-term wage effect of 
marriage based on the pooled sample with White and Black individuals lumped together. The key 
coefficients of interests in this set of analysis are the coefficients on the dummies for years of 
marriage. To present these coefficients, I first align these coefficients on the axis of years of 
marriage, ranging from five years or more prior to marriage (years of marriage= −5) to twenty 
years after marriage (years of marriage= 20), and then plot the Lowess-smoothed line of wage 
trajectory by years of marriage, with the wage earned at five years prior to marriage held as the 
reference level. For simplicity, I refer to the wage relative to wage at five years or more prior to 
marriage as the MWP (Marriage Wage Premium) in my context. Figure 5 demonstrates the 
Lowess-smoothed trajectories of MWP in the pooled sample. The red horizontal line is the 
reference line indicating zero marriage wage premium. Among men, the wage effect of marriage 
started as early as five years prior to marriage. This pre-marriage wage trend is consistent with 
results from previous studies (Dougherty, 2006; Krashinsky, 2004) and may be due to several 
reasons. It may be that the anticipation of marriage makes soon-to-be-married men better 
workers, or that men tend to get married after they have demonstrated some earnings potential by 
having substantial wage growth. It is also possible that marriage and career advancement are 
outcomes of latent maturation process. The growth of MWP for men continues until about five 
years after marriage, slows down from 5 to 15 years of marriage, and speeds up again after 15 
years of marriage. 53F
54
 After twenty years of marriage, men accumulate over 20% of wage 
                                                        
53
 Distributions of Black and White’s years of marriage and years of divorce are presented in Appendix J. 
54
 As later sensitivity analysis will show, similar pattern holds under alternative specifications of potential 
experience. 
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premium relative to five years or more prior to marriage. 54F
55
 
The pattern for women differs substantially from that for men. Among women, there is a 
small but positive wage premium prior to marriage, but this wage premium starts to decline 
gradually after getting married. About five years after marriage, women’s wage premium 
becomes negative and continues to decline. After twenty years of marriage, controlling for 
experience, married women earn about 10% lower than what they earned five years or more prior 
to marriage. That is, married women experience an accumulation of wage disadvantage over 
years of marriage. Statistical tests indicate that both the increase in the MWP for men and the 
decrease in the MWP for women are significant. Hence, in the pooled sample, Hypothesis 1A 
and 1B are both supported. 
Analysis on Separated Samples 
The analysis in the pooled sample is informative about the population-average wage effect of 
marriage for men and women. Yet, does this population-average estimate conceal important 
between-race heterogeneity? Next, I replicate the above analysis on the Black and White sample 
separately. Figure 6 demonstrates the Lowess-smoothed trajectories of selection-adjusted MWP 
by race and gender over years of marriage. 55F
56
 Throughout the married years, Black men receive a 
higher MWP than White men, and the level of wage premium between the two races is 
significantly different, but there is no statistically distinguishable racial difference in the rate of 
growth of the wage premium of marriage, a finding that corroborates that from Rodgers & 
                                                        
55
 As a note on the causal interpretation, this suggests that the reverse causality is unlikely to explain all of the wage 
effect of marriage, because if wage growth is for the mere purpose of satisfying a pre-marital threshold, we should 
not expect wage to rise after marriage. In addition, the latent maturation process is also unlikely to explain the whole 
story, because otherwise we would not expect to observe the maintenance and increase of the MWP many years 
after marriage. Hence, the results suggest that there is a positive and increasing treatment effect of marriage on 
men’s wages. 
56
 The estimated results for the separated sample with different set of controls are presented in Appendix D. 
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Stratton (2010). Hence, both Hypothesis 2A and 2B are rejected.56F
57
 
 Significant racial differences exist for women. Black and White women started off with 
similar levels of wage premium prior to marriage. Yet, after getting married, White women 
experience a decline in the MWP over years of marriage, while Black women experience an 
increase in the MWP over years of marriage. The decline in the MWP for White women and the 
increase in the MWP for Black are both statistically significant. This implies marriage limits 
White women’s wage growth yet promotes Black women’s career prospect. After twenty years of 
marriage, White women have incurred about 15% wage penalty compared to their own wage at 
five years or more prior to marriage, while Black women have gained about 15% wage premium 
compared to their own wage at five years or more prior to marriage. Hence, my findings support 
Hypothesis 3B and reject Hypothesis 3A. 
 Comparing the results from separate samples with those from the pooled sample, we see that 
the pooled sample masks important racial differences in how marriage affects life course wage 
trajectories. Such racial difference is more important for women than for men. Since White 
women take up a majority of the female sample, the estimated wage effect of marriage in the 
pooled sample is driven almost entirely by the pattern for White women, concealing the story for 
Black women in the pooled sample.  
Childbearing as a Mediating Mechanism 
Next, I turn to the mediating effects of two specific mechanisms in producing the total effect of 
marriage. I start with the mechanism of childbearing. Appendix Table 2.E1 plots the trajectory of 
                                                        
57
 To test for the significance of between-group differences, I regress the MWP on years of marriage for each 
gender-race subgroup separately and then compare the point estimates and standard deviations of the estimated 
coefficient on years of marriage. Full results of the tests are available from the author. 
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number of children in the household by years of marriage by race and gender. 57F
58
 Does the size of 
the total effect of marriage on wage growth shrink after childbearing is controlled for in the 
model? To test this, I add controls for the number of children in the household and age groups of 
youngest child to the total effect model. Since specialization theory suggests that the wage effect 
of childbearing may depend on the person’s marital status (Budig and England 2001; Killewald 
and Gough 2013), I also include the interaction between the number of children in the household 
with dummies of marital status to capture the heterogeneous effect of childbearing by marital 
status. I further control for dummy indicators of the age range of youngest child (0-6 years, 7-12 
years, and 12-18 years). The full model is presented in Appendix Table 2.F1. The number of 
children in the household has a significantly negative impact for married White female and 
married Black female (resulting in a 4.3% penalty for White women and a 4.4% penalty for 
Black women), yet it does not have significant impact on unmarried women. This is consistent 
with the specialization theory that specialization intensifies when the demand of domestic labor 
increases with childbearing, leading to a reduction in women’s wages. For White women, an 
additional 10.7% penalty is associated with having a youngest child aged 7-12 years, and an 
additional 6.4% penalty is associated with having a youngest child aged 13-18 years. Number of 
children has no significant impact on men’s wages, yet having a youngest child aged six years 
old or less is associated with a 4.3% fatherhood premium for Whites and a 3.7% fatherhood 
premium for Blacks. For Blacks, similar level (4.1%) of fatherhood premium holds when their 
youngest child reach 7-12 years of age, yet no significant premium is found for White men at this 
age range. This finding offers new evidence to the fatherhood premium literature (Glauber, 2008; 
                                                        
58
 The number of children increases over years of marriage and peaks at about fifteen years after marriage. Blacks, 
particular Black women, have greater number of children in the household than their White counterparts, especially 
during the five years prior to marriage and the first ten years of marriage. This racial gap closes up fifteen years after 
getting married for both sexes. 
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Hodges & Budig, 2010; Killewald, 2013), highlighting the importance of accounting for the age 
of child as well as the differences by race. 
 My main focus is whether including controls for childbearing explains the total effect of 
marriage on wage over years of marriage. The results are presented visually in the line for 
“Baseline+childbearing” in Figure 7 (male) and Figure 8 (female) respectively. Including 
childbearing controls shifts White and Black men’s wage trajectory slightly downward. 
Controlling for childbearing makes White women’s wage trajectories flatter, but only to a 
moderate degree. Childbearing controls move Black women’s wage trajectories significantly 
upward, implying that childbearing has a negative impact on Black women’s wage level and 
wage growth: Had the negative impact of childbearing on Black women’s wages been eliminated, 
married Black women would have enjoyed greater growth of the MWP. The finding of a larger 
impact of childbearing on women’s accumulation of wage disadvantage after marriage but not on 
men’s accumulation of wage advantage is consistent with earlier works (Dougherty, 2006; 
Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009), yet it highlights the differences in the degree to which 
childbearing matters by different gender-race subgroups. Overall, this round of results lends 
weak support for Hypothesis 4 among White men, Black men, and White women, yet provides 
strong support for Hypothesis 4 among Black women. 
Work Experience as a Mediating Mechanism 
Next, I examine the extent to which changes in work experience in married years explain the 
changes in men and women’s wage trajectories due to marriage. Work experience is measured by 
seven variables: job tenure, total hours worked in the year, annual number of weeks unemployed, 
annual number of weeks out of the labor force, cumulative number of weeks unemployed, 
cumulative number of weeks out of the labor force, occupation on a 41-category scheme. The 
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descriptive trajectories of work experience variables over years of marriage are presented in 
Appendix Figure 2.E2 and 2.E3.58F
59
  
I add controls for work experience in two ways: First, I add these controls to the previous 
“Baseline + childbearing” model, which yields the “Baseline+ childbearing + workexp” model. 
Here, the contribution of work experience is captured by the changes in the wage trajectory from 
the former to the latter model. Second, I add these controls to the total effect model, yielding the 
“Baseline + workexp” model. Here, the contribution of work experience is represented by the 
change from the “Baseline” model to the “Baseline + workexp” model. 59F60 The first case is the 
contribution of work experience with controls for childbearing, and the second without such 
controls. The key results are presented visually in Figure 7 (male) and Figure 8 (female).60 F
61
 For 
White men, including measured work experience variables in the model does not alter the 
trajectory of MWP. This may be due to two reasons. First, the increase in productivity due to 
marriage may come from motivational changes that are not measured by survey data. Second, it 
may be that White men receive marriage premium, not because they alter behaviors in these 
measured work experience, but because of unobserved employer preferences that favor the 
                                                        
59
 The trajectories suggest that overall, White men work more hours and more weeks than Black men. The average 
White women, however, work less than Black women. While the annual number of weeks unemployed is greater for 
Black women is greater than that for White women, the gap closes quickly as they enter into marriage. Black women 
spent a greater number of weeks out of the labor force than White women prior to marriage, yet the pattern quickly 
reverses as they get married: over the married years, the average White women spent a greater amount of time out of 
the labor force than Black women. Although these trajectories are descriptive, they reveal patterns that are consistent 
with previous findings that intrahousehold specialization may be less intense among Black families than among 
White families (Daniel, 1995; Waite, 1995). 
60
 The full coefficients of these models are presented in Appendix Table 2.F2. Longer job tenure and longer work 
hours are associated higher wage, yet their impact decreases over years of experience. The numbers of weeks 
unemployed and out of the labor force are negatively associated with wage, and the interaction terms indicate that 
this impact is greater at later stages of labor market experience. 
61
 Controls for work experience include the seven time-varying indicators of work experience as described above, as 
well as the interactions between these variables (except for the cumulative measures and occupation) with potential 
experience to capture the heterogeneity in their effects at different career stages. 
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married over unmarried, or those who are married for a long time over those who are recently 
married. For Black men, controlling for work experience beyond childbearing shifts the MWP 
trajectory substantially downward. This suggests married Black men’s increased participation in 
productivity-enhancing labor market activities operates as a key mechanism through which they 
accumulate their wage advantage over married years.  
Substantial Black-White differences are also found for the case of women. Controlling for 
work experience shifts White women’s trajectory of negative and declining MWP in the baseline 
model upward towards the red zero premium line, which implies that changes in work 
experience limit White women’s wage growth over their lives. This finding is consistent with the 
specialization and human capital theory, as the decline of MWP over married women’s life 
course could be a result of the increased intrahousehold specialization that deters women’s 
accumulation of productivity-enhancing experiences. It also lends some support to the 
motivation and discrimination theory, as married women may become more family-oriented and 
retreat from the labor market or the employers would perceive so. On the contrary, controlling 
for measured work experience shifts Black women’s trajectory of MWP downward. This means 
that, unlike what would be predicted by the specialization or human capital theory, changes in 
work experience actually help Black women counteract the negative wage impact of childbearing 
and maintain a good wage trajectory over years of marriage. This finding implies that 
intrahousehold specialization may not be an appropriate perspective for understanding the wage 
impact of marriage for Black women. Rather, my results is consistent with previous arguments 
that the labor market experience and outcomes among married Black women should be better 
understood in relation to Black men’s disadvantage in the labor market and the wife’s lower 
expectations for the husband’s career success in Black families (Daniel, 1995; Waite, 1995). 
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Overall, among these gender-race subgroups, Hypothesis 5 is only supported for Black men and 
White women. 
Quantitative Assessment of the Contributions of Mediating Mechanisms 
I conclude my empirical analysis with a quantitative assessment of the relative contributions of 
childbearing and work experience to the accumulation of wage (dis)advantage by gender-race 
subgroups. In keeping with the life course approach, the focus of my results is the contributions 
of each mechanism to the changes in the MWP over time rather than the overall level of the 
MWP. First, for each group of race-gender combination, I calculate the predicted beginning and 
ending premium, expressed as percentages of hourly wage, according to the models as described 
in the previous sub-section. 61F
62
 Then, I calculate the changes in premium over this period. A 
positive change indicates a growth in the MWP, and a negative change indicates a drop in the 
MWP. The results are presented in Table 6 (for men) and Table 7 (for women). The wage 
advantage for White and Black men accumulates gradually as years of marriage grow: Among 
White men, the MWP grows from 0.4% to 21.37% after twenty years of married life. Among 
Black men, the MWP increases from 5.21% to 27.45% over this period. While the level of the 
MWP is greater for Black men than for White men, the amount of growth in MWP is similar for 
the two races. The MWP trajectories for White and Black women, however, are in sharp contrast: 
Although the two groups both start with similar MWP (1.85% for Whites and 1.46% for Blacks) 
at the beginning of this period, the MWP drops to negative (-13.49%) for White women while 
increases to 11.63% for Black women. 
 Finally, drawing on results from Table 6 and 2.3, I go on to calculate the contributions of the 
                                                        
62
 To smooth out transitory fluctuations, the beginning premium is calculated as the average of the first three years 
of the analytic time window (years of marriage = -4, -3, and -2); ending premium is calculated as the average 
marriage premium for the three ending years of the analytic time window (years of marriage = 18, 19, and 20). 
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two mechanisms according to how much of the growth in the MWP is changed by controlling for 
each of the two mechanisms, which provides a quantitative assessment of the patterns visualized 
in Figure 7 and 2.5. The contribution of each mechanism is calculated first with and then without 
the other mechanism controlled for (termed “controlled contribution” and “uncontrolled 
contribution” respectively). The results are presented in Table 8. A positive sign means that the 
mechanism has a positive impact on the growth of the MWP over years of marriage, and a 
negative sign means the opposite. The table suggests that the controlled and uncontrolled 
contributions are very similar for the two mechanisms. As is consistent with the finding from 
Figure 7, neither childbearing nor work experience explains much of White men’s accumulation 
of wage advantage. However, as much as half of Black men’s growth of MWP over this period is 
explained by their changes in work experience following marriage, yielding strong support for 
the human capital theory.  
The findings also reveal important racial differences for women. Childbearing has a negative 
impact for the growth of MWP among White and Black women, yet its negative impact is larger 
for Black women (6%-7%) than for White women (3%-5%). Also, the contribution of 
childbearing holds regardless of whether work experience is controlled for, implying that the 
negative impact of childbearing on women’s wages does not necessarily operate though altering 
their measured work experience. Changes in work experience affect White and Black women’s 
wage trajectories to similar degrees, yet in opposite directions. For Black women, the 
accumulation of wage disadvantage due to childbearing is counteracted by their changes in 
measured work experience.  
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
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Linear spline specification and test for significance of MWP growth. This specification of 
dummy variables for years of marriage is more flexible with the shape of the wage trajectory, yet 
it comes at the cost of efficiency: The standard deviation around each coefficient on the dummy 
is relative large, making it difficult to test whether the changes in the MWP is statistically 
significant. In the sensitivity analysis, presented in Appendix G, I align these dummies of years 
of marriage in the order of time and then estimate the changes in the MWP by the linear spline 
function, with splines separated by 0, 7, and 14 years of marriage. The results suggest that while 
the speed of growth or decline in the MWP varies by stage of marriage, overall, the life course 
patterns of the MWP in the linear spline specification are consistent with those in the dummy 
variable specification. 62F
63
 
Alternative Control for Selection out of Marriage. Next, I test whether the main results are 
sensitive to how I control for selection. While it is a common practice in previous works to 
control for age at first marriage in accounting for the influence of selection into marriage, it is 
not clear in current literature how divorce should be controlled for. In this round of sensitivity 
analysis, I replace the total years of divorce in the main analysis with the proportion of divorced 
years among all observed years as adjustment for selection out of marriage. The results, 
presented in Appendix Figure 2.H, are not altered by this different specification.  
Alternative Specifications for Potential Experience. One may question whether the temporal 
patterns of the MWP depends on how potential experience is specified in the model (Killewald & 
                                                        
63
 The growth of the MWP is positive and significant for White and Black men, except for the period between 8 and 
14 years of marriage. The results suggest that the growth of the MWP is positive and significant for White and Black 
men, except for the period between 8 and 14 years of marriage. Among White and Black men, the pace of growth in 
the MWP is most pronounced during the pre-marriage years and fifteen years after marriage. White women 
experience a statistically significant decline of the MWP during the latter two period of marriage, and the Black 
women experience a statistically significant growth of the MWP during the four years prior to marriage and fifteen 
years of marriage. The wage advantage of Black women did not start to increase until later stages of marriage, while 
for White women, the pace of decline in the MWP remains stable in married years. 
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Lundberg, 2014). The main analysis adopts the linear and quadratic specification, and as 
sensitivity analysis, I experimented with two alternative specifications for potential experience: 
the logarithm of experience (results shown in Figure 2.I1) and linear spline function (results 
shown in Figure 2.I2). The results hold in these two alternative specifications.  
Restricting to First Marriage and Childless Years. The main analysis treats childbearing as a 
mediating variable between years of marriage and wage. But it remains unclear whether the 
changes in MWP over years of marriage depend on whether there is a child in the household. In 
this sensitivity analysis, I restrict my sample to those marriage and childless person-years. The 
results, as presented in Appendix Figure 2.J, show similar patterns of MWP trajectory over years 
of marriage.  
Replicating the Analysis on Cohabitation History. With the emergence of cohabitation as an 
important alternative option of union formation (Cohen, 2002; Kiernan, 2001; Seltzer, 2000; 
Thornton et al., 2008), it is worthwhile, as a preliminary investigation, to replicate the analysis 
on cohabitation history. I ran fixed-effect models among those who are never-married, adding 
dummy indicators for those with different years of cohabitation history. The estimated 
“cohabitation premium” – the wage difference between the cohabiting unmarried individuals and 
the non-cohabiting unmarried individuals –  up to five years of cohabitation by gender and race 
is presented in in Appendix Figure 2.K. White and Black men experience a small increase in the 
cohabitation premium, particularly for those with three or more years of cohabitation history. 
Similar as marriage premium, the cohabitation premium is greater for Black men than for White 
men. White women experience a small cohabitation penalty, and Black women’s cohabitation 
premium demonstrates an interesting U-shape. The growing prevalence of cohabitation and the 
emerging diversity of family forms warrant future investigation to follow in this direction. 
  
124 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF LIMITATIONS 
 
The first limitation comes from the possibility that individuals – especially women – may 
optimize their wage attainment by self-selecting into jobs that are associated with relatively 
higher wage gains or lower wage cost of marriage or childbearing (Becker 1985; England 2005; 
Polachek 1981). For example, some women may have already mitigated some of the wage cost 
to their via this self-selection process, which may lead to the under-estimation of the negative 
wage effect of marriage for them: if these women had not buffered against their anticipated risks 
of wage losses by purposefully selecting “more optimal” jobs, the negative effect of marriage 
would have been even larger.  
 The second limitation is the lack of measures about work experiences on the finer-grained 
organizational level in the data. Previous works suggest that more subtle mechanisms affecting 
individuals’ life course wage trajectories, such as workplace networks, organizational 
arrangement, and employer-employee relations, are likely to lie within the organizational 
environment and the workplace network structure (Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson 
2005; Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002). Due to data limitation, many of these factors are 
unfortunately not accounted for in my analysis. Thus, my results may not well-reflect the impact 
of these unobserved experiences on wage trajectories. 
 The third limitation is that my analysis does not test the possible differences in the temporal 
variations in the MWP by social class. Prior works have pointed to the possibility that the gender 
display, dependence, and division of labor within the family may depend critically on the 
husband and wife’s earnings (Budig & Hodges, 2010; Gupta, 2006, 2007) and education 
(Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Gershuny & Sullivan, 
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2003). Future research is needed to explore the three-way intersection between gender, race, and 
social class in determining the long-term wage effect of marriage.  
 The fourth limitation consists in the inability of the currently available NLSY79 data to 
account for individuals at their older ages, as most of the respondents have not passed age 50 in 
the currently available waves. Thus, my results are most informative of the effect of marriage on 
wage growth during early- and mid-stages of their careers and marriages. Given my finding that 
the rate at which MWP changes over years of marriage depends on durations of marriage, it is 
reasonable to expect that marriage may affect wage growth differently at older ages. With the 
continuing collection of NLSY79 data, it would be possible in the future to extend my analyses 
to the effect of marriage on post-marital wage trajectories at older ages. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
How does marriage affect wages? Growing availability of longitudinal data and statistical 
methods has enabled recent literature to invoke the life course approach in understanding the 
long-term impact of marriage on labor market outcomes. However, current scholarship on this 
topic tends to focus on the population-average effect of marriage or limit themselves to the case 
of some particular gender or racial group. This paper, instead, conducts a comprehensive analysis 
on the intersection of gender and race in the total long-term effect of marriage as well as its 
underlying mechanisms. 
Does the wage effect of marriage take place instantaneously or cumulatively?  I showed 
that marriage accelerates wage growth for men yet limits wage growth for women, resulting in a 
cumulative effect of marriage. This finding can be seen as a long-term, life course extension of 
the well-documented consensus that marriage generally benefits men’s earnings substantially, yet 
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has little impact on, or even hurts women’s earnings (Waite, 1995). Further, to put this finding in 
the context of the broad literature on life course gender inequality, the gender difference in the 
cumulative wage effect of marriage can be seen as an important micro-level pathway through 
which gender inequality is maintained and reproduced over the life course (Bielby & Bielby, 
1992; Blau & Ferber, 1992; Budig, 2002; Fernandez‐Mateo, 2009; Noonan, Corcoran, & Courant, 
2005; Don Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 2002).  
Does the life course pattern of the wage effect of marriage vary by race? My answer is 
gender-dependent: for men, no; and for women, yes. While Black men receive greater marriage 
premium than White men in the overall level of wage, the impact of marriage on the rate of wage 
growth is similar for both groups. For women, however, the wage effects of marriage are in sharp 
contrast for the two races: White women incur a growing wage penalty after marriage, while 
Black women experience a slowly but steadily growing wage premium after getting married. 
Hence, marriage holds back White women’ careers, yet promotes Black women’s wage growth. 
This finding suggests that previous analysis based on the pooled sample is representative of the 
pattern for White women, yet obscures the different story for Black women. 
Do the mechanisms underlying the total effect of marriage vary across gender-race 
subgroups? My short answer is yes. The impact of marriage on White and Black men’s earnings 
is driven by different factors: For Black men, work experience – measured by a set of variables 
including job tenure, employment hours, labor market attachment, and occupation – explains a 
substantial amount of the positive effect of marriage on their wage growth, a finding that accords 
with the specialization theory and human capital theory (Becker, 1985; Mincer & Ofek, 1982). 
However, for White men, neither childbearing nor work experience explains much of their 
growth of MWP over years of marriage. Hence, married White men’s accumulation of wage 
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advantage is more consistent with the motivation argument and the discrimination theory that 
emphasize the unobserved determinants of wages. In the case of women, consistent with the 
motherhood penalty literature (Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; Gough and 
Noonan 2013; Hochschild and Machung 1989), childbearing is found to be a career impediment 
for both White and Black women, regardless of whether work experience is controlled for. Work 
experience, however, imposes opposite impact for Black and White women: Black women gain, 
while White women lose, from changes in work experience induced by marriage. This implies 
that specialization theory may not be an appropriate perspective for understanding the wage 
impact of marriage for Black women. Rather, their wage trajectories should be better understood 
in the context of Black men’s disadvantage in the labor market and the wife’s lower expectations 
for the husband’s career success. Failure to account for the intersection of gender and race in the 
mechanisms leading up to the wage effect of marriage will lead to over-simplification of the 
complex, heterogeneous nature of contemporary marriages.  
My findings also stimulate two methodological implications. First, the revealed temporal 
variations in the wage effect of marriage imply that when comparing the estimated MWP among 
different studies, overlooking the temporal variations in the wage effect of marriage may lead to 
the misinterpretation of the systematic differences in sample composition as the actual 
differences in the wage effect of marriage. I recommend future researchers to explicitly model 
the temporal variation of the MWP in their models. Second, studies that aim to model the 
likelihood or timing of the entrance into marriage often takes interest in constructing a summary 
measure to represent an individual’s expected amount of long-term economic potential in 
post-marital years (e.g. Xie et al. 2003). The construction of this measure relies on a basic 
knowledge about the trajectories of wages after marriage. The estimated trajectory of wages 
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after marriage can be utilized by this line of works as the basis for constructing the indicator of 
this “economic potential” variable.  
Findings from this paper point to new directions in research on work and family. In 
explaining the association between family transitions and economic wellbeing, previous research 
often asks whether the reality is more consistent with some theory than with others. However, 
my results show, with the case of marriage, that a universally-applicable theory in work and 
family may not always exist. Rather, some theories are more applicable to some gender-race 
subgroups than others. I call for future works in this area to combine intersectional perspective 
with the life course approach so as to fully comprehend the important heterogeneity in the 
long-term impact of family transitions. 
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Figure 4 Graphic illustration of wage effect of marriage for men under the static and life course 
perspectives. 
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Figure 5 Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage in Total Effect Model by Gender in 
Pooled Sample 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The models also include a dummy for a person being either divorced or married but 
separated from their spouse. The models control for selection into marriage by including the 
interaction between age at first marriage and potential experience, and control for selection out 
pf marriage by including the interaction between total years of divorce and potential experience. 
The models control for potential experience and its square term. Other baseline controlling 
variables include: the interactions between racial categories (coded as white, black and Hispanics) 
with potential experience, and the interactions between educational attainment (coded as high 
school and below, college educated, and beyond college education) with potential experience.  
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Figure 6 Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage in Total Effect Model by Gender and 
Race 
 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 
models also include a dummy for a person being either divorced or married but separated from their spouse. The 
models control for selection into marriage by including the interaction between age at first marriage and 
potential experience, and control for selection out pf marriage by including the interaction between total years 
of divorce and potential experience. The models control for potential experience and its square term. Other 
baseline controlling variables include: the interactions between racial categories (coded as white, black and 
Hispanics) with potential experience, and the interactions between educational attainment (coded as high school 
and below, college educated, and beyond college education) with potential experience.  
0
.1
.2
.3
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
 P
re
m
iu
m
 i
n
 l
o
g
 w
a
g
e
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Years of marriage
White Male
Black Male
Marriage Premium, Male
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
 P
re
m
iu
m
 i
n
 l
o
g
 w
a
g
e
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Years of marriage
White Female
Black Female
Marriage Premium, Female
  
140 
 
Figure 7 Selection-adjusted Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage by Race in Models 
with Different Controls of Potential Mechanisms, Male 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The models also include a dummy for a person being either divorced or married but 
separated from their spouse. The models control for potential experience and its square term. 
Other baseline controlling variables include: the interactions between racial categories (coded as 
white, black and Hispanics) with potential experience, and the interactions between educational 
attainment (coded as high school and below, college educated, and beyond college education) 
with potential experience. Controls for childbearing are implemented by including the number of 
biological/step/adopted children in the household, as well as the interaction between this variable 
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with marital status. Controls for work experience include job tenure, total hour worked in the 
previous year, annual and cumulative weeks unemployed, annual and cumulative weeks out of 
the labor force, as well as the interactions between these variables and potential experience 
(except for cumulative measures). All models are weighted.  
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Figure 8   Selection-adjusted Marriage Wage Premium by Years of Marriage by Race in 
Models with Different Controls of Potential Mechanisms, Female 
 
 
 
 NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The models also include a dummy for a person being either divorced or married but 
separated from their spouse. The models control for potential experience and its square term. 
Other baseline controlling variables include: the interactions between racial categories (coded as 
white, black and Hispanics) with potential experience, and the interactions between educational 
attainment (coded as high school and below, college educated, and beyond college education) 
with potential experience. Controls for childbearing are implemented by including the number of 
biological/step/adopted children in the household, as well as the interaction between this variable 
with marital status. Controls for work experience include job tenure, total hour worked in the 
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previous year, annual and cumulative weeks unemployed, annual and cumulative weeks out of 
the labor force, as well as the interactions between these variables and potential experience 
(except for cumulative measures). All models are weighted. 
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Table 5   Descriptive Statistics by Race and Gender 
 
    White (N= 14,349)  
Black (N=45,004) 
    Male Female  
Male Female 
 
 (54.71%) (45.29%)  
(56.48%) (43.52%) 
       
 Educational Attainment at Age 25 (Analytic Sample)     
 
High School or less 64.75% 55.09%  
69.90% 53.53% 
  Some College 17.65% 23.56%  
18.57% 32.71% 
  At Least 4 years of college 17.60% 21.35%  
11.53% 13.76% 
       
Marital History        
  Never Married at Age 25 42.45 % 26.59 %  
60.32 % 49.52 % 
  Never Married at Age 35 24.88 % 14.62 %  
41.23 % 34.72 % 
  Never Married at Age 45 21.82 % 12.53 %  
35.96 % 29.85  % 
       
Age at First Marriage among Those Ever Married    
 
Mean 24.05 22.22  
26.61 24.53 
  S.D. (4.97) (4.99)  
(6.30) (6.58) 
         
Percentage Ever Divorced      
  Percentage 33.85 % 43.9 %  
43.15 % 49.52 % 
       
Age of First Divorce Among Those Ever Divorced       
    29.54 28.08  
31.95 29.83 
    (7.59) (7.88)  
(7.87) (7.96) 
 Years of Marriage among Married Person-years      
 
Mean 12.47 13.13  
10.41 11.18 
  S.D. (7.96) (8.17)  
(7.42) (7.86) 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard deviations are 
presented in parentheses. All sample statistics are weighted. 
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Table 6   Beginning, Ending, and Change in Marriage Wage Premium for White Male and Black Male 
 
Model Beginning Premium Ending Premium Change in Premium 
White Male 
   
Baseline 0.40% 21.37% 20.97% 
Baseline+Childbearing 0.21% 19.30% 19.09% 
Baseline+Work Experience 1.66% 22.18% 20.52% 
Baseline+Childbearing+Work Experience 1.32% 20.14% 18.82% 
    
Black Male 
   
Baseline 5.21% 27.45% 22.24% 
Baseline+Childbearing 5.24% 26.26% 21.02% 
Baseline+Work Experience 2.19% 12.92% 10.73% 
Baseline+Childbearing+Work Experience 2.27% 11.58% 9.31% 
  
NOTE: Beginning premium is calculated as the average marriage premium for the three beginning years of the analytic time window 
(years of marriage = -4, -3, and -2); ending premium is calculated as the average marriage premium for the three ending years of the 
analytic time window (years of marriage = 18, 19, and 20). Estimation of beginning premium and ending premium is based on the 
models as presented in Appendix Table 2.F1 and 2.F2. Change in premium is calculated as the difference between ending premium 
and beginning premium.   
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Table 7  Beginning, Ending, and Change in Marriage Wage Premium for White Female and Black Female 
 
Model Beginning Premium Ending Premium Change in Premium 
White Female 
   
Baseline 1.85% -13.49% -15.34% 
Baseline+Childbearing -1.61% -12.13% -10.52% 
Baseline+Work Experience 0.69% -8.75% -9.44% 
Baseline+Childbearing+Work Experience -1.19% -6.84% -5.65% 
    
Black Female    
Baseline 1.46% 11.63% 10.17% 
Baseline+Childbearing 1.02% 17.78% 16.76% 
Baseline+Work Experience -0.35% 5.09% 5.45% 
Baseline+Childbearing+Work Experience -0.11% 11.53% 11.65% 
  
NOTE: Beginning premium is calculated as the average marriage premium for the three beginning years of the analytic time window 
(years of marriage = -4, -3, and -2); ending premium is calculated as the average marriage premium for the three ending years of the 
analytic time window (years of marriage = 18, 19, and 20). Estimation of beginning premium and ending premium is based on the 
models as presented in Appendix Table 2.F1 and 2.F2. Change in premium is calculated as the difference between ending premium 
and beginning premium.   
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Table 8    Total Change in Marriage Wage Premium and Contributions of Childbearing and Work Experience, Expressed as 
Percentage of Wage 
 
  
Total Change in 
MWP 
Childbearing Work Experience 
 
Uncontrolled 
Contribution 
Controlled 
Contribution 
Uncontrolled 
Contribution 
Controlled 
Contribution 
White Male 20.97% 1.88% 1.70% 0.45% 0.27% 
Black Male 22.24% 1.22% 1.42% 11.51% 11.71% 
White Female -15.34% -4.82% -3.78% -5.90% -4.86% 
Black Female 10.17% -6.60% -6.20% 4.72% 5.12% 
 
NOTE: Estimation is based on the models as presented in Appendix Table 2.F1 and 2.F2 and the calculation in Table 3 and 4. The 
contribution of each mechanism is calculated both with and without the other mechanism controlled for (termed “controlled 
contribution” and “uncontrolled contribution” respectively). A positive sign means that the mechanism has a positive impact on the 
growth of the MWP over years of marriage, and a negative sign means that the mechanism has a positive impact on the growth of the 
MWP over years of marriage.   
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Appendix G 
 
Detailed Discussion of Selection Problems 
 
In the main text, I presented the potential selection problems involving marital sorting and my 
analytic strategies to address these problems. Here, I offer a more detailed discussion of these 
selection problems. In this discussion, I start with a simple taxonomy of selection problems. The 
taxonomy begins by identifying two general types of selection, namely the wage level based 
selection (termed “Type 1 Selection” in Table 2.A) and the wage growth based selection (termed 
“Type 2 Selection” in Table 2.A). In prior works that focus exclusively on the static comparison 
between the married and unmarried, the researcher’s major concern is the selection into and out 
of marriage based on individual characteristics that simultaneously affect their wage level 
throughout their lives (i.e. Type 1 Selection). However, this paper concerns not just how 
marriage affects one’s overall wage level, but also the pattern by which such wage impact of 
marriage changes over years of marriage. Hence, another type of selection may be involved: 
selection into and out of marriage based on characteristics that simultaneously affect the person’s 
wage growth rate (i.e. Type 2 Selection).  
It is also possible to illustrate Type 1 and Type 2 selection using a basic wage 
determination equation. Consider, for example, the wage determination equation:  Wageit =
β0 + β1 ⋅ t + β2 ⋅ t
2 + ∑ βkXitk
K
k=3 + λ ⋅ D
Married + γ ⋅ TYears of marriage + ϵit , where the 
residual term ϵit = ωi + vi ⋅ t +  eit. The researcher is interested in the effect of being married 
(λ) and the effect of having stayed one additional year in marriage (γ). Suppose that the 
components in the residual are not observed. Type 1 selection occurs when the person-specific 
intercept in the residual of the wage determination equation, ωi , is associated with 
TYears of Marriage or DMarried, and Type 2 selection occurs when the person-specific slope in the 
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residual of the wage determination equation, vi,  is associated with T
Years of Marriage  or 
DMarried. 
For each type of selection, I further demonstrate directed causal diagrams for four 
specific cases: (1) no selection; (2) selection into being married; (3) selection of the timing of 
entry into marriage; (4) selection of the timing of exit from marriage. In the case of no selection, 
a person’s wage could depend on the status of being married and on years of marriage via the 
parameter of wage growth rate βi. Years of marriage further depends on the timing of entry into 
marriage and the timing of exit from marriage. In the case of selection into being married, those 
could sort into marriage based on person-specific characteristics (U1) that are simultaneously 
affect the person’s wage throughout the person’s life, or based on person-specific characteristics 
(V1) that are simultaneously associated with the person’s rate of wage growth (βi).  
The latter two cases (bottom two rows in Table 2.A) concern the possibility that 
individuals who are married for different lengths of time may differ systematically, because the 
person-specific characteristics that are associated with the timing of entering into marriage (U2 
and V2 in Table 2.A) or exiting from marriage (U3 and V3 in Table 2.A) may simultaneously 
affect the person’s oeveral wage level throughout life and the rate of wage growth. It follows that 
the observed decline of MWP for women at later years of marriage may be an artifact of the 
composition of the sample rather than the real decline in the wage return of marriage.  
In empirical analysis, not all variables in U1, U2, U3, V1, V2, and V3 are observed in 
data, and as can be seen in the directed causal diagrams in Table 2.A, failure to control for those 
unobserved variables means that some of the confounders of the “treatment effect” of being 
married and years of marriage on wage are left out of the model. Analytic strategies are needed 
to address these confounding problems. Type 1 selection can be addressed by applying 
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fixed-effect models to longitudinal data so that those person-specific time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics in the intercept are controlled for (Hausman & Taylor, 1981; Kilbourne, England, 
& Beron, 1994; Korenman & Neumark, 1991). Some other works use twins or sibling data to 
control for family-level unobserved heterogeneity (Antonovics & Town, 2004; Isacsson, 2007; 
Krashinsky, 2004; Neumark & Korenman, 1992). Yet, the validity of this strategy relies on the 
assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity is equal for twins or siblings. Type 2 selection, 
however, cannot be ruled out by controlling for the individual fixed effect, because the 
person-specific slope in the wage equation (i.e. βi in Table 2.A) remains after accounting for the 
individual fixed effect (Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2009; Rodgers & Stratton, 2010). Hence, to 
further control for the individual differences in wage growth rate, Loughran & Zissimopoulos 
(2009) adopted a method that removes the individual-specific slope variable by demeaning the 
first-differenced wage variable. In the Analytical Strategy Section in the main text, I present my 
strategies to deal with these selection problems. 
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Table 2.A.  A Taxonomy of Selection Problems 
 
Type 1 Selection:  
Wage Level Based Selection 
Type 2 Selection:  
Wage Growth Based Selection 
No 
Selection 
 
 
Selection 
into being 
married 
  
Selection 
of the 
timing of 
entry into 
marriage 
 
 
Selection 
of the 
timing of 
exit from 
marriage 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: βi  represents the person-specific wage growth rate. U1 , U2 , U3 , V1 , V2 , and 
V3represent the confounding variables that simultaneously determine wage and marital status or 
marriage timing. 
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Appendix H 
Statistics for Sample Restriction 
 
Table 2.B.  Statistics for Sample Restriction 
Sample Restriction White Male White Female Black Male Black Female 
 N % N % N % N % 
All 63992 100.00% 65780 100.00% 32528 100.00% 32853 100.00% 
Had no children before 18, and had 
at least two non-missing wage 
44158 69.01% 45769 69.58% 17689 54.38% 15631 47.58% 
Non-negative potential experience 35368 55.27% 36860 56.04% 14916 45.86% 12882 39.21% 
Non-missing current wage 31667 49.49% 29550 44.92% 12355 37.98% 10294 31.33% 
AFM between 18030; cumulative 
divorce<10 
24623 38.48% 20381 30.98% 8104 24.91% 6245 19.01% 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
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Appendix I 
Sample Distribution of Years of Marriage and Total Years of Divorced 
 
Blacks and Whites differ, not only in the average length of marriage, but also in the shape of 
distribution of years of marriage and years of divorce. Appendix Figure 2.C1 gives the histogram 
of years of marriage among those who are married by race and gender. Among Whites, the 
distribution of years of marriage is more flat across different lengths, while among Blacks, the 
mass of the distribution is concentrated at the shorter lengths of marriage. The scenario for 
divorce is the opposite: Appendix Figure 2.C2 gives the distribution of number of years divorced 
among those who have ever experienced divorce. Among Whites, the mass of the distribution is 
concentrated at the shorter lengths of divorce spells, while among Blacks, the distribution is 
more flat across different lengths. 
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Figure 2.C1 Histogram of Years of Marriage among the Married by Race and Gender 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Years of marriage is calculated for those who have ever got married in the data.  
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Figure 2.C2 Histogram of total number of years spent divorced among those who has ever 
divorced by race and gender 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Years spent divorced are calculated for those who have experienced at least one year of 
divorce in the data. 
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Appendix J 
Fixed-effect Models with Different Controls for Selection 
 
Here, I present detailed results from models with different controls for selection. As recognized 
by prior works, Blacks and Whites may differ significantly in the form and intensity of 
selectivity in regard to the likelihood and timing of entering, staying in, and exiting from a 
marriage (Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, & Landry, 1992; Manning & Smock, 1995; Wilson, 
2012). By separating Black and White samples, my analysis will simultaneously account for the 
racial differences in the treatment effect as well as the influence of selection. In the analysis, I 
apply the specification in Equation 1 to the data, yet exclude controls for childbearing or work 
experience. The full results are given in Appendix Table 2.E. Model (1) - (4) in Appendix Table 
2.E excludes controls for selection into and out of marriage based on wage growth rate (i.e. 
Type-2 selection). Then, I add controls for selection into marriage (i.e. interaction between AFM 
and potential experience), presented in Model (5)-(8) in Appendix Table 2.D. Lastly, I add 
controls for selection out of marriage (i.e. interaction between TYD and potential experience), 
presented in Model (9)-(12) in Appendix Table 2.D. The trajectories of the MWP under the 
model with no controls for selection, with controls for selection into marriage, and with controls 
for selection into and out of marriage are presented in Appendix Figure 2.D. The figures suggest 
that selectivity based on wage growth (i.e. Type-2 selection) plays a greater role among men 
among women. Among Whites, selection into marriage has little effect on the estimated wage 
effect of marriage, while selection out of marriage based on wage growth causes an 
overestimation of the wage effect of marriage. Among Blacks, selection into marriage causes an 
underestimation of the wage effect of marriage, and selection out of marriage causes an 
overestimation of the wage effect of marriage. This suggests that both White and Black men with 
faster wage growth tend to stay longer in marriage, and Black men with faster wage growth tend 
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to get married later. 
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Table 2.D   Coefficients on Covariates in Fixed-effect Models Predicting Log Hourly Wage , Comparing Models with Different 
Controls for Selection into and out of Marriage. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 No Controls for Selection With Controls for Selection into Marriage With Controls for Selection out of Marriage 
 
White male 
White 
Female 
Black Male 
Black 
Female 
White male 
White 
Female 
Black Male 
Black 
Female 
White male 
White 
Female 
Black Male 
Black 
Female 
             
Potential 
experience 
0.0351*** 0.0451*** 0.0238** 0.0506*** 0.0342*** 0.0463*** 0.0313* 0.0511*** 0.0436*** 0.0467*** 0.0459*** 0.0506*** 
(0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0093) (0.0128) (0.0138) (0.0079) (0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0141) 
             
Squared 
potential 
experience 
-0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0005* -0.0011*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0003 -0.0011** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0004† -0.0011** 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
             
Dummy for 
Divorced 
0.1073* -0.0041 0.1029 0.0298 0.0952 0.0133 0.1753* 0.0341 0.0838 0.0121 0.1549† 0.0350 
(0.0504) (0.0606) (0.0726) (0.0648) 
 
(0.0611) (0.0774) (0.0784) (0.1027) (0.0609) (0.0787) (0.0792) (0.1046) 
Some 
college × 
experience 
0.0015 -0.0053† -0.0022 -0.0063† 0.0012 -0.0049 -0.0007 -0.0062 0.0014 -0.0049 -0.0020 -0.0061 
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0044) 
             
College and 
above × 
experience 
0.0072* -0.0262*** -0.0023 -0.0192** 0.0067† -0.0255*** 0.0008 -0.0189* 0.0069† -0.0256*** -0.0015 -0.0189* 
(0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0073) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0084) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0065) (0.0085) 
             
Age at first 
marriage × 
experience 
    0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0000 
    (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
             
Total years 
spent 
divorced × 
experience 
        -0.0006** -0.0000 -0.0008*** 0.0000 
        (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
             
Dummies 
for Years of 
Marriage? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
             
Constant 2.2088*** 2.0762*** 2.0759*** 1.8398*** 2.2130*** 2.0681*** 2.0531*** 1.8379*** 2.2139*** 2.0685*** 2.0558*** 1.8378*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0340) (0.0374) (0.0396) (0.0275) (0.0448) (0.0386) (0.0561) (0.0274) (0.0451) (0.0381) (0.0562) 
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R-squared 0.1349 0.0426 0.1043 0.0885 0.1349 0.0426 0.1046 0.0885 0.1358 0.0426 0.1088 0.0885 
# of 
person-year 
observation
s 
24,623 20,381 8,104 6,245 24,623 20,381 8,104 6,245 24,623 20,381 8,104 6,245 
#  of 
respondents 
1,907 1,739 591 505 1,907 1,739 591 505 1,907 1,739 591 505 
             
             
             
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. Being married means that the person is married and his/her spouse is 
physically present; the reference category is being never married. The models also include a dummy for a person being either divorced 
or married but separated from their spouse. The models control for potential experience and its square term. Other baseline controlling 
variables include  and the interactions between educational attainment (coded as high school and below, college educated, and 
beyond college education) with potential experience. All analyses are weighted. 
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Figure 2.D  Estimated Wage Premium by Years of Marriage by Race and Gender, with Different 
Controls for Selection into and out of Marriage (Lowess Smoothed) 
 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The models also include a dummy for a person being either divorced or married but 
separated from their spouse. The models control for selection into marriage by including the 
interaction between age at first marriage and potential experience, and control for selection out 
pf marriage by including the interaction between total years of divorce and potential experience. 
The models control for potential experience and its square term. Other baseline controlling 
variables include and the interactions between educational attainment (coded as high school and 
below, college educated, and beyond college education) with potential experience. 
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Appendix K 
 
Descriptive Trajectories of the Number of Children in the Household and Measured Work 
Experience 
 
Figure 2.E1  Descriptive Trajectories of the Number of Child(ren) in the Household by Years of 
Marriage 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.   
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Figure 2.E2   Descriptive Trajectories of Annual Hours Worked and Job Tenure by Years of 
Marriage 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.   
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Figure 2.E3   Descriptive Trajectories of Annual Weeks Unemployed and Annual Weeks out of 
the Labor Force by Years of Marriage 
 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.
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Appendix L  
Coefficients in Fixed-effect Models with Different Controls for Mechanisms 
 
Table 2.F1   Coefficients on Covariates in Fixed-effect Models Predicting Log Hourly Wage , Comparing Models with Different 
Controls for Medication Mechanisms (With and Without Controls for Childbearing) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Baseline Model, No Controls Baseline Model + Controls for Childbearing 
 
White  
Male 
White 
Female 
Black  
Male 
Black 
Female 
White  
Male 
White 
Female 
Black  
Male 
Black 
Female 
                  
Potential 
experience 0.0436*** 0.0467*** 0.0459*** 0.0506*** 0.0430*** 0.0500*** 0.0449*** 0.0560*** 
 
(0.0079) (0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0079) (0.0099) (0.0125) (0.0141) 
         
Squared potential 
experience -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0004† -0.0011** -0.0007*** -0.0012*** -0.0004 -0.0012** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
         
Dummy for 
Divorced 
0.0838 0.0121 0.1549† 0.0350 -0.0267 -0.0374 0.0082 -0.0694† 
(0.0609) (0.0787) (0.0792) (0.1046) (0.0309) (0.0381) (0.0370) (0.0393) 
         
Some college × 
experience 
0.0014 -0.0049 -0.0020 -0.0061 0.0013 -0.0076* -0.0018 -0.0064 
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0045) 
         
College and above 
× experience 
0.0069† -0.0256*** -0.0015 -0.0189* 0.0065† -0.0283*** -0.0016 -0.0197* 
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0065) (0.0085) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0064) (0.0087) 
         
Age at first 
marriage × 
experience 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0000 
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
         
Total years spent 
divorced × 
-0.0006** -0.0000 -0.0008*** 0.0000 -0.0005** -0.0001 -0.0008*** -0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
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experience 
Number of 
child(ren)     
0.0162 -0.0071 0.0192 -0.0032 
    
(0.0192) (0.0172) (0.0191) (0.0222) 
     
Number of 
child(ren) × 
Married 
    
-0.0120 -0.0428* -0.0198 -0.0441* 
    
(0.0193) (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0188) 
         
Youngest child  
age 0-6 
    0.0427** -0.0266 0.0368† 0.0075 
    (0.0147) (0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0261) 
         
Youngest child 
age 7-12  
    0.0014 -0.1066*** 0.0411† -0.0048 
    (0.0206) (0.0274) (0.0246) (0.0306) 
         
Youngest child  
age 13-18 
    0.0100 -0.0638* 0.0047 0.0096 
    (0.0246) (0.0322) (0.0335) (0.0365) 
         
Dummies for 
Years of Marriage? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
        
Constant 2.2139*** 2.0685*** 2.0558*** 1.8378*** 2.2157*** 2.1027*** 2.0551*** 1.8317*** 
 
(0.0274) (0.0451) (0.0381) (0.0562) (0.0274) (0.0461) (0.0385) (0.0583) 
         
R-squared 0.1358 0.0426 0.1088 0.0885 0.1369 0.0476 0.1102 0.0917 
# of person-year 
observations 
 
24,623 
 
20,381 
 
8,104 
 
6,245 24,623 20,381 8,104 6,245 
#  of respondents 1,907 1,739 591 505 1,907 1,739 591 505 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. 
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Table 2.F2   Coefficients on Covariates in Fixed-effect Models Predicting Log Hourly Wage , Comparing Models with Different 
Controls for Medication Mechanisms (With and Without Controls for Work Experience) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Baseline model + Controls for work experience 
Baseline model + Controls for work experience 
+ Controls for childbearing 
 
White  
Male 
White  
Female 
Black  
Male 
Black  
Female 
White  
Male 
White  
Female 
Black  
Male 
Black  
Female 
                  
Potential 
experience 
0.0556*** 0.0610*** 0.0486*** 0.0434** 0.0553*** 0.0626*** 0.0476*** 0.0470*** 
(0.0086) (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0139) (0.0086) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0139) 
         
Squared 
potential 
experience 
-0.0007*** -0.0006** -0.0004† -0.0008* -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0004 -0.0009* 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
         
Dummy for 
Divorced 
0.0839 0.0439 0.0633 -0.0020 -0.0196 0.0083 -0.0110 -0.0781† 
(0.0713) (0.0788) (0.0796) (0.0945) (0.0379) (0.0395) (0.0419) (0.0420) 
         
Age at first 
marriage × 
experience 
-0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0005 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
         
Total years 
spent divorced 
× experience 
-0.0002 0.0000 -0.0006** -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0006** -0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
         
Some college 
× experience 
0.0005 -0.0050† -0.0049 -0.0077† 0.0003 -0.0067* -0.0047 -0.0075† 
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0043) 
         
College and 
above × 
experience 
0.0042 -0.0245*** -0.0040 -0.0152* 0.0038 -0.0262*** -0.0039 -0.0155† 
(0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0060) (0.0079) 
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Number of 
child(ren)     
0.0088 0.0084 0.0279 0.0068 
    
(0.0207) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0225) 
Number of 
child(ren) × 
Married 
    
0.0002 -0.0362* -0.0244 -0.0423* 
    
(0.0206) (0.0184) (0.0206) (0.0179) 
         
Youngest child  
age 0-6 
    0.0235 -0.0204 0.0269 -0.0050 
    (0.0144) (0.0201) (0.0217) (0.0285) 
         
Youngest child 
age 7-12  
    -0.0234 -0.0948*** 0.0226 0.0033 
    (0.0200) (0.0275) (0.0255) (0.0312) 
         
Youngest child  
age 13-18 
    -0.0069 -0.0426 0.0157 0.0295 
    (0.0240) (0.0309) (0.0318) (0.0329) 
         
Job tenure 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
         
Job tenure × 
experience 
-0.0000* -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
         
Total hours 
worked in the 
previous year 
0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0001* 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
         
Total hours 
worked in the 
previous year 
× experience 
-0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000† -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000† 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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# of weeks 
unemployed in 
the previous 
year 
-0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0025† -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0026† -0.0029 
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
         
# of weeks out 
of labor force  
in the previous 
year 
-0.0002 0.0014 0.0007 -0.0044* -0.0001 0.0014 0.0007 -0.0043* 
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0017) 
# of weeks 
unemployed in 
the previous 
year × 
experience 
-0.0002† -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002† -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
         
# of weeks out 
of labor force  
in the previous 
year × 
experience 
-0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003† -0.0000 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003† -0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
         
Cumulative # 
of weeks 
unemployed 
-0.0019*** -0.0021** -0.0014** -0.0010† -0.0019*** -0.0022** -0.0013** -0.0010† 
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
         
         
Cumulative # 
of weeks out 
of labor force 
-0.0008** -0.0008*** -0.0007* -0.0005* -0.0008** -0.0008*** -0.0007* -0.0004† 
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
         
Dummies for 
Years of 
Marriage? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Constant 2.1638*** 2.1446*** 2.1339*** 1.7434*** 2.1574*** 2.1773*** 2.0938*** 1.7197*** 
 
(0.0913) (0.1912) (0.0726) (0.1403) (0.0898) (0.1896) (0.0771) (0.1377) 
     
    
R-squared 0.1829 0.1076 0.1725 0.1663 0.1837 0.1102 0.1737 0.1687 
# of 
person-year 
observations 21,320 17,346 6,917 5,234 21,320 17,346 6,917 5,234 
#  
respondents 1,872 1,694 581 497 1,872 1,694 581 497 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. 
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Appendix M 
Sensitivity Analysis 1: Linear Spline Specification and Test for Significance of Changes in 
MWP  
 
Figure 2.G  Estimated MWP by Years of Marriage by Gender and Race, Using Linear Spline 
Functions 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Estimation and prediction are based on the coefficients on the dummies for years of 
marriage as presented in the baseline model of the total effect of marriage, with no controls for 
childbearing and work experience.
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Table 2.G   Test for Significance of Changes in MWP by Linear Splines 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
White Male Black male White Female Black Female 
Spline1 (-4-0) 0.0284*** 0.0366*** 0.00678 0.0161† 
  (3.93) (5.32) (0.65) (1.96) 
Spline2 (1-7) 0.00832* 0.0124*** -0.00733 -0.00530 
  (2.47) (3.86) (-1.50) (-1.39) 
Spline3 (8-14) -0.00225 -0.00457 -0.00810† -0.00102 
  (-0.70) (-1.49) (-1.73) (-0.28) 
Spline4 (15-20) 0.0125* 0.0110* -0.0140* 0.0209*** 
  (2.83) (2.60) (-2.18) (4.17) 
Constant 0.0957*** 0.158*** 0.0423† 0.0632** 
  (6.19) (10.73) (1.88) (3.60) 
N 25 25 25 25 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † 
p<0.1. Estimation is based on the coefficients on the dummies for years of marriage as presented 
in the baseline model of the total effect of marriage, with no controls for childbearing and work 
experience.
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Appendix N 
Sensitivity Analysis 2: Alternative Control for Selection out of Marriage  
 
Figure 2.H  Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with selection out of marriage controlled for by interacting 
the proportion of total years in sample spent divorced and potential experience  
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The models also include a 
dummy for a person being either divorced or married but separated from their spouse. The models control for selection into marriage 
by including the interaction between age at first marriage and potential experience, and control for selection out of marriage by 
including the interaction between the proportion total years of divorce among all years in the sample and potential experience. The 
models control for potential experience and its square term. Other baseline controlling variables include  and the interactions between 
educational attainment (coded as high school and below, college educated, and beyond college education) with potential experience. 
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Appendix O 
Sensitivity Analysis 3:  Alternative Specifications for Potential Experience  
 
Figure 2.I1.  Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with logarithm of potential experience included as control 
for potential experience. 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The models also include a 
dummy for a person being either divorced or married but separated from their spouse. Control for potential experience is done by 
including the logarithm of potential experience in the independent variable in the fixed-effect models. The models control for selection 
into marriage by including the interaction between age at first marriage and potential experience, and control for selection out of 
marriage by including the interaction between the proportion total years of divorce among all years in the sample and potential 
experience. Other baseline controlling variables include and the interactions between educational attainment (coded as high school and 
below, college educated, and beyond college education) with potential experience. 
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Figure 2.I2.  Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with linear splines of potential experience included as 
control for potential experience. 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The models also include a 
dummy for a person being either divorced or married but separated from their spouse. Control for potential experience is done by 
including five linear splines of potential experience (splines separated by knots of 5, 10, 15, and 20 years of potential experience) in 
the independent variable in the fixed-effect models. The models control for selection into marriage by including the interaction 
between age at first marriage and potential experience, and control for selection out of marriage by including the interaction between 
total years of divorce among all years in the sample and potential experience. Other baseline controlling variables include and the 
interactions between educational attainment (coded as high school and below, college educated, and beyond college education) with 
potential experience. 
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Appendix P 
Sensitivity Analysis 4: Restricting to First Marriage and Childless Years 
 
Figure 2.J.  Selection-adjusted marriage premium in total effect model, with sample restricted to first marriage, childless years 
 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The models also include a 
dummy for a person being either divorced or married but separated from their spouse. Control for potential experience is done by 
including a linear and square term in the independent variable in the fixed-effect models. The models control for selection into 
marriage by including the interaction between age at first marriage and potential experience, control for selection out of marriage by 
including the interaction between the proportion total years of divorce among all years in the sample and potential experience, and 
control for selection of childbearing is by the interaction between age at first birth and potential experience. Other baseline controlling 
variables include and the interactions between educational attainment (coded as high school and below, college educated, and beyond 
college education) with potential experience.  
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Appendix Q 
Sensitivity Analysis 5: Replicating the Analysis on Cohabitation History 
 
Figure 2.K. Estimated cohabitation premium in total effect model 
 
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The analytic sample contains 
individuals who are never-married. Cohabitation premium is defined as the wage difference between those with k years of 
cohabitation and those who are not cohabiting. The fixed-effect models control for potential experience and its square term. Other 
baseline controlling variables include the interactions between educational attainment (coded as high school and below, college 
educated, and beyond college education) with potential experience. 
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Chapter 4  Risk-Sharing in the Family: Within-couple Inter-temporal 
Responsiveness in Labor Market Activities 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Family has long been regarded by sociologists as the core structural unit in the stratification 
system. Recently, the theoretical orientation of family research has undergone three major 
reforms. The first is the shift from the unitary perspective, which describes a family’s 
socioeconomic position by the attainment of the male household head (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn, & 
Payne, 1980; Sewell & Hauser, 1975), towards the individualistic perspective that recognizes the 
autonomy of every individual member, particularly every woman (Drobnic & Blossfeld, 2001; 
Sorensen & McLanahan, 1987; Sweeney, 2002).  The second is the shift from the static 
perspective, which emphasizes the cross-sectional variations in socioeconomic status that are 
linked to the intergenerational transmission of advantage (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Hout, 1984; 
Sewell & Hauser, 1975), towards the life course perspective, which emphasizes the 
intragenerational mobility of life conditions (DiPrete, 1981, 2002; Rosenfeld, 1992; Sørensen, 
1975; Warren, Sheridan, & Hauser, 2002; Western, Bloome, Sosnaud, & Tach, 2012). The third is 
the shift from construing the family as a resource-sharing institution, in which family members 
share resources that are crucial for their well-being (Coleman, 1988; Duncan & Brooks‐Gunn, 
2000; Sara McLanahan, 2004), towards viewing the family as a risk-sharing institution, in which 
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family members adjust their behaviors according to each others’ so as to buffer against external 
uncertainties that affect total well-being of the family (Cooper, 2014; DiPrete, 2002; Western et 
al., 2012). 
 These three theoretical shifts have strongly influenced family stratification research in recent 
years, in part because they align well with two ongoing empirical trends in  US society. The 
first trend is rising female labor participation (Drobnic & Blossfeld, 2001; Goldin, 2002; McCall 
& Percheski, 2010; Pencavel, 2006; Sweeney, 2002), which highlights the importance of female 
household members’ contributions to the family’s financial resources as well as the growing role 
females play in the family’s decision making. The second is the growing significance of 
economic insecurity and instability (Gottschalk & Moffitt, 2009; Hacker & Jacobs, 2008; 
Kalleberg, 2009; Western et al., 2012), which makes it necessary for social institutions such as 
the family to function as a “safety net” that buffers against external risks to its members (DiPrete 
& McManus, 2000; Western et al., 2012). In addition, potential empirical investigations are made 
possible by the ongoing effort in data collection to obtain more detailed information on 
individual-level, long-term longitudinal data (Cheng, 2014; Elder Jr & Giele, 2009). 
Individual-level data, as opposed to household-level measures, allows the researcher to gauge the 
behaviors of specific individual family members. The long-term longitudinal design allows the 
researcher to link outcomes of individual persons into trajectories or sequences of life, which 
then facilitates the investigation of within-person changes over the lifetime. 
Despite the growing significance of these theoretical shifts in family research, their 
empirical applications have just started to accrue and remain far from adequate. The current 
literature suffers from two major limitations. First, in examining the implications of risks to 
families and their individual members, prior works often characterize risks by the occurrence of 
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adverse events (i.e. “negative shocks”), such as job displacement (Brand & Thomas, 2014; 
DiPrete, 1981; Lundberg, 1985; Stephens Jr, 2001) and family dissolution (Cherlin, 
Chase-Lansdale, & McRae, 1998; Smock, Manning, & Gupta, 1999). These discrete events, 
however, represent only a very small and particular share of individuals’ experiences in their 
social and economic lives. A family may experience substantial year-to-year fluctuations in 
well-being even absent these events. Second, while existing works have started to move from 
cross-sectional observations towards longitudinal analysis, prior longitudinal analyses often draw 
on data that cover a short period of time ranging from a few months to less than five years (e.g. 
Juhn & Potter, 2007; Lundberg, 1985; Pencavel, 2006; Spletzer, 1997). Since individuals may 
vary considerably in their timing of many important life course transitions such as job mobility 
and childbearing, limiting the analysis to a short time period may ignore a sizable share of 
changes in labor market activities that occurred outside of the observation window.  
This paper aims to cross-fertilize these three theoretical shifts in family research through an 
in-depth examination of the case of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness in labor supply 
among married couples. Specifically, I define the within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness as 
the temporal adjustments in one’s labor supply according to the spouses’ labor market activities. 
These adjustments will occur, for example, when the wife increases her level of labor force 
participation after the husband experiences low earnings, or when the husband works more than 
normal hours after the wife retreats from the labor market. I argue that such within-couple 
inter-temporal responsiveness, if found to be true, will serve as empirical evidence that the 
individualistic, life course, and risk-sharing perspectives are better suited for contemporary 
family research than the unitary, static, and resource-sharing perspectives.  
First of all, within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness in labor supply stems from the 
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individualistic perspective, because to study how individual family members respond to each 
other, we should first recognize individual family members as independent, goal-oriented agents 
that interact with each other in decisions about their labor market behaviors. Second, the 
inter-temporal nature of these within-couple dynamics points to the significance of the life course 
perspective, because these temporal changes in individual behaviors and corresponding 
inter-temporal adjustments unfold gradually over the life course. And most importantly, 
within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness provides an excellent case for the function of the 
family as a risk-sharing institution. On the one hand, marriage is one of the most common forms 
of family formation. And since the husband and wife commit to providing financial support for 
each other, they likely consider their spouses’ labor market activities in making their own labor 
market decisions. On the other hand, given the dominant pattern of marital age homogamy, it is 
more common for the husband and wife to be at similar life course stages than for other family 
relations such as parents and children. Hence, married couples are likely to share similar life 
experiences, such as the birth of a child, as well as similar domestic responsibilities, such as 
taking care of their parents and in-laws. These similarities make it likely and possible for the 
husband and wife to maintain economic stability through collaboration. For example, if the 
husband experiences a drop in his wage, the wife may change from a part-time job to a full-time 
job, or work more hours in order to compensate for the husband’s lost earnings. As such, 
individuals connected by family ties are able to protect themselves against economic insecurity 
and instability. 
I then conduct an empirical analysis to investigate the existence of, and heterogeneity in, the 
responsiveness of the individual’s labor force participation to his or her spouse’s labor market 
activities. My key outcome measures include a continuous indicator of the total number of hours 
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a person works annually,  a categorical indicator of the total number of hours a person works, 
and categorical indicators of the person’s work status: not working, working part-time, working 
full-time, or working overtime. My key independent variables are the spouse’s one-year-lagged 
labor market outcomes, including annual earnings, total number of hours worked, and hourly 
wage. I adopt several identification strategies to aid the causal interpretation of the analysis: I 
first employ fixed-effect models to control for the couple-specific fixed effect, then use 
time-varying covariate controls to net out potential confounders such as childbearing and family 
size, and lastly use the individual’s own lagged labor force participation variable to block out the 
influence of time-varying unobserved variables. My analysis accounts for two dimensions of 
responsiveness heterogeneity. Hypothesizing that the persisting gender roles in the family may 
lead to greater responsiveness of women than of men to spouses’ outcomes, I examine 
within-couple responsiveness for males and females separately and test for gender differences in 
the degree of responsiveness. Hypothesizing that the presence of a greater number of children, 
and a young child in particular, may increase the necessity of a stable income flow to the family, 
I test whether such responsiveness is associated with parenthood status. 
Applying these models to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data, I show that 
the wife tends to adjust her labor supply according to the labor market outcomes of her husband, 
such that if the husband earns less annual income, works fewer hours, or receives a lower hourly 
wage, the wife is likely to increase the amount of hours she works annually or to transition from 
lower-labor-supply to higher-labor-supply work status. However, no such behavior is found for 
the husband. In addition, the wife’s responsiveness in labor supply is greater when there is a 
young child present in the household. These findings provide evidence of within-family 
risk-sharing in the real world and point to the importance of considering gender and childbearing 
  
183 
 
when studying such risk-sharing behaviors. 
Finally, I conclude by suggesting that the case of within-couple inter-temporal 
responsiveness points to new directions of family research that align well with the individualistic, 
life course, and risk-sharing perspectives. Drawing on the empirical results, I will discuss the 
case of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness in the context of four lines of sociological 
inquiries: (1) the functions of family in the contemporary society; (2) the dimension of “risk” in 
social inequality; (3) the proper unit of analysis in stratification theories; (4) gender in the family. 
 
THREE THEORETICAL SHIFTS IN FAMILY RESEARCH 
 
Scholarly understandings of the nature and functions of family in the modern society are strongly 
influenced by what theoretical perspectives we adopt. And the popularity and pertinence of these 
perspectives in the research literature evolve with time. In recent decades theoretical orientations 
on family research have undergone three major transformations: (1) from unitary to 
individualistic, (2) from static to life course, and (3) from resource-sharing to risk-sharing. This 
section discusses these theoretical shifts, focusing particularly on how they may be brought in to 
understand within-family dynamics in the contemporary society.  
 
From the Unitary towards the Individualistic Perspective  
It is a long-standing tradition for stratification research to consider the family as the primary unit 
of stratification, yet, the issue of how to best describe the position of a family in the stratification 
system has been constantly questioned and debated. It was once the common practice for 
stratification research to adopt the unitary perspective, relying on the fundamental assumption 
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that the socio-economic position of a family can be sufficiently captured by the attainment of the 
male household head (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979; Erikson, 1984; Goldthorpe, 
1983).  This unitary perspective on family is also consistent with what functionalists sees as a 
“functional necessity,” as it facilitates the assignment of the offspring to proper social status 
(Giddens, Duneier, Appelbaum, & Carr, 2000; Parsons, 1953).  
A sizable literature has challenged the assumptions underlying the unitary perspective, 
arguing instead that with the rise of married women’s labor market participation, the 
socioeconomic standing of a family can no longer be reduced to the standing of the male 
household head (Acker, 1973; DiPrete, 2002; Sorensen & McLanahan, 1987; Sørensen, 1994). 
Observing that the traditional nuclear family in which the wife completely depends on the 
husband has been declining, Acker (1973) posited that women’s position in the total social 
structure will become a more legitimate sociological problem. Two decades later, Annemette 
Sørensen (1994) further developed arguments that while the empirical evidence is to some extent 
in favor of the conventional approach, there seem to be sufficient grounds for recommending the 
incorporation of women’s outcomes in stratification studies, given the changes that have taken 
place in women’s economic roles.  
These changes in the labor market and the family continued into the current era, when the 
dominant patterns of American families have transitions from the male bread-earner families to 
the prevalence of dual-earner families, accompanied by the decline of gender wage gap in the 
labor market (Drobnic & Blossfeld, 2001; Goldin, 1994, 2002; Moen, 1992; Sayer, Casper, & 
Cohen, 2004). In the traditional male-headed family, the amount of financial resources available 
to the family depends primarily on the earnings of the husband. However, with a growing 
number of women working in the labor market and taking higher-paying jobs, the wife could 
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also play an important role in maintaining the family’s total financial resources and economic 
stability (Goldin, 2002; McCall & Percheski, 2010).  
 The growing importance of women in the family implies that the unitary perspective may be 
problematic, as it often reduces a family’s economic standing to the household head (Goldthorpe, 
1983). One natural solution to this problem is to add women’s earnings to the calculation of the 
family’s economic standing. For example, Wright (1989) amended the unitary perspective by 
decomposing a family’s standing into “the totality of direct and mediated class relations” (Wright, 
1989, pp. 41). However, I argue that such amendment is still questionable, because it atomizes 
each individual in the family and thus fails to fully acknowledge the mode of relations and 
interactions between the individuals. In fact, one key implication of the growing significance of 
women’s economic contribution is that it enables women to engage more equally in negotiations 
and collaborations with their spouse in their decisions on labor market behaviors. As a result, the 
family operates as a social environment that hosts constant and dynamic interactions, responses, 
and adjustments among its members.   
Finally, despite the growing significance of women’s earnings as an important source of 
family income, the within-family dynamics remain far from gender-neutral. As numerous studies 
have indicated, the gender revolution in the labor market is far from complete, as women are still 
segregated in lower-paying occupations (England, 2005; Petersen & Morgan, 1995; Don 
Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 2002), earning lower wages (Goldin, 2002; Tomaskovic-Devey & 
Skaggs, 2002), and facing substantial barriers to their career advancement (DiPrete & Soule, 
1988; Fernandez‐Mateo, 2009; Petersen & Saporta, 2004). Meanwhile, gendered norms and 
display in the family continues to impact the distribution of power and responsibilities in the 
family (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; England, 2010; West & 
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Zimmerman, 2009). In their interpretation of these facts, the unitary and individualistic 
perspectives differ substantially. Works like Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992), for example, 
interpreted the finding that  employed married women’s class identification is more closely 
associated with their spouse’s class than with their own as evidence that the unitary perspective 
is more preferable. By contrast, I argue that the stalled gender revolution at home and at home 
indeed endorses the significance, rather than the irrelevance, of the individualistic perspective, 
for two reasons. First, since gender is fundamentally an attribute attached to the individual, the 
attention to gender asymmetry in within-family behaviors actually accords with the emphasis of 
the individualistic perspective. Second, studying within-family interactions through gender lens 
implies that treating family as a unitary entity runs the peril of overlooking the nuanced 
interactions among individual members within the family, particularly the within-family 
interactions that develops around gender roles.  
 
From the Static towards the Life Course Perspective 
As discussed above, the individualistic approach establishes the individual family members as 
independent, goal-oriented social actors of interest. Yet, the question remains as to whether 
individual outcomes are better described as permanent or changing. The conventional 
intergenerational attainment literature follows from the static perspective, as it often describes a 
person’s socioeconomic attainment by the person’s education or occupation which are fixed 
throughout the adult life (P. M. Blau & Duncan, 1967; Hout, 1984; Sewell & Hauser, 1975). 
Later works, however, brought up the importance of the intragenerational mobility process that 
affects the trajectory of attainment over the life course (Cheng, 2014; DiPrete & Eirich, 2006; 
Sørensen, 1975; Warren et al., 2002). They have explored extensively the patterns by which the 
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individual’s trajectory develops from earlier to later life stages (Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003; 
Elder, 1985; Fernandez‐Mateo, 2009; Willson, Shuey, & Elder, 2007). As a whole, these later 
works invoked the life course perspective in stratification and family research. 
 Two implications of the life course perspective could bear on the nature and function of the 
family in the contemporary world. The first concerns between-person associations in life course 
trajectories. In its most basic form, the between-person connection can be described as 
“similarity” or “homogamy. For example, a sizable literature has demonstrated that life course 
trajectories tend to be similar for individuals sharing the same social attributes such as gender, 
education, and race (Cheng, 2014; Elman & ORand, 2004; Fernandez‐Mateo, 2009; 
Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, & Johnson, 2005). Yet, such accounts of the statistical resemblance 
between individual life course trajectories come from the researcher’s, or the outsider’s point of 
view. Missing from this line of works is whether and how a person’s life course trajectory can 
interact directly with the life course trajectories of other family members. In other words, the life 
course trajectories of family members may be interdependent, not only because these members 
share the same living conditions, but also because they could engage in constant within-family 
exchanges, adjustments, and collaborations over the lifetime. These interactions give rise to the 
co-movements, responsiveness, and interdependence of family members’ trajectories in the long 
run. 
The second implication is the conceptualization of life course risks. In the extreme case of a 
stable society where individuals can perfectly predict or insure against future fluctuations in 
well-being, taking the life course perspective is almost equivalent to portraying the person’s 
exact life course trajectory. However, such a stable society does not exist, as the unanticipated 
fluctuations are always part and parcel of socioeconomic attainment in the modern society 
  
188 
 
(Cheng, 2014; DiPrete, 2002; Sorenson, 2000). As DiPrete (2002, pp.273) described, “even 
common “transitory” fluctuations in income may not be adequately anticipated by many people.” 
This brings up the importance of considering the concept of “risk” when we study the individual 
life course. Sorenson (2000), for example, established the concept of living conditions, and 
argued that there are substantial class differences in the level of uncertainty in living conditions. 
DiPrete (2002) follows up Sorenson’s argument and further illustrated that life conditions cannot 
adequately be defined at the individual level, because the living conditions of individuals depend 
on how the impact of past life course risks is shared by the household. Following this argument, 
the incorporation of life course risks into the life course perspective in family research makes it 
imperative to further consider the function of family in insuring against these risks, which will be 
the core argument in the next theoretical shift to follow. 
 
From the Resource-sharing towards the Risk-sharing Perspective 
The preceding paragraphs established the importance of incorporating individuals’ life 
trajectories and life course risks in the study of family. However, my discussion above did not 
explicitly address why and how family members would act to buffer against these life course 
risks. This leads us to the third theoretical shift in family research: the shift from viewing the 
family as a resource-sharing institution towards a risk-sharing institution. 
Family is, first and foremost, a social unit in which individuals pool and share their resources. A 
sizable body of research has shown that these family resources are crucial determinants for 
demographic transitions such as marriage and childbearing (Michael & Tuma, 1985; Schneider, 
2011), the achievement of offspring  (Coleman, 1988; Duncan & Brooks‐Gunn, 2000; Sara 
McLanahan, 2004), and individual attitudes (Dominitz & Manski, 1996; McHugh, Gober, & 
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Reid, 1990; Sorenson, 2000). This resource-sharing perspective has been the central focus of 
intergenerational mobility research and status attainment research.  
And yet, if family operates merely as a resources-sharing unit, then it can be reduced to no 
more than the aggregate of atomized individuals. It then follows that the well-being of the family 
can be easily summarized by adding up the amount of resource available to each family member. 
This assertion is problematic, because it downplays the importance of family ties as social 
relations that hold them as a group. As Annemette Sørensen (1994) pointed out, “Research on 
those aspects of the stratification or class system that are linked to the pooling of resources and 
the sharing of living conditions clearly must consider the interdependence among the members 
of the group that shares resources and living conditions. This group is usually the family.” 
More importantly, the interdependence among family members could operate as a social 
mechanism through which the life course risks to the family can be reduced. It is particularly 
fitting to discuss this mechanism against the backdrop of the recent growth of economic 
instability and insecurity in contemporary American society (Gottschalk & Moffitt, 2009; Hacker, 
2008; Karen, Douglas, & Daniel, 2012). Economic instability causes unstableness of family 
financial resources and limits the family’s short-term consumption, particularly in years of 
unexpected low income (Osberg & Sharpe, 2002; Western et al., 2012). In extreme cases, 
economic instability may even pose risks of severe financial difficulty or poverty (Gottschalk, 
Moffitt, Katz, & Dickens, 1994; Hacker & Jacobs, 2008). Fluctuations and uncertainties are 
incurred by individual wage-earners in the labor market, but when these individuals combine into 
families and relate to each other in their daily lives, they may be able to jointly mitigate the 
external risks with other family members through their dynamic interactions. For example, 
within-family risk pooling may take place when a perceived decrease in the earnings of one 
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family member is followed by a compensatory increase in the earnings of another family 
member, or when an increase in the labor force participation of one family member is responded 
by a retreat from the labor market of another family member. As a result, these family members 
enjoy more stable financial resources, and thus are better-off with these within-family 
interactions than if they had acted as unrelated and isolated individuals. This in turn signifies the 
family as a meaningful social institution which functions above and beyond isolated individuals. 
Accompanying this empirical trend of growing economic insecurity is the emerging 
stratification literature that explicitly underscores the function of family as a risk-sharing 
institution in the stratification system. DiPrete (2002) illustrated that when faced with life course 
risks for downward mobility, individuals, when formed into a household, have “the opportunity 
for rapid recovery provided by counter-mobility events such as reemployment, upward 
occupational mobility, or remarriage” (pp.278). Similarly, Western et al. (2012) described risk 
pooling that smoothes incomes over time as a collective endeavor in which household and family 
ties could play a crucial role in insuring against income instability. Western, Bloome, & 
Percheski (2008) showed empirical patterns consistent with this risk-sharing argument that the 
within-group variance in log income – an indicator of the economic volatility of the household – 
is lowest for two-parent families with a working mother. 63F
64
 These works point to the importance 
of considering the family, as opposed to the individual, as the key stratification units, because the 
collaborations among family members to buffer against risks clearly demonstrate some collective 
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 Another line of works suggest that family members may offset transitory earnings fluctuations by adjusting their 
consumption or by self-insuring through family savings (e.g. Dynarski et al. 1997; Guariglia and Kim 2004; Guiso, 
Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1992; Morduch 1995). While consumption adjustment and savings are effective mechanisms 
to reduce the negative consequences of economic instability, they typically occur after earnings are obtained from 
the labor market. But because insecurity in earnings takes place first and foremost in the labor market, I emphasize 
that family members may adjust their career decisions according to the past labor market outcomes of another family 
member, before they resort to any post-earnings insurance strategies such as consumption adjustment or savings. 
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protective power that goes beyond isolated individuals (DiPrete, 2002; Western et al., 2012). 
 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL CASE: WITHIN-COUPLE INTER-TEMPORAL 
RESPONSIVENESS 
Why This Case? 
The previous section has discussed the development of three theoretical shifts in family research. 
Whether these theoretical shifts are useful in sociological research depends on whether they 
could be matched to patterns and cases in social reality. As mentioned earlier, current empirical 
studies of the dynamics in the family have not well-matched the growing significance of these 
theoretical shifts, for two major reasons. First, risks to the family are often characterized by the 
occurrence of adverse events, such as job displacement (Brand & Thomas, 2014; DiPrete, 1981; 
Lundberg, 1985; Stephens Jr, 2001) and family dissolution (Cherlin et al., 1998; Smock et al., 
1999). DiPrete (2002), for example, called attention to the implications of these discrete events 
and their socioeconomic consequences to the life course mobility of individuals and families. 
However, while the author recognizes that the consequences of these discrete events could be 
related to fluctuations in the socioeconomic standings, the analyses are essentially 
events-centered, revealing little about whether these fluctuations, by themselves, have 
implications for the behaviors of household members. The next key step of such life course 
mobility analysis is to move towards the analysis of year-to-year fluctuations in economic 
well-being that are defined and measured continuously. 
Second, the growing availability of longitudinal data has prompted recent studies on family 
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and work to move from cross-sectional observations towards longitudinal analysis. Yet, previous 
longitudinal analyses tend to rely on data that cover only a short period of time ranging from a 
few months to less than five years (e.g. Juhn & Potter, 2007; Lundberg, 1985, 1988; Pencavel, 
2006; Spletzer, 1997). While these works are important first steps in our scholarly inquiries, such 
short-term analysis suffers from two major limitations. On the one hand, individuals may vary 
considerably in their timing of many important life course transitions, such as job mobility and 
childbearing (Fuller, 2008; Hynes & Clarkberg, 2005; Looze, 2014). A short time period may 
only capture a small and very limited share of these life transitions, missing a sizable share of 
observations of life course transitions occurring outside of the observation window. On the other 
hand, the statistical efficiency of the estimation of inter-temporal associations relies critically on 
the amount of variation over time versus the amount of between-person variation. A short 
observation period could make the estimation subject to more measurement error, as within the 
period there may not be enough observations for each person to precisely estimate and rule out 
the influence of the person’s fixed effect. 
To address these two limitations, this paper focuses on the within-couple inter-temporal 
responsiveness in labor supply over the long-term marital life course as an empirical case that 
integrates and illustrates the importance of the three theoretical shifts. My conceptualization of 
the within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness describes the phenomenon in which one adjusts 
one’s labor force participation according to the spouses’ labor market outcomes, including annual 
earnings, hourly wage, and amount of hours worked annually, so as to reduce the external 
fluctuations in their wellbeing. Here, by focusing on within-couple changes, I rule out from my 
conceptualization the spousal associations due to marital sorting (Lundberg, 1988); and by 
focusing on inter-temporal responsiveness, I highlight the dynamic within-couple adjustments 
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that occur gradually over the long-term marital life course.  
 How does this empirical case engage the three theoretical shifts? Figure 9 provides a 
conceptual illustration of how the within-couple inter-temporal associations can be viewed 
through the lenses of three theoretical shifts discussed in the previous section. 64F
65
 The top two 
graphs show that the unitary perspective characterizes the family as a stratification unit 
dominated by the male household head and his wife, whereas the individualistic perspective 
conceptualizes the family as two equal and interacting individuals. The middle two graphs show 
that the static and life course perspective considers the lives of the husband and wife differently: 
the former treats the husband and wife as playing two fixed roles and marginalizes the variable 
of time, while the latter extends the focus of analysis from “dots” to “trajectories” that unfold 
gradually over the life course.  
Finally, the bottom two graphs of Figure 9 show how the within-couple inter-temporal 
responsiveness accords with the transition from the resource-sharing perspective to the 
risk-sharing perspective. Under the resource-sharing perspective, the family is a simple 
aggregate of the life course trajectories of the husband and wife, and the two spouses are 
assumed to journey through their life courses without interactions between their life course 
trajectories. The risk-sharing perspective, by contrast, recognizes the dynamic, inter-temporal 
associations in the husband and wife’s life course trajectories that are needed for reduce thing 
overall income flows to the family. These inter-temporal associations are indicated by the arrows 
coming back and forth between the husband and wife’s life trajectories in the bottom-right graph. 
Under this risk-sharing perspective, the grouping of individuals by marriage is meaningful, not 
just because the spouses choose to share resources over a period of time, but also because they 
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 It would be interesting, particularly in the new era, to consider the dynamics of same-sex couples. But for 
simplicity, I focus on heterogeneity couples in the current study. 
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could engage in the dynamic cooperation between themselves over their marital life course.  
 
Relation to Existing Theories 
Next, I discuss my conceptualization of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness in relation 
to several existing theories on marriage and family. First, there are important distinctions 
between my conceptualization of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness and Becker’s 
specialization theory. The specialization theory sees marriage as a social institution in which the 
husband and wife makes the joint decision to specialize in different divisions of labor (Becker, 
1991; Hersch & Stratton, 2000; Kenny, 1983; Waite & Gallagher, 2002). As such, the 
specialization theory involves the interactions and joint decisions between the husband and wife, 
which is consistent with the individualistic perspective in family research. Yet, it implicitly 
assumes that, once the couple has decided on a specialization scheme, they will be no 
uncertainties or fluctuations in their labor market activities and outcomes. In other words, the 
specialization theory ignores the temporal changes – particularly those undesirable changes – 
that occur over the marital life course, as well as the inter-temporal responsiveness to these 
changes. This explains a sharp difference in prediction from my analysis and that from Becker’s 
theory: Becker’s theory predicts the function of family as a social institution will decline because 
women’s enhanced position in the labor market renders household specialization less valuable, 
while by contrast, I predict that the increase in women’s labor force participation makes it more 
possible for them to act responsively to their husband’s labor market outcomes and therefore 
strengthens the role of the family as a risk-sharing institution.  
 Another important distinction between specialization theory and my conceptualization of 
within-family risk-sharing behaviors is that they assume different mechanisms for the association 
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between the husband and wife’s labor market activities. The specialization theory implies a 
negative association between the husband and the wife’s labor force participation after getting 
married, because it predicts that men will allocate more time in the labor market and women in 
the family. Hence, after controlling for men’s work hours, men’s hourly wage rate – a measure of 
productivity rather than time allocation – should not affect women’s labor force participation. If, 
however, married couples adjust their labor force participation not just as an act of household 
specialization, but also as a dynamic strategy to defend against earnings uncertainty, then we 
should expect that women’s labor force participation will respond negatively to their spouse’s 
hourly wage, even after the spouse’s labor force participation is controlled for. This distinction 
makes it possible for my analysis to test whether within-couple risk-sharing behaviors exist in 
addition to conventionally household specialization. 
Second, my conceptualization of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness can be seen as 
a more general form of the added-worker effect. The “added-worker effect” literature describes 
the phenomenon in which the wife increases her labor market participation in the event of her 
husband’s unemployment, so as to provide a “spousal safety net” that compensates for the 
forgone earnings (Lundberg, 1985; Stephens, 2001).  Yet, works following this perspective tend 
to focus on the impact of an adverse event, such as involuntary job loss, on the behavior of other 
family members (DiPrete & McManus, 2000; Heckman & MaCurdy, 1980; Stephens Jr, 2001). 
The occurrence of these particular adverse events, however, represents only a very small and 
particular share of individuals’ experiences in their social and economic life. Instead, my analysis 
asks a more general question about whether, even in absence of the occurrence of adverse events, 
married couples collaborate by acting responsively to each other’s labor market outcomes so as 
to reduce economic instability and insecurity.  
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Third, my conceptualization of within-couple responsiveness engages the growing literature 
on the deinstitutionalization of marriage and the need to consider alternative bases for modern 
marriage (Amato, 2004; Burgess & Cottrell, 1939; Burgess & Locke, 1945; Cherlin, 2004; 
Coontz, 2004; Lauer & Yodanis, 2010). Burgess & Cottrell (1939) observed the weakening 
institutional basis of marriage and the emergence of companionate marriage. Following this line 
of argument, Cherlin (2004) further discussed the transition from companionate marriage to 
individualized marriage beginning in the American society in the 1960s. The marker of the 
individualized marriage is the declining influence of social norms on family and personal life and 
the rise of self-development, negotiations, communications and openness within marriage 
(Cancian, 1990; Cherlin, 2004). One important implication of this deinstitutionalization view on 
marriage is that, individuals nowadays form marriage, not just because social values told them to, 
but more importantly, because they choose to share life with each other in their separate yet 
mutual pursuit of personal interests and rewards. If we consider more stable income flows and 
lower economic insecurity as part of the mutual interests that individuals pursue in marriage, 
then the within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness can be seen as a manifestation of the 
actions taken by the husband and wife to realize the value and enhance the quality of their 
individualized marriage.  
 
HETEROGENEITY IN THE DEGREE OF RESPONSIVENESS 
 
My earlier discussion in the theoretical section points to the importance of considering the 
heterogeneity in the degree of responsiveness within married couples. One important 
implications of the individualistic perspective is that personal attributes may affect modes of 
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interactions with other family members. Meanwhile, central to the life course perspective is the 
notion that individuals’ behaviors are contingent on the context of the life cycle (Elder, 1985; 
Mayer, 2009).65 F
66
 Following these perspectives, analysis in this paper further considers two 
sociologically-meaningful dimensions of heterogeneity in degree of responsiveness. 
 
Gender and Degree of Inter-temporal Responsiveness 
First, I argue that the within-couple decision-making process may turn out to be a locale where 
gender roles in the family are manifested, strengthened and even reproduced. While women’s 
labor market participation has increased in recent years, due to the persistence of the gendered 
division of labor within married couples, the husband may continue to be considered the primary 
income earner in the family and the wife the secondary source of family income, or the “added 
worker” to the family (Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012; Goldin, 1994; Jacobs & 
Gerson, 2004; Lundberg, 1985). This could happen when the traditional gender role persists in 
the family domain and has an impact on the division of responsibilities between the husband and 
wife (Cooke, 2006; Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011; Hochschild & Machung, 1989; West & 
Zimmerman, 1987), or when barriers to women’s entry and promotion continue to operate in the 
workplace (England, 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 2002; Yang & Aldrich, 2014), which 
can discourage women from prioritizing their careers. By contrast, for men, behaviors in the 
family and in the labor market can be viewed as symbols for their masculinity, a phenomenon 
commonly referred to as “doing gender” or “gender display” (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & 
Robinson, 2000; Goffman, 2007; West & Zimmerman, 1987). As an act of “doing gender”, men 
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 Waite (1980), for example, illustrated that in making decisions on labor market participation, wives tend to weigh 
factors differently at different life cycle stages. 
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may not always reduce their labor force participation when their spouse’s earnings are higher, so 
as to display their masculinity by maintaining their status as the primary breadwinner in the 
family.  If this is the case, one may expect the wife’s labor force participation to be more 
malleable in response to the financial situation of the family than the husband’s, a finding that is 
suggested by earlier works (Cha, 2010; Devereux, 2004; Hyslop, 2001; Pencavel, 2006).   
 To address the heterogeneity by gender, my analysis will examine the degree of 
responsiveness for men and women separately: 
Hypothesis 1A (men): Men increase (reduce) their labor supply when their wives earn 
lower (higher) income, lower (higher) wages, or work less (more) hours. 
Hypothesis 1B (women): Women increase (reduce) their labor supply when their 
husbands earn lower (higher) income, lower (higher) wages, or work less (more) hours. 
I then test whether the gender difference in the degree of responsiveness is non-zero: 
Hypothesis 2 (gender difference): The degree of labor force participation responsiveness 
to the spouse’s labor market activities is greater among women than among men. 
 
Parenthood and Degree of Inter-temporal Responsiveness 
Indicators of parenthood status may work as a moderator of the effects of spousal labor market 
outcomes on the individual’s labor market activities. Because economic instability, especially the 
implied risks of poverty, is particularly harmful for the well-being of children (Brooks-Gunn & 
Duncan, 1997; Duncan & Brooks‐Gunn, 2000; McLoyd, 1998), the demand for maintaining a 
stable income flow and offsetting hazards of family poverty is greater when the wellbeing of the 
children is taken into consideration in the parent’s labor market decisions. Lundberg (1988), for 
example, found that husbands and wives without pre-school children act like separate individuals, 
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and the negative association in the husband and wife’s labor force participation occurs only to 
couples with more than one pre-school child. Lehrer (1999) also showed that the husband’s 
income depresses female employment most strongly when preschoolers are present in the home. 
Moreover, given that the economic costs associated with raising children have risen in recent 
years (Casper & O’Connell, 1995; England & Folbre, 1999), financial difficulties in child-raising 
are usually beyond what can be solved by borrowing money from elsewhere in short term, and 
thus maintaining a substantial amount of financial resources in the family is particularly 
important to couples with children in the household. Therefore, I expect the degree of 
responsiveness in the couple’s labor market activities to be greater for couples with children, 
particularly those with a young child. Using number of children and age of the youngest child as 
indicators of parenthood status, my analysis will test the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3 (number of children): The degree of inter-temporal responsiveness is higher 
with the presence of a greater number of children in the household. 
Hypothesis 4 (age of youngest child): The degree of inter-temporal responsiveness is 
higher with the presence of a younger child in the household. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Timeline of Analysis 
My analysis of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness relies on data that contain multiple 
observations for each person. For each person, I focus on the years of his or her first marriage to 
ensure homogeneity in the nature of marriage. I first line up the married couple’s experiences in 
the order of time. Then, for each couple-year observation, I use the spouse’s labor market 
activities in the previous year (𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝 ) and the respondent’s own labor market activities in the 
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previous year (𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛) to predict the respondent’s own labor market activities in the current 
year (𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛). This specification requires that (1) the two individuals should stay married in both 
time t-1 and t, and (2) no missing information in 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
, 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 and 𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛. By way of 
demonstration, Figure 10 visualizes the timeline of one hypothetical individual respondent, 
Respondent R. Respondent R enters the labor market at time point zero, and the numbers in the 
figure counts the number of years since Respondent R’s labor market entry. A circled number 
means that none of 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
, 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 and 𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 is missing, at a non-circled number means that 
information is missing at this person-year or couple-year. At time 2, Respondent R got married, 
for the first time in his or her life, to Spouse S. The marriage lasted seven years, until they 
divorced at time 9. During their marriage, as indicated by the circled numbers, information is 
available for Respondent R at 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 years of labor market experience, and available 
for Spouse S at 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 years of labor market experience. The arrows in the figure, 
leading from 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
 or 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 to 𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛, represent the couple-year observations that will be used in 
my model estimation. For example, Time 2 is not used as the outcome time point, because this is 
the year when the couple got married, and thus 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
 and 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 are not defined prior to this year. 
Time 7 is not used as the outcome time point, because 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 is missing. 66F
67
 After the 9
th
 time 
point, the two persons got divorced, and thus what happened afterwards will not be included in 
my analysis. 
  
Alternative Mechanisms and Identification Strategies 
The theoretical arguments point to the possibility and importance of risk-sharing within married 
                                                        
67
 The fixed-effect model, however, is flexible with missing data and unbalanced spacing of observations 
across different individuals. 
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couples. This risk-sharing behavior should be manifested as the negative “treatment effect” of 
the spouse’s labor market outcomes (e.g. earnings, work hours, and hourly wage) on the 
respondent’s own labor force participation. However, in the empirical analysis, the identification 
of such treatment effects requires the exclusion of several alternative mechanisms by which a 
husband-wife association in labor market activities may also be induced. Below, I discuss each of 
the four possible alternative mechanisms and introduce my identification strategies. Table 2 
presents a list of alternative mechanisms, along with their corresponding type of confounding 
effect in statistical language, examples, illustration with directed acyclic graphs (DAG hereafter), 
and my identification strategies. 
The first alternative mechanism is marital sorting on fixed individual attributes, which 
typically induces a positive cross-sectional association in labor market activities among married 
couples because individuals with similar traits tend to marry each other (Hout, 1982; Mare, 1991; 
Schwartz, 2010). The DAG in the first row of Table 9 provides a visual illustration of the 
confounding effect of marital sorting. S represents the couple’s shared time-invariant attributes, 
such as education, race, or family background. For example, S could represent the husband and 
the wife’s average level of education. Because individuals tend to marry individuals of the same 
educational attainment, and given that, in general, educational attainment positively affects the 
individual’s labor force participation at any time point, S will positively affect 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
, 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 and 
𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛. A spurious and positive association between 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
 and 𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛will be induced if we do not 
rule out this confounding effect of S. I rule out the influence of marital sorting on individual 
attributes by adopting the fixed-effect model to control for the individual-specific and 
couple-specific fixed characteristics, so that the estimated associations between the husband and 
wife’s work hours or wages are entirely due to inter-temporal variations within couples, rather 
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than the cross-sectional associations in their labor market activities. 
Second, the husband and wife may share similar career trajectories, which could induce 
spurious associations. For example, the husband and wife may have the same educational 
attainment, and because individuals with higher educational attainment tend to experience faster 
career progress (Elman & O’Rand, 2004), the couple’s labor market trajectories may move in a 
similar direction, not because they purposefully adjust their labor market activities, but because 
their career trajectories tend to follow similar trends. The second row of Table 9 illustrates this 
confounding effect of trajectory-induced husband-wife association. Such spurious association is 
not ruled out by the fixed-effect model, because the fixed-effect model only deals with the 
confounding due to couple’s fixed attributes that affect earnings constantly over time. To account 
for such trajectory-induced spurious association, my fixed-effect models will include controls for 
the husband-wife association in wage growth rate due to their similarities in educational 
attainment, cognitive ability, and race. 
The third alternative mechanism is the spurious association in the couple’s labor market 
activities induced by their mutual association with observed time-varying confounding variables, 
such as parenthood status, family size, and total family income. Take parenthood status for 
example. The specialization theory predicts that married men tend to specialize in market labor 
while married women specialize in domestic labor. It is thus implied that when demand for 
domestic responsibilities increases due to events such as childbearing, household specialization 
will be intensified, resulting in the husband’s increasing his labor force participation and the wife 
incurring a reduction her labor force participation. This in turn induces a “spurious” negative 
association in the couple’s labor market activities. The DAG in the third row of Table 9 
illustrates this confounding effect. The graph shows that the observed time-varying confounders, 
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represented by 𝑂𝑇𝑉𝐶𝑡−1, affect 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
, 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 and 𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 simultaneously and induce a “spurious” 
within-couple inter-temporal association. My analysis addresses this problem by explicitly 
controlling for these potential time-varying confounders. These controls include number of 
children in the household, age of youngest child in the household, family size, and the total 
income to the family.  
Lastly, unobserved time-varying confounders may exist to induce spurious within-couple 
associations. These unobserved confounders may include the changing values towards family 
and work that affect the behaviors of the husband and wife simultaneously, and the unobserved 
shocks to the household that induce both the husband and wife to alter their behaviors. To 
address this problem, I include the respondent’s own labor force participation at time t-1, 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛. 
This strategy is visualized in the DAG at the last row of Table 1. Controlling for 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛 blocks 
out the confounding effect of unobserved time-varying confounders on the effect of 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
 on 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑛 by blocking the path of their effects on  𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛 that works through 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
. This 
identification strategy requires the assumption that given the respondent’s own labor force 
participation at time t-1, the unobserved time-varying confounders are independent of the 
respondent’s own labor market activities at time t. This identification assumption can be 
formalized as: UTVCt−1 ⊥ Lt
own | Lt−1
own.  
 
DATA, MEASURES, AND MODELS 
Data 
This study uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data (NLSY79 hereinafter), a 
longitudinal study that follows a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young people aged 
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14 to 22 when they were first surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed annually 
through 1994 and biennially thereafter. The major advantage of the NLSY79 dataset for the 
purpose of this study is that it provides rich information about the temporal variations of 
individuals’ labor market experiences, as well as family domain transitions, which stretch across 
more than 30 years within a cohort of population. The analytic sample consists of an average of 
5.8-6.5 couple-year observations per respondent, with a maximum of 22 couple-year 
observations per respondent. As discussed earlier, sufficient within-couple long-term temporal 
variation is crucial for modeling and estimating the within-couple inter-temporal associations in 
labor market activities. 67F
68
 My analysis draws on all currently available waves (1979-2010) of the 
NLSY79 data. The sample is weighted in the analysis. 
In the NLSY79 data, when a spouse is present, the respondent will be asked about 
information on the spouse’s work-related experiences and outcomes. Cautioning that individuals 
may behave in different ways in first and later marriages, I restrict the analytic sample to the 
couple-years pertaining to the individual’s first marriage so as to retain relatively homogeneous 
marriage experiences. Because I focus on the respondent’s years in first marriage, the NLSY79 
respondent’s married person years are equivalent to couple years, and for simplicity, the rest of 
this paper will refer to the unit of analysis as couple years.  
 
Measures 
I use two key dependent variables to describe the respondent’s labor market activities. The first is 
a categorical indicator of work status, which contains four mutually exclusive categories: (1) 
                                                        
68
 Yet, because of the dataset’s relatively homogeneity in the range of birth years, one should take caution 
when generalizing results based on this dataset to other cohorts. 
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non-working; (2) working part-time (less than 35 hours per week); (3) working normal hours (35 
to 50 hours per week); and (4) working overtime (more than 50 hours per week). The second is 
the logarithm of annual work hours, which is the total amount of hours worked by the respondent 
in the calendar year. The categorical indicators reflect individuals’ adjustment in labor force 
participation by changing their work statuses, while the continuous indicators reflects their 
adjustment in work hours in greater granularity (Damaske, 2011; Lundberg, 1985).   
 The key independent variables include the logarithm of the spouse’s total annual income 
(including income from salaries, wages, and business income), the logarithm of the spouse’s 
annual hours worked and the logarithm of spouse’s hourly wage of the most current or primary 
job for the individual in the previous year. From 1994, the NLSY79 survey schedule changed 
from annually to every other year, and in cases where a one-year lag is missing, I assume that the 
labor market activities remain unchanged from the previous year (i.e. two-year lag). 68F
69
 The 
independent variable is lagged by one year for two reasons. First, methodologically speaking, the 
concurrent labor market experiences of the individual and the spouse are more likely to be 
confounded by other unobserved time-varying confounders, while using a one-year lagged 
predictor can reduce such confounding problem, that is, the effects of spousal variables can be 
assumed to follow a causal direction (Cha, 2010). Second, the organization of the real labor 
market makes it not likely that one can adjust his or her work hours or change between work 
statuses instantaneously. Thus, it usually takes some time for the responsiveness to spouse’s labor 
market activities to actualize, which gives us another reason to specify a one-year lag of the 
                                                        
69
 Two robustness checks are conducted in this respect. First, I replaced the one-year lag in the main analysis 
with the different lengths of lags; Second, I restricted my analysis to pre-1994 years when the NLSY79 
interviews are conducted every year. Results are consistent with my main findings, and are available upon 
request to the author.  
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independent variables of labor market activities. 69F
70
  
Note that for each couple-year observation, I choose to use the spouse’s labor market 
activities to predict the NLSY79 respondent’s own labor market activities, but do not use the 
NLSY79 respondent’s labor market activities to predict the spouse’s labor market activities. This 
is because of two concerns. The first is a concern with measurement. The NLSY79 data 
measures the respondent’s and his or her spouse’s earnings and work hours differently: the 
respondent self-reports his or her own labor market activities, while the spouse’s labor market 
information is proxy-reported by the respondent. Hence, in addition to the common measurement 
error shared by these two self-reported measures, the measures for the spouse’s labor market 
activities are also subject to an additional proxy reporting bias. Such differences in the sources of 
variation in these two different measures makes it problematic to treat the respondent and 
spouse’s information as symmetric and draw statistical inferences from them as if they were the 
same dependent variable. 70F
71
 Therefore, my analysis consistently uses the respondent 
self-reported experiences as dependent variables, but not the other way round. The second is a 
concern with survey design. The nature of the NLSY79 data as a longitudinal individual-based 
survey means that more detailed covariates, such as cognitive test scores and race/ethnicity, are 
available for the respondents than for their spouses. Hence, treating the respondent’s earnings 
and work hours as the dependent variable will allow me to control for other important covariates 
                                                        
70
 Appendix Figure 3.A demonstrates the relationship between 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
, 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑜𝑤𝑛, and 𝐿𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛, as well as the measures 
for each of these three key indicators. 
71 Appendix Table 3.B1 gives the mean and variances of hourly wage, annual work hours, and annual income for 
the respondent and spouse by age and gender. some interesting discrepancies in the self- and proxy-reported 
information can be seen from the numbers in Appendix Table 3.A1. For example, consistent across all three age 
groups, female respondents report lower average hours worked per year as well as hourly wage than what was 
reported by male respondents of their female spouses. Thus, at lease descriptively, labor market experiences for the 
respondent and the spouse should be better treated as different measures. 
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of the respondents, such as age, race and educational attainment, which are crucial for the 
statistical inference drawn from the models.  
Meanwhile, I measure the continuous dependent and independent variables by the logarithm 
scale, so that the estimated coefficients on these independent variables can be interpreted by the 
percentage change in the dependent variable caused by the percentage change in the independent 
variable.71F
72
 In other words, the scale of measurement of these variables will not affect the results. 
The scale-free feature of this specification is particularly favorable, because it makes it possible 
to compare the estimated coefficients for different gender or parenthood status groups who are 
likely to differ in their level of labor force participation or hourly wage. 
 Other covariates to be incorporated into the models include the linear and square terms of 
age, race, highest grade completed, standardized cognitive test score (i.e. AFQT score), number 
of children in the household and age of the youngest child in the household. The respondent’s 
own annual work hours and hourly wage in the previous period are also included in the models. 
The inclusion of the respondent’s own annual work hours is crucial for the identification of 
within-couple responsiveness, as I will explain in the next section.  
 
Model Specifications 
The first set of fixed-effect models assess whether the respondent’s likelihood of working in a 
certain category of work status is affected by the spouse’s annual income. Specifically, I first 
code the indictor of work status (denoted by S) as 1 if the individual is not working, as 2 if the 
individual is working part-time, 3 if the individual is working normal hours, and 4 if the 
                                                        
72
 For example, the coefficient on log spousal annual work hours in predicting the respondent’s log hourly wage 
will indicate the percentage change in the respondent’s hourly wage caused by a percentage change in the spouse’s 
annual work hours. 
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individual is working overtime. The greater the value of S, the more hours the individual works 
per week. Then, I predict the respondent’s probability of working (i.e. (𝑆 ≥ 2|𝑆 ≥ 1) ), 
probability of working at least normal hours given that the respondent is working (i.e. 𝑃(𝑆 ≥
3|𝑆 ≥ 2), and the probability of working overtime as opposed to working normal hours given 
that respondent is working at least normal hours (i.e. P((𝑆 ≥ 4|𝑆 ≥ 3)). Formally, the 
fixed-effect logistic regression model for 𝑃(𝑆 ≥ 𝑠 + 1 |𝑆 ≥ 𝑠), is written as follows:  
Eq.3.1:       𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃(𝑆 ≥ 𝑠 + 1 |𝑆 ≥ 𝑠)) 
                          = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2             Baseline and age effect   
                       +∑ βj
𝐽
𝑗=1 Lt−1,j
𝑜𝑤𝑛           Controlling for own activities 
                       +∑ γk
𝐾
𝑘=1 Lt−1,k
𝑠𝑝
         Responses to spouse’s activities 
              +∑ θmXitm
𝑀
𝑚=1           Time-varying controls 
                       +𝜇𝑖               Individual fixed effect 
                       +𝜔𝑖𝑡                   Residual 
 
 In Eq. 1, the linear and quadratic terms of age captures the individual’s general trend of 
change in labor market activities over the life cycle. The set of Lt−1,j
𝑜𝑤𝑛 ′𝑠 and Lt−1,k
𝑠𝑝 ′𝑠 represent 
measures for the labor market activities of the respondent and the spouse, as discussed earlier. 
The set of 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚′𝑠 includes time-varying controls, including the interaction terms between age 
and race, between age and education, and between age and cognitive test score, as well as 
time-varying variables such as parenthood status, family size, and family total income. 𝜇𝑖 
captures the respondent’s fixed characteristics. The key coefficients of interest in this equation 
are the 𝜃′𝑠, which represents the effect of the spouse’s labor market activities on the 
respondent’s likelihood of being in different work statuses. For example, a negative value of the 
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𝜃 coefficient on the spouse’s annual work hours or hourly wage in the equation where s=1 will 
suggest that individuals are less likely to be working as opposed to non-working in response to a 
greater level of labor force participation or a higher level of hourly wage of their spouse.  
 The second set of fixed-effect models predict the respondent’s logarithm of annual work 
hours at time t, denoted by 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡
𝑜𝑤𝑛, as follows: 
 
Eq.3.2     𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟t
𝑜𝑤𝑛  = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2         Baseline and age effect   
                       +∑ ψj
𝐽
𝑗=1 Lt−1,j
𝑜𝑤𝑛             Controlling for own activities 
                       +∑ ϕk
𝐾
𝑘=1 Lt−1,k
𝑠𝑝
           Responses to spouse’s activities 
               +∑ λmXitm
𝑀
𝑚=1             Time-varying controls 
                       +𝜂𝑖                 Couple-specific fixed effect 
                       +𝜖𝑖𝑡                     Residual 
 The independent variables and their coefficients in Eq. 2 are similar to those in Eq. 1 and 
explanations are provided following each set of independent variables in the above. The key 
coefficients of interest in this equation are the 𝜙𝑠, which indicates the effect of the spouse’s 
labor market activities on the respondent’s annual work hours. Recall that as illustrated earlier, 
when annual income, annual work hours, and hourly wage are included as the dependent or 
independent variables, they are measured under the log scale. Therefore, the 𝜙𝑠 can be 
interpreted as the percentage change in the respondent’s own annual work hours caused by a 
percentage change in the spouse’s annual income, annual work hours or hourly wage. 
 The fixed-effect models specified in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 will first be applied to the NLSY79 
male and female sample separately to test Hypotheses 1A and 1B. Then, I will test the gender 
differences in the degree of responsiveness (i.e. Hypothesis 2) by applying the models to the 
  
210 
 
male-female pooled sample and interact the independent variables with gender. Lastly, I will test 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 by conducting another set of analyses with the interactions between the 
number of children in the household and the age of youngest child with Lt−1
𝑠𝑝
 to assess the 
heterogeneity in within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness by parenthood status. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 10 compares the weighted descriptive statistics of these covariates for the total NLSY79 
sample and my analytic sample, which is restricted to individuals’ first marriages. My analytic 
sample takes up about 1/3 the size of the total NLSY79 sample. The table suggests that compared 
to all respondents in the NLSY79 dataset, the analytic sample contained slightly more females 
than males, and more whites and less blacks. The analytic sample has higher average age than 
the total sample, mainly because of its exclusion of young-age unmarried person-years. The level 
of schooling and the cognitive test score are higher for the analytic sample. As for parenthood 
status, the analytic sample, who are all married, has a higher number of children in the household; 
and conditional on having at least one child in the household, the age of the youngest child is 
slightly lower in the analytic sample. As for labor market activities, the analytic sample contains 
person-years in which the individual works more hours and receive higher hourly wages than the 
total sample average. In addition to individual-level covariates, the analysis also controls for 
family size and total family income in the previous year.  
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Responsiveness to Spouse’s Annual Income 
I start with assessing the effect of the spouse’s annual earnings on the individual’s work status, 
annual work hours, and hourly wage. I apply Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 to the data, with 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
 measured by 
one single variable: log annual income of the spouse (log (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝 )).  Columns (1)-(6) in the 
upper panel of Table 11 give the estimated coefficients on spouse’s annual income in predicting 
the likelihood of working instead of not working, of working at least normal hours instead of 
working part-time, and of working overtime instead of working normal hours. The reported 
coefficients are log odds ratios. A positive coefficient means that spouse’s annual income 
increases the possibility of being in a work status, and a negative coefficient means the opposite. 
Hypotheses 1A and 1B imply that the coefficients should be negative for men and women, 
respectively. For the male sample, the results show that contrary to our expectation of a negative 
association between own labor force participation and spousal annual income, the likelihood of 
working instead of not working for a husband increases with the annual income of his spouse. 
One possible explanation is that the norms of traditional gender roles still works in the family, so 
that when the wife is earning higher income, men become more likely to work instead of staying 
home, so as to maintain his identity as a breadwinner in the family. However, the spouse’s annual 
income has no statistically significant effect on men’s likelihood of working at least normal 
hours instead of working part-time, or their likelihood of working overtime instead of working 
normal hours. For the female sample, the results indicate statistically significant negative 
responses in their labor force participation to their spouse’s annual income, in terms of the wife’s 
likelihood of working instead of non-working, and in terms of her likelihood of working at least 
normal hours instead of working part-time. This implies that when the income earned by the 
spouse is lower, the wife tends to move to work status embodying greater work hours in order to 
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maintain a more stable income flow to the family. Interestingly, the degree of women’s negative 
responsiveness in labor supply is greatest when we compare the likelihood of working at least 
normal hours to the likelihood of working part-time. They are more likely to pull back from 
working at least normal hours to working part-time at time 𝑡 when their husband earns higher 
annual income at time 𝑡 − 1. This means that women’s flexibility of adjusting their labor supply 
according to their spouse’s annual income when they are deciding between working part-time 
and working normal hours.  
I next turn to the effect of spouse’s annual income on the respondent’s annual work hours. 
The coefficients, shown in Columns (7) and (8) in the upper panel of Table 11, show that both 
men and women respond negatively to their spouse’s labor force participation. The coefficient is 
statistically significant for both genders, yet the absolute value of the coefficient for women is 
five times as large as that for men. In the model that controls for parenthood status additively, 
given a one percent increase in the spouse’s annual income, the women’s labor force 
participation will be reduced by about 0.05 percent, while the men’s labor force participation will 
be reduced by about 0.01 percent. Again, consistent with the findings for work status, this 
suggests that the labor force participation of women is more responsive to their husband’s annual 
income than that of men to their wife’s annual income.   
Is the gender difference in the responsiveness in labor supply with regard to spouse’s annual 
income statistically significant? To test this, I run the above models in the male-female pooled 
sample, with interactions between the independent variables and the dummy for being female. 
The statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction terms, therefore, indicates 
whether the gender difference in the degree of inter-temporal responsive is statistically 
significant. Table 12 summarizes the empirical results. An estimate with p value ≤ 0.05 will be 
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marked as statistically significant. The table shows that women’s greater degree of inter-temporal 
responsiveness is statistically significant in terms of the likelihood of working versus 
not-working, and in terms of their adjustment in the continuously measured annual work hours. 
 
 
Responsiveness to Spouse’s Annual Work Hours and Hourly Wage 
The preceding analysis focuses on spouse’s annual income as one holistic measure of the 
economic resources brought into the family by the spouses. Next, I break down spouse’s annual 
income into two separate components: (1) annual work hours, which represent the time input in 
the labor market; and (2) hourly wage, which represent the rate of pay the spouse could receive 
for one hour of market labor. That is, in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, the independent variable 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
 is 
measured by two separate variables: log annual work hours of the spouse (log (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝 )) and log 
hourly wage (log (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝 )). I break down annual income into annual work hours and hourly 
wage for two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, if the observed inter-temporal association is 
purely a result of changes in household specialization, we may expect the spouse’s work hours to 
affect the respondent’s labor force participation, but may not expect the spouse’s hourly wage to 
affect the respondent’s labor force participation. So if significant responsiveness is detected with 
regard to the spouse’s hourly wage, it will stand as evidence that this due to the couple’s 
risk-sharing behaviors rather than pure household specialization. Second, breaking down the 
sources of annual income allows for the possibility that the two sources of annual income 
differently. 
Columns (1)-(6) in the lower panel of Table 12 presents the effect of the spouse’s annual work 
hours and hourly wage on the respondent’s likelihood of working in different work statuses. 
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Consistent with our findings about the effect of the spouse’s annual income, none of the 
coefficients on the spouse’s annual work hours and hourly wage is significant in the male sample, 
meaning that males’ work status does not respond significantly to their spouse’s work hours or 
wage. The coefficients are negatively significant for females for the likelihood of working 
instead of not working, and the likelihood of working at least normal hours instead of working 
part-time. Moreover, in both cases, women’s labor force participation is responsive to their 
spouse’s labor force participation and rate of pay, yet the responsiveness in men’s labor force 
participation is not statistically significant. 72F
73
 This is also true when the respondent’s labor force 
participation is measured using a continuous measure: Columns (7) and (8) in Table 11 show that 
a one percent increase in the spouse’s annual work hours at time 𝑡 − 1 will cause about 0.01 
percent decrease in men’s annual work hours, and about a 0.06 percent decrease in women’s 
annual work hours at time 𝑡. A one percent increase in the spouse’s hourly wage at time 𝑡 − 1 
will cause about a 0.01 percent (statistically insignificant) decrease in men’s annual work hours, 
and about a 0.07 percent decrease in women’s annual work hours at time 𝑡. Significance tests 
shown in Table 12 suggest that the gender difference in the degree of responsiveness in annual 
work hours is statistically significant. 
In sum, my findings lend little support to Hypothesis 1A, as men’s labor force participation 
appears to be unaffected by their spouse’s labor market outcomes. I find strong support to 
Hypothesis 1B, that is, women exhibit substantial negative inter-temporal responsiveness to their 
spouse’s annual income, annual work hours, and hourly wage. Moreover, the results support 
Hypothesis 2, as the estimated coefficients for the degree of inter-temporal responsiveness are 
significantly greater among women than among men. Overall, these findings are consistent with 
                                                        
73
 This difference is comparable because the two measures are logged and thus scale-free. 
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my expectations that although women have become an important source of household income, 
they act responsively to their husband’s labor market outcomes in making their labor supply 
decisions. 
 
Heterogeneity in Within-couple Responsiveness by Parenthood Status 
Next, I examine whether the degree and pattern of within-couple responsiveness vary by two 
measures for parenthood status: (1) number of children in the household;  (2) the age of 
youngest child in the household. To do so, in Eq.3.1 and Eq.3.2, I include the interactions 
between parenthood status and 𝐿𝑡−1
𝑠𝑝
. Table 13 gives the results from the models with the 
spouse’s annual income as the key predictor, and Table 14 gives the results from the models with 
the spouse’s annual work hours and hourly wage as key predictors. The estimated coefficients 
from these two tables show similar patterns:  In both the male and female samples, a greater 
number of children in the household does not seem to affect the degree of responsiveness. Yet, it 
turns out that women’s degree of responsiveness to their spouse’s annual income and hourly 
wage depends on the age of the youngest child in the household: When deciding between 
working part-time or working at least normal hours, having a youngest child in the 0-6 and 7-12 
age groups makes women’s labor force participation more responsive to their spouse’s earnings 
and wage, but having a youngest child aged above 12 does not. The results are consistent with 
those from earlier studies that found that the presence of young-age children intensifies the 
wife’s responsiveness to the husband’s earnings capability (Lehrer, 1999; Lundberg, 1985). The 
heterogeneity by parenthood status supports my expectation that having a child increases the cost 
of economic insecurity, and thus raises the necessity for risk-sharing in the family. 
 Figure 11 and Figure 12 display the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the 
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effect of spouse’s annual income (Figure 11) and spouse’s hourly wage (Figure 12) at time 
𝑡 − 1 on the respondent’s likelihood of working at least normal hours versus working part-time 
at time 𝑡. The figures show that for men, the coefficients for responsiveness are close to zero, 
and none of these coefficients are statistically distinguishable from zero, regardless of the 
number of children and the age of youngest child. For women, the coefficients are not significant, 
and very small, when there is no child in the household, or when the age of the youngest child is 
over 12 years old. The number of children in the household does not affect the degree of 
women’s inter-temporal responsiveness. By contrast, having a younger-age child in the 
household increases the degree of responsiveness: When the youngest child in the household is 
below 12, women’s negative inter-temporal responsiveness to their spouse’s annual income and 
hourly wage is statistically significant. 73F
74
  Overall, among women, the analysis on the 
heterogeneity by parenthood does not support Hypothesis 3 about the moderating effect of the 
number of children, but does support Hypothesis 4 about the moderating effect of the age of 
youngest child. Neither Hypothesis is supported among men. 
 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: FAMILY RESEARCH RECONSIDERED 
 
I started this paper with an overview and discussion of three recent shifts in theoretical 
orientation in family research: from the unitary to individualistic perspective, from the static to 
life course perspective, and from the resource-sharing perspective to the risk-sharing perspective. 
Then, I set out to focus on the case of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness in labor 
                                                        
74
 There is no statistical difference in the degree of responsiveness, however, between women with a youngest child 
in the 0-6 or 7-12 age groups. 
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supply as an empirical case that combines and illustrates these theoretical shifts. Applying fixed 
effect models with lagged independent variables to the NLSY79 data, I found that, conditional 
on the couple’s fixed characteristics and observed time-varying variables, married women’s labor 
force participation in a given year responds negatively to their spouse’s annual income, annual 
work hours, and hourly wage in the previous year. By contrast, no statistically significant 
inter-temporal responsiveness is found among men, and this gender difference is statistically 
significant. Moreover, consistent with my expectation that the presence of young child intensifies 
the need for financial stability, my results show that having a youngest child aged below 12 years 
old increases women’s degree of responsiveness.  
I draw on these findings to reconsider theories and practices in family research in several 
important ways. First, the findings shed light on the functions of family in contemporary society. 
Sociologists constantly inquire into the multifaceted functions of family as a social institution. 
Family as an institution plays a functional role in the society, as it draws the boundary for 
defining how assets and other resources should be assigned, shared, and inherited by offspring 
(Parsons, 1949). Meanwhile, family plays a key role in individuals’ lives, as it provides an 
environment for its members to share resources (Keister, 2003; Mare, 2011), companionship 
(Burgess & Locke, 1945; Cherlin, 2004), social support (Schoeni & Ofstedal, 2010; Shanas, 
1979) and cultural values (Halaby, 2003; Lareau, 2011). Findings from this paper add to these 
lines of works by illustrating, with micro-level evidence, a new function of family from a 
dynamic perspective. Specifically, the inter-temporal responsiveness within married couples 
illustrates a case in which family members, beyond sharing varying levels of resources, act 
collectively to insure against external uncertainties through dynamic interactions. As such, a new 
boundary is drawn between the family environment and extra-family environment: Outside of 
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the family, individuals each face uncertainties and risks, and these risks may not be fully insured 
through social policies. However, when these individuals are connected by family ties and 
grouped into families, they may act collectively and responsively in within the family to reduce 
the impact of these risks. Family, in this sense, serves its function as a risk-sharing institution in 
the contemporary society.  With the growing prevalence of risks, uncertainties, and insecurities 
in the everyday life of the contemporary society (Beck, 1992; Cooper, 2014; Gottschalk et al., 
1994), one may expect that the risk-sharing function of the family will be more important in the 
present and future than in the past.   
Second, the results underscore the dimension of “risk” or “insecurity” in social inequality 
among different family structures. Prior works have well-documented the inequality in the 
amount of economic resources (Sara McLanahan, 2004; Western et al., 2008) , quality of living 
arrangements (Brown, 2004; Spitze, Logan, & Robinson, 1992) , and availability of social and 
psychological support (McLanahan, Wedemeyer, & Adelberg, 1981) among families with 
different structures. However, much less research has noticed the inequality in economic 
insecurity among contemporary families. One notable exception is the work by Western and 
colleagues (2008), which showed that within-group inequality – an indicator of economic 
insecurity – is lowest in two-parent families with a working mother, as it is easier for these 
families to share risks and absorb unexpected income losses. While the authors provide an 
aggregate-level analysis of the inequality in economic insecurity, my findings of within-couple 
inter-temporal responsiveness illustrate the micro-level, dynamic mechanisms through which 
family members insure against such economic insecurity in reality. These findings confirm, with 
direct evidence, the long-standing conjecture that, the lower economic insecurity faced by 
dual-earner families on the macro-level is indeed in part the result of risk-sharing actions taken 
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by individuals within the family.   
 More specifically, the risk-sharing function of family engages the recent debate about 
whether the gains to marriage continue to exist in the current society. One side of the debate 
raises questions as to whether marriage continues to be significant in the contemporary society, 
given the weakening of social norms that push individuals into establishing households through 
marriage (Amato, 2004; Cherlin, 2004; Lauer & Yodanis, 2010), the declining value of 
specialization within marriage given rising female labor force participation (Becker, 1991), and 
the emergence of alternative family forms (Jencks & Peterson, 2001; Sarah McLanahan & 
Sandefur, 2009; Seltzer, 2000). The other side of the debate maintains that marriage is still 
beneficial, as it provide a form of enforceable trust (Cherlin, 2000, 2004) between the husband 
and wife in their commitment of a long-term relationship. One expected result of such 
enforceable trust is that, over the marital life course, family members would have stronger 
motivation to work together to increase their mutual well-beings, one of them being economic 
security. Therefore, my finding that married couples act responsively to reduce the fluctuations in 
their total economic wellbeing underscores the risk-reduction gains of marriage relative to those 
never-married, single-parent, divorced, or widowed households.  
Third, the results speak to the core debate on the proper unit of analysis in stratification 
research. As the theoretical as well as empirical developments in this study showed, the 
re-organization among contemporary American families around both male and female income 
earners means that the individualistic perspective is more useful than the traditional unitary 
perspective on the family. However, the recognition of individual behaviors in no way means that 
we should abandon the family as the unit of analysis. Rather, my findings make it evident that in 
the contemporary social context, individual interactions and decisions continue to be organized 
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around the family ties. These family ties are, in essence, social relations that connect the life 
course trajectories, as thus the intra-generational mobility processes, of different individual 
family members to each other. The spousal relations in my analysis, for example, enable family 
members to achieve the level of economic security that is not achievable had they acted as 
isolated individuals. Therefore, the interactions and joint decision-making among individual 
family members strengthen, rather than weaken, the salience of family as a key stratification 
unit.  
And more broadly, the risk-sharing behaviors among individuals connected by family ties may 
also be found in extended kinship networks. McLanahan and colleagues (1981), for example, 
illustrated that single mothers may rely on a complex combination of relatives, friends, and 
spouse-equivalents for social support crucial for their psychological well-being. Mare (2011) 
also reminded us that the availability of kin outside of the nuclear family means that stratification 
studies should extend to consider the quantity and quality of a broader range of family relations. 
My findings engage this line of argument in suggesting that individuals within the network of 
family ties may provide support for each other through risk-sharing behaviors, and I await future 
research to extend this line of analysis to examine whether such risk-sharing behaviors could be 
found among broader kin networks.  
 Last, it is important to read my results in light of gender in the family. In many facets of the 
contemporary American society, the gender revolution is far from complete (Blau, Brinton, & 
Grusky, 2006; England, 2010; Goldin, 2002). Rather, gender roles and gender divisions of labor 
in the family nowadays play out in more nuanced and complex ways. Previous research, for 
example, has focused on how men and women behave differently in housework (Bianchi et al., 
2012; Gough & Killewald, 2011; Gupta, 2007; Hochschild & Machung, 1989), time use 
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(Burgard & Ailshire, 2013; Offer & Schneider, 2011), and geographic mobility (Benson, 2014; 
Bielby & Bielby, 1992). My findings that women adjust their labor force participation according 
to their spouse’s earnings, wages, and work hours to a greater extent than men do suggest that 
women may still be considered as a “flexible income earner” or an “added worker” in the family, 
whose labor force participation is largely contingent on how their husband does. This may be due 
to several mechanisms, such as gender display in the family, women’s continued disadvantage in 
the labor market, and the segregation of women into occupations with more flexible work hours. 
But at least as a first step along this new line of inquiries, my results indicate that while the 
risk-sharing behaviors may benefit both the husband and wife, the way in which such 
risk-sharing is carried out may not be gender-neutral.  
 Let me conclude by stressing that, my emphasis on the function of family as a risk-sharing 
institution does not mean to obscure the significance of other social institutions in shaping the 
economic well-beings of individuals and families. In fact, individuals and household may cope 
with insecurity through various channels. As DiPrete (2002) pointed out, a country’s life course 
mobility regime must be understood as shaped simultaneously by various factors including the 
labor market system of occupational mobility, wage distribution mechanisms, as well as social 
welfare programs that affect the rates and consequences of union formation and dissolution. In 
addition, a sizable literature shows that adjustments in consumption and savings behaviors may 
also alleviate the negative impact of income fluctuations (Dynarski, Gruber, Moffitt, & Burtless, 
1997; Guariglia & Kim, 2004; Guiso, Jappelli, & Terlizzese, 1992). Furthermore, the way in 
which the organization of family influences the individual life course may depend critically on 
the functions and influences of other co-existing institutions. It is indeed illuminating to consider 
modern families as structure units embedded in the broader social, political, and cultural 
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contexts. 
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Figure 9  Conceptual Illustration of Within-couple Inter-temporal Responsiveness under the 
Three Theoretical Shifts   
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Figure 10 Visualization of the analytic timeline of a hypothetical individual 
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Figure 11  Effect of spouse’s annual income on the individual’s likelihood of working at least 
normal hours versus working part-time by number of children and age of youngest child, male 
and female. 
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Figure 12  Effect of spouse’s hourly wage on the individual’s likelihood of working at least 
normal hours versus working part-time by number of children and age of youngest child, male 
and female. 
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Table 9  Demonstration of alternative mechanisms and identification strategies  
 
Alternative 
Mechanism 
Type of 
Confounding Effect 
and Examples 
Directed Acyclic Graph 
Identificatio
n Strategy 
Marital 
sorting on 
time-invaria
nt attributes 
Time-invariant 
confounder (e.g. 
marital sorting on 
education, race, and 
other unobserved 
attributes)  
Controlling 
for 
individual-fi
xed effects 
in the 
fixed-effect 
model 
Mutual 
trend in 
career 
trajectories 
Trajectory-induced 
confounder 
(e.g. the association 
between career 
trajectories with 
education, cognitive 
skill, race, gender, 
etc.) 
 
 
 
Controlling 
for 
interactions 
between 
individual 
characteristic
s and age. 
Mutual 
association 
caused by 
couple-level 
events 
Observed 
Time-varying 
Confounders 
(e.g. parenthood 
status, family size, 
family total income) 
 
 
 
 
Controlling 
for observed 
time-varying 
confounders. 
Mutual 
association 
with 
unobserved 
time-varyin
g variables 
Unobserved 
Time-varying 
Confounders 
(e.g., within-couple 
power dynamics, 
unobserved events 
in the family) 
 
 
 
Controlling 
for the 
respondent’s 
own labor 
supply and 
wage at 
Time t-1. 
(Identifying 
assumption: 
UTVCt-1 ⊥
Lt
own | L
t-1
own  
) 
 
NOTE 
OTVC is short for observed time-varying confounder. UTVC is short for unobserved 
time-varying confounder 
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Table 10  Weighted descriptive status for the NLSY79 total sample and my analytic sample 
  
NLSY79 total sample Analytic sample 
Sex 
   
 
Male 49.47% 47.58% 
 
Female 50.53% 52.42% 
Race 
   
 
Hispanics 6.42% 5.62% 
 
Black 14.44% 7.65% 
 
White 79.14% 86.73% 
Age    
 
Mean 32.08014 34.17089 
 
S.D. (9.44) (8.20) 
Highest grade completed   
 
Mean 13.00 13.54 
 
S.D. (2.47) (2.52) 
Z-score of AFQT test   
 Mean 0.27 0.42 
 
S.D. (1.02) (1.00) 
Marital 
Status    
 
Single 32.56% 0% 
 
Cohabiting 2.61% 0% 
 
Married 49.61% 100.00% 
 
Other 15.22% 0% 
Number of children in the household 
 
0 59.14% 35.12% 
 
1 13.06% 17.72 
 
2+ 27.80% 47.15% 
Age of youngest child 
  
 
<6 46.82% 51.25% 
 
6---12 32.03% 30.26% 
 
12--18 21.14% 18.49% 
Work Status 
  
 
Non-working 13.66% 13.51% 
 
Part-time (<35 hours) 20.20% 16.93% 
 
Normal hours (35-50 
hours) 53.75% 55.94% 
 
Overwork (>50 hours)  12.38% 13.62% 
Annual work hours   
 
Mean 1571.84 1693.14 
 
S.D. (985.14) (984.59) 
Hourly wage 
  
 
Mean 12.90 14.98 
 
S.D. (8.89) (9.85) 
N  308242 105652 
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Table 11   Effects of spousal annual work hours and hourly wage on the individual’s likelihood of transition between work status and 
annual work hours 
 
Work v.s. Non-work 
Normal hours+  v.s. 
Part-time 
Overwork v.s. Normal 
hours 
log (Hourt
own) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Models with spouse’s annual income 
   
  
      
log(Inct‐1
sp
) 0.167* -0.179*** -0.126 -0.303*** 0.0154 -0.000473 -0.00949* -0.0537*** 
 
(0.0774) (0.0539) (0.0728) (0.0565) (0.0393) (0.0916) (0.00424) (0.0132)    
N 2903 13486 3915 14054 9599 4825 17643 19559    
       
  
Models with spouse’s annual work hours and hourly wage 
 
  
      
log (Hourt‐1
sp
) 0.166 -0.204** -0.121 -0.282*** 0.0133 -0.0817    -0.0111* -0.0578**  
 
(0.105) (0.0760) (0.0930) (0.0751)    (0.0483) (0.114)    (0.00495) (0.0186)    
log (Waget‐1
sp
) 0.0432 -0.231*** -0.115 -0.350*** 0.0439 0.0567    -0.0110 -0.0654*** 
 (0.107) (0.0623) (0.102) (0.0647)    (0.0566) (0.104)    (0.00628) (0.0157)    
N 2547 12423 3523 13134    8936 4543    16605 18682    
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 
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Table 12  Summary of Empirical Results on the Significance of Inter-temporal Responsiveness and Gender Differences 
 
 Work Status Annual work hours 
 
Work v.s. 
Non-work 
Normal hours+  
v.s. Part-time 
Overwork v.s. Normal 
hours  
     
Effect of spouse’s annual income    
Men No No No Yes 
Women Yes Yes No Yes 
Gender diff. Sig. N.S. N.S. Sig. 
     
Effect of spouse’s annual work hours    
Men No No No Yes 
Women Yes Yes No Yes 
Gender diff. Sig. N.S. N.S. Sig. 
     
Effect of spouse’s hourly wage    
Men No No No No 
Women Yes Yes No Yes 
Gender diff. N.S. Sig. N.S. Sig. 
  
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 
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Table 13  Effect of spouse’s annual income on the respondent’s own labor supply, testing the heterogeneity by parenthood status 
 
 
Work v.s. Non-work 
Normal hours+  v.s. 
Part-time 
Overwork v.s. Normal hours 
log (Hourt
own) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
log(Inct‐1
sp
) 0.400*** -0.0573 -0.135 -0.148    0.00383 0.0387    -0.0175** -0.0432*   
 
(0.115) (0.0722) (0.0990) (0.0759)    (0.0634) (0.130)    (0.00659) (0.0171)    
         
Interactions with number of children in the household 
  
log(Inct‐1
sp
)
× #child 
-0.164* -0.0120 0.0702 -0.00856    0.0201 -0.0572    0.00238 -0.0233    
(0.0710) (0.0305) (0.0558) (0.0393)    (0.0323) (0.0616)    (0.00468) (0.0139)    
         
Interactions with age of youngest child 
 
log(Inct‐1
sp
)
× age 0‐6 
-0.0325 -0.224** -0.148 -0.254**  -0.0249 -0.00823    0.00795 -0.0125    
(0.161) (0.0800) (0.127) (0.0921)    (0.0747) (0.159)    (0.0102) (0.0296)    
         
log(Inc
t-1
sp
) ×
age 7-12 
0.176 -0.0655 -0.172 -0.336**  -0.0193 0.103    0.00674 0.0115    
(0.206) (0.106) (0.171) (0.121)    (0.0963) (0.171)    (0.0124) (0.0321)    
         
log(Inct‐1
sp
)
× age 12 + 
-0.134 0.168 -0.208 0.0556    -0.0861 0.299    -0.00737 0.111*   
(0.242) (0.142) (0.268) (0.143)    (0.122) (0.255)    (0.0137) (0.0511)    
N 2903 13486 3915 14054    9599 4825    17643 19559    
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 
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Table 14  Effects of spouse’s annual work hours and hourly wage on the respondent’s own labor supply, testing the heterogeneity 
by parenthood status 
 
 
Work v.s. Non-work Normal hours+  v.s. Part-time 
Overwork v.s. Normal 
hours 
log (Hourt
own) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
log (Hourt‐1
sp
) 0.503** -0.203 0.0626 -0.197 0.0840 0.209 -0.0119 -0.0821**  
 
(0.176) (0.119) (0.130) (0.108) (0.0891) (0.194) (0.00809) (0.0279)    
         
log (Waget‐1
sp
) -0.0147 -0.0616 -0.254 -0.224* -0.0307 0.00432 -0.0333*** -0.0488*   
 (0.159) (0.0896) (0.142) (0.0894) (0.0853) (0.152) (0.00978) (0.0195)    
         
Interactions with number of children in the 
household 
  
   
log (Hourt‐1
sp
)
× #child 
-0.205 -0.0837 -0.0184 -0.0473 0.0313 -0.194* -0.000713 -0.00420    
(0.108) (0.0610) (0.0823) (0.0662) (0.0424) (0.0932) (0.00481) (0.0222)    
         
log (Waget‐1
sp
)
× #child 
-0.0275 -0.00901 0.128 0.0356 -0.0102 -0.0217 0.00288 -0.0354*   
(0.102) (0.0386) (0.0843) (0.0478) (0.0476) (0.0769) (0.00722) (0.0162)    
         
Interactions with age of youngest child   
   
log (Hourt‐1
sp
)
× age 0‐6 
0.0564 0.174 -0.305 -0.134 -0.150 -0.0483 0.00537 0.0113    
(0.268) (0.161) (0.191) (0.162) (0.109) (0.241) (0.0118) (0.0486)    
         
log (Hourt‐1
sp
) 
× age 7-12 
-0.147 0.248 -0.201 -0.0553 -0.177 0.0754 0.000222 0.0326    
(0.343) (0.221) (0.272) (0.215) (0.131) (0.291) (0.0137) (0.0519)    
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log (Hourt‐1
sp
)
× age 12 + 
-0.539 0.360 -0.820 0.510 -0.212 0.198 -0.00963 0.156*   
(0.443) (0.273) (0.488) (0.268) (0.165) (0.360) (0.0152) (0.0682)    
         
log (Waget‐1
sp
)
× age 0‐6 
-0.0367 -0.255* -0.0551 -0.292** 0.128 0.0145 0.0286* -0.00425    
(0.241) (0.102) (0.208) (0.113) (0.111) (0.201) (0.0141) (0.0368)    
         
log (Wage
t-1
sp
) ×
age 7-12 
0.613 -0.240 -0.138 -0.467** 0.216 0.179 0.0336 0.0213    
(0.314) (0.136) (0.256) (0.148) (0.143) (0.205) (0.0172) (0.0394)    
         
log (Waget‐1
sp
)
× age 12 + 
0.158 0.134 0.122 0.0118 0.0922 0.318 0.0169 0.130*   
(0.279) (0.166) (0.389) (0.163) (0.174) (0.305) (0.0211) (0.0589)    
N 2547 12423 3523 13134 8936 4543 16605 18682    
 
NOTE: Data Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. 
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Appendix R 
 
Appendix Figure 3.A demonstrates the relationship between L
t-1
sp
, L
t-1
own and Lt
own, as well as the measures for each of these three key 
indicators. Path 1 represents the effect of the respondent’s own labor market activities in the previous year on those in the current year, 
and Path 2 represents the effects of the spouse’s labor market activities in the previous year on the respondent’s labor market activities 
in the current year. The construction of one-year lag variables is straightforward prior to Year 1993, as the respondents were 
interviewed every year. Yet, from 1994 afterwards, the NLSY79 data collects information biannually. In consequence, for the 
observations at or later than year 1994, I have information on the respondent’s and his or her spouse’s labor market experience at the 
current period (i.e. at t) and two years ago (i.e. at t-2), but not for the previous year (i.e. t-1). Additional complications for observations 
after 1994 are added by the fact that in each interview, the respondent’s own wage is recorded for the current year while the 
respondent’s annual work hours and the spouse’s wage, annual work hours are record for the previous year. The result of this is that 
depending on the specific model, some of the lag variables will be missing for the previous year but available for two years ago. To 
address this, whenever the lag variable for the previous year is missing, I assume that the individual’s labor market experiences remain 
unchanged from t-2 to t-1, and thus use the reporting at t-2 as the proxy for the reporting at t-1.  
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Figure 3.A  Illustration of within-couple inter-temporal responsiveness 
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Appendix S 
 
Table 3.B  Weighted descriptive statistics of annual income, hourly wage, and annual work hours for the respondent and the spouse 
  All age Age 18-30 Age 31-40 Age 40+ 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Hoursown 2153.30 1294.67 2027.53 1203.07 2283.59 1347.61 2242.59 1498.08 
 (827.06) (936.92) (851.80) (912.44) (767.57) (955.85) (817.18) (942.49) 
Hourssp 1557.26 2193.80 1478.45 2137.01 1600.27 2268.13 1700.42 2263.39 
 (767.65) (649.00) (791.31) (680.30) (751.65) (599.67) (699.27) (597.20) 
  
        
Wageown 17.62 12.23 14.12 10.30 19.35 13.87 22.55 14.92 
 (10.48) (8.31) (7.68) (6.54) (11.10) (9.28) (12.01) (9.57) 
Wagesp 14.04 17.51 12.47 16.57 15.09 19.10 16.14 17.89 
 (10.25) (9.68) (10.56) (10.60) (10.05) (8.57) (9.14) (7.69) 
  
        
Incown 42574.08 20820.29 33179.78 17200.04 49892.95 24321.25 52266.22 25184.64 
 (29316.44) (19278.24) (21723.68) (14774.05) (32726.99) (21390.68) (31972.66) (23989.53) 
Incsp 20782.25 38238.36 17745.51 34627.51 22381.27 43587.71 23919.73 40041.12 
 (16392.57) (22040.66) (13343.99) (21654.79) (16556.24) (23077.03) (19617.04) (19528.24) 
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Appendix T 
 
Figure 3.C Demonstration of Transition between Different Work Statuses 
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Chapter 5  Conclusion and Future Research 
 
 
Sociological studies on social stratifications are, by nature, studies of differentiation processes in 
society. Among various differentiation processes, the life course process is one of the most 
important, as it ties together the development of human life cycle and the influence of social, 
historical, and institutional contexts. The three papers of my dissertation examined life course 
inequality from three different angels: (1) the macro-micro linkage, (2) the intersection of gender 
and race, and (3) the dynamic function of family. Together, these chapters illustrate the 
possibility and importance of studying social stratification from the life course perspective. 
The life course approach to inequality is a major thread tying together the various 
components of my research agenda. I plan to move forward with three lines of future research. 
First, whereas my past work focused mainly on one specific cohort of population, my future 
research will examine whether and how patterns of life course inequality are shaped by historical 
and social contexts. The LCT framework established in Chapter 2 can be applied to the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics data and test whether various mechanisms generating inequality have 
operated in different ways or exerted different influences for different birth cohorts in the US. 
Uncovering such intercohort differences will reveal important structural, cultural and 
demographic processes shaping the trajectories of inequality in the United States. In addition, I 
will combine micro-level panel data from different countries, such as the US, UK, Germany and 
China, to conduct a cross-country comparison of the life course patterns of inequality across 
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different social, political, and institutional configurations.  
The second line of research, growing out of Chapter 4, focuses on the effect of within-family 
interactions in life trajectories. Specifically, I will study how an individual’s life trajectory 
responds to the trajectories of his or her parents and grandparents, spouse, children, siblings, and 
even more remote kin. In conventional stratification research, the characteristics of one’s family 
are often simplified as static measures of “family background.” In contrast, my research 
emphasizes that one’s family does not always stay unchanged in the “background.” Instead, 
one’s own life trajectory may affect, or be affected by, the trajectories of family members. Such 
dynamic within-family interactions could cause co-movements of life trajectories among related 
individuals, enable individuals to insure against potential income risks, shift the distribution of 
power within the family, or alter the patterns and closeness of social interactions between 
different family members. Through this research, I hope to show that adopting the life course 
approach can not only aid our understandings of macrolevel inequality patterns, but also deepen 
our knowledge about the microlevel dynamic functions of individuals and their families. 
The third line of future work involves methodological development. I plan to design 
quantitative methods for drawing causal inference from complex longitudinal data. I will 
establish an integrative model for mapping the “sequence space” of life events (e.g., 
cohabitation, marriage, childbearing, and job changes) to a “life course trajectory” of outcomes 
(e.g., income, wealth, and health). A satisfactory model should account for two critical issues: (1) 
how to identify causal effects of time-varying treatments with the presence of time-varying 
moderators and confounders; (2) how to account for compositional bias due to the selectivity of 
the timing and duration of life events. The successful solution to these issues lies in drawing a 
linkage between trajectory-based models (e.g., Sequence Analysis, Latent Class Analysis, 
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Growth Curve Model) and causal models (e.g., Inverse Probability Weighting, Marginal 
Structural Model). It is my goal to enable such a linkage and build a model that is readily 
applicable to both simulated and real data. 
